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PREFACE
/

In &n1 list of Reyolutionary War leaders the Dame of John Adams would
command a prominent position.

Immediately would come to aind his role in the

pre- and early lears of the conflict when he struggled manfully ia Massachusetts and later in the Continental Congress against the wiles of the
English and the timiditl of his countrymen.

Few would fail to recall his

role as co-negotiator with Franklin and Jal at the peace convention in Paris.
But strangell enough, his role as American minister plenipotentiary to the
United Provinces--the work for which he most wished to be remembered and
through which he believed that he had rendered the greatest service to his
country--would be recalled but vaguell and fleetingll.
There are partial explaDations of this.

Ad.ams, himself, was prevented,

b, the needs of his country and its continued claims upon his tille and energy,
from fulfilling his desire "to collect together in one view my little negotiations."

Both his contemporaries and subsequent historians haYe been

satisfied to acknowledge the immediate benefits of these negotiations without
delving too deeply for details on their procurement.

That indifference

could, among other things, have been related to an awareness that some ot
the pertinent Adams correspondence was not available.

Although theotficial

correspondence and many ot the more private letters of his mission to the
Netherlands had been published, there remained a reasoDable presumption that
a detailed account of the work he undertook in Holland would require access
to manl other letters to friends which had not been published.

Very recently

this deficienc was remedied b the releasin of the Adams Famil Pa ers.

iv
Investigations show that the securing of recognition for the new republic, the suocessful floating of a loan, and the signing of a treaty of
amity and commerce were tasks to try the hardiest soul.

BecaUse of an in-

tricately involved political system and an all-encompassing dependence upon
commerce, the Dutch were little inclined to embroil themselves in further
difficulties with England.

When Adams arrived in Amsterdam, he discovered

that the mynheers knew practically nothing of America.

He responded by be-

coming a propaganda agent par excellence and pitted his abilities in that
field against an active and well-organized pro-English propaganda group.

To

complicate his problem the Prince and many of the highest officers of the
country were pro-English.
and frustrating.
developing

The remaking of Dutch opinion was time-consuming

Although aided by La Vauguyon, the French ambassador, in

anti-F~glish

sentiment, Adams found that same ambassador deter-

mined to prevent him from undertaking any measure to gain recognition for
America.

In this La Vauguyon was only acting upon orders from the French

Foreign Minister who thoroughly distrusted Adams.
From the beginning of his mission Adams was subjected to the machinations of those who should have supported him--Congress, his fellow-minister,
Franklin. and the ministers of America's ally, France.

Because of the

peculiarities of his character and his stubborn advocacy of a militia style

of diplomacy which was anathema at Versailles, he alienated both Franklin
and the powerful French Foreign Minister, Vergennes.

Vergennes, indiffer-

ently supported by Franklin, brought strong influence to bear on Congress
to have Adams recalled or restricted.

Congress, badly torn by internal

strife, was in no position to defend Adams and rather tamely submitted to

v

French insinuations.

Only the slowness of transatlantic communications per-

mitted Adams the opportunity to achieve his purpose before he learned that
his powers were severely curtailed.

In spite of "the fury

or enemies,

as

well as of elements, the subtiety and arrogance of allies, and, what has been
worse than all, the jealousy, envy, and little pranks of friends and copatriots," Adams was successful.

His accomplishment is still considered quite

a feat by the men who have studied it.

"A perfect revolution had thus taken

place in the inner politics of the United Provinces, the English party having
lost ground completely, and the Prince of Orange being oompelled to yield to
public sentiment, which had grown decidedly anti-English."l

"He managed to

write a brilliant chapter in Amerioa's diplomatic history.tt2

His militia

system of diplomacy did secure significant advantages for the United States.
It is the purpose of this paper to reconstruct those "little negotiations"
as they unfolded in the two years Adams spent in the Netherlands.

lFriedrioh Edler, The Dutch Republic and the American Revolution
("Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science,"
Series XIX, No.2; Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1911), p. 228.
2Richard B. Morris, The Peacemakers: The Great Powers and American
Independence (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), p. 131.
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CHAPTER I
/

MINISTER

FOR

PEACE, 1 779-JULY, 1780

"When I go to heaven I shall look down over the battlements with
pleasure upon the stars and stripes wantoning in the wind at The Hague. tI
And the fiercely patriotio and oftentimes truculent John Adams could not resist adding, "There is another triumph in the case, sweeter than that over
our enemies. • • •

It is the triumph of stubborn independence.

of friends and foes."l

Independence

In these few words Adams summed up his twenty-six

month sojourn as a militia diplomat in the Netherlands.

It vas largely be-

cause of his stubborn independenoe that he first had gone to the Netherlands
and it was largely his stubborn independence that brought suooess to his
struggles to win Dutch friendship, a sUbstantial loan, and a treaty of
commerce.
For these tasks Adams thought the traditional style of diplomacy
inadequate.

Its acoepted praotice was to dispatch ministers only to those

foreign oourts at which there was a solid expeotation that they would be
received.

Similarly an application for a loan, other than as part of a

treaty of alliance, would be made only through the proper business channels. 2

Adams advocated and, in the Netherlands, practioed the disruption

of both rules.

When oalled to task for his unorthodox methods by Robert

Livingston, Minister of Foreign Affairs, he baptized his system with his
retort that diplomatists might "consider us a sort of militia and hold
us • • • in some degree of oontempt; but wise men know that militia sometimes

2

gain victories over regular troops even by departing from the rules.,,3

In

its simplest terms, militia diplomacy was a system whereby straightforward,
unequivocating ministers in quest of recognition and financiAl aid ware
sent uninvited to foreign courts.

John Adams proudly remained its principal

exponent and its chief practitioner.

But this penchant for the militia s1s-

tem brought him into conflict with the very men from whom he otherwise should
have expected the greatest co-operation.

These primarily were the Comte de

Vergennes, the French Foreign Secretary, who tried his utmost to have Adams
replaced, and Doctor Franklin, the only duly recognized Amerioan minister in
Europe at the time.
Franklin, with whom Adams was originally expected to work more or less
in tandem, viewed this type of diplomacy with a sort of horror.

"A virgin

state should prese·rve its virgin character, and not go about Buitoring for
alliances, but wait with decent dignity for the application of others.,,4

On

several occasions throughout the period of Adams' activities in the Netherlands some action of the volatile New Englander would spark a verbal exchange
on their views between the two.

Fortunately for Adams' pride, his system

was sucoessful with the Dutch and did secure both recognition and a loan.
He very correctly argued that these objects could never have been accomplished by the traditional methods.

I1If after receiving such advice and

exhortations as I did, I had suspended operations to request instructions, I
should have been forbidden to do what has been done.,,5

Indeed if he had

followed the traditional system, he would not have gone to the Netherlands
in the first place as that country was not requesting a minister and the
commission Adams had received was to participate in a peace negotiation.

3
Even this commission he held only because Vergennes' diplomatic leverage
had been insufficient to outbalance militia advocates and sectional interest
/

groups in Congress in the summer of 1779.

Charles Gravier, Comte de Vergennes, the French Foreign Secretary and
presumed co-negotiator with Adams at the awaited peace convention. was, like
Franklin, the embodiment of traditional diplomacy. 6 His previous experience
with the American commissioners in France,7 of whom too many had been of the
militia persuasion, convinced him that the security of his own diplomatic
negotiations. as well as those of his ally, depended on confining the conduct
of American diplomacy to Franklin's able hands.

Accordingly, in the fall of

1778, when the first possibility of a peace settlement arose. the Comte inquired of Franklin whether he possessed full powers to treat with England
in case of a general pacification.

After carefully studying Franklin's com-

mission, the two ministers agreed that it did not confer that power on the
American plenipotentiary.

In December, 1778, Vergennes. therefore, directed

his ambassador in Washington to secure the requisite authorization for
Franklin.

8 Dutifully, Gerard informed the President of Congress that a

negotiation for peace was possible and that the king desired Congress to
crant their plenipotentiary full instructions and extensive powers for taking
part in the negotiations. 9 At the time, however, Congress was so preoccupied
with internecine conflicts that the request went unheeded. Several weeks
later Gerard submitted a second brief but urgent request. 10
Congress then proceeded to draw up instructions but shortly became
involved in a dispute over the article on boundaries.

Gerard reminded them

that France's guarantees under the alliance applied only to independence

4
per !! and not to boundaries.

Any decision concerning these could not be

made unilaterally but must be decided jointly by the allies. ll

When his first

remarks proved ineffectual, Gerard again memorialized congre~ and insisted
that not only the welfare of the country but the general good of the alliance
required an immediate appointment.

12

Gerard's anxiety was based on his fear

that a settlement would soon transpire but that, until they had granted
Franklin full powers, Congress would neither look kindly upon nor easily accept any negotiation made by the Doctor.

Gerard personally agreed with his

chief that a proper procedure would be that Franklin negotiate under French
auspices and then transmit the results for ratification.

He was, however,

firmly convinced that the members of Congress would not view it in that light.
On the contrary, he wrote, they husbanded power with so much reserve and
jealousy that they would very probably consider it a crime if Franklin were
to negotiate prior to authorization.

Franklin's reputation in Philadelphia

did not appear to Gerard strong enough to withstand the Charge. 13
Negotiations plodded on through May and June, 1779.

The Congress

occupied itself with the details of instructions for the peace negotiator,
and Gerard occupied himself with attempts to secure a
unbound by detailed instructions.

s~tisfactory

Franklin was the man in mind.

minister
In mid-

July, the opportunity arose for Gerard to inject remarks concerning the French
court's approbation of the Doctor and the insinuation that, with such a person as minister, the court would have no further occasion to withhold any
information which might be of mutual interest.

14 But the struggle to secure

Franklin's appointment was a losing battle and Gerard knew it.

A rew days

later he informed Vergennes that neither the anti-Galli cans nor his own

5
followers had much confidence in the Doctor and a new man would be sent from
the states as plenipotentiary for peace. 15
Gerard next concentrated on the instructions being
minister.

dra~

for the future

Due to his influence, Congress changed from the demand that sover-

eignty and independence must be tracknowledged fl to the lesser stipulation that
they were to be "assured" before the treaty was drawn. 16

He also secured

provision for a truce under specified conditions and for greater moderation

B,y August 13, a committee com-

in the demands on boundaries and fisheries.

pleted drafting the instructions, and some member furnished Gerard with a
copy before they were presented to the Congress.

The ambassador was not

completely satisfied but felt that on the whole they were not unfavorable to
France. l ? Congress debated and then unanimously approved of the instructions
for negotiating peace.

Congress immediately after prepared instructions for

a minister to negotiate a treaty of commerce with Great Britain.
of these instructions, also, Gerard procured.
French Foreign Secretary.

18 A summary

He forwarded both sets to the

Incorrectly, however, he stated

t~~t

the pleni-

potentiary would communieate his instructions to the French ministry and
act in concert with it. 19

Such a directive was not included in the set given

to Adams and occasioned one of the first clashes between that minister and
Vergennes.
Once the instructions were settled, the choice of a minister invited
extensive caballing.

Gerard and his partisans favored Jay and the anti-

Gallicans supported John Adams.

On September 24 a proposal was brought to

charge Adams and Franklin jointly with the peace commission but too many
members opposed and the meeting adjourned.

The following day Adams and Jay

6

were nominated.

Franklin was not mentioned by either party.

Adams' cause

was aided when his partisans produced in the assembly hall a courtesy farewell letter from Vergennes to Adams on the latter's quitting/France the
previous spring.

Because of this letter some members were inclined to form

a highly favorable impression of Adams and to believe that he would be acceptable to Vergennes.

20

Nevertheless, the first ballotings ended in a dead-

lock between Adams and Jay.

Then, by secret prearrangement, a resolution

was passed to appoint a minister to negotiate a treaty of amity and commerce
with Spain.

By this maneuver Congress could elect Jay as minister to Spain

and Adams as minister plenipotentiary for peace and for a commercial treaty
with England. 21

On October 20, the two commissions and the accompanying

instructions were transmitted to Adams.

Although he had spent the entire

fall in Boston and Braintree and knew very little of the intentions and
desires of a goodly number of the members of Congress, he accepted on November 4 and prepared to sail directly from Boston on November 13, in the
French frigate Sensible.

22

The selection of minister was one at which Vergennes could scarcely
be overjoyed.

His p':.)rsonal knowledge of Adams' passion for candor and com-

plete distaste for diplomatic niceties boded ill for future co-operation
between the two men.

Although Vergennes, in 1778-1779, had professed no

interest in the internal frictions among the American commissioners, he was
well aware that Adams had favored Arthur Lee23 in the unpleasantness between
Lee and Franklin. 24

Furthermore, the correspondence of Gerard had given him

a distorted picture of the sentiments of Adams.

This for two reasons.

Gerard received most of his information from his partisans and so forwarded

7
biased opinions.

Also, he frequently had reference to Sam Adams but used

only the family name and the resulting ambiguity further discredited Adams
in the Count's eyes. 25 That Vergennes had been prejudiced by these sources
was evidenced in his original instructions to the Chevalier de la Luzerne
when dispatching him to replace Gerard in Philadelphia in July, 1779.
\1e clearly perceive that an opposition party exists in Congress which
if not sold to England, nevertheless favors the views of that power,
and which seeks to establish and to bring into credit principles diametrically opposed to those which form the basis and spirit of our
treaties with the United States • • • 2~ It is indubitable that, among
them, may be counted Mr. John Adams.
Adams possibly had some premonition of Vergennes' attitUde.

Years

later when writing his autobiography, Adams noted that he had realized that
Congress had disappointed the French ministry both by its failure to appoint
Franklin as minister for peace and by its commission for a commercial treaty
with England.

He evidently did not realize that Vergennes considered him

pro-English and, thereby, he missed the major point of Vergennes' antipathy
and a primary cause of that minister's great concern over the Adams' appointmente

He quickly "determined to proceed with the utmost caution, delibera-

tion, and prudence; to do nothing which would excite the smallest jealousy
in the French court • • • • ,,27 Consequently, upon his arrival in Paris
(February 9), he arranged for a formal call upon Vergennes and was courteously received on February 11, 1780.

The next day Adams very correctly

submitted in writing a summary of the nature of his commissions and promised
to "take no steps of consequence" in fulfillment of these commissions "without consulting his Majesty's ministers."

At the same time he requested the

Count's opinion as to whether he should acquaint the British ministry with
his commission for peace, publish it in the gazettes, or whether he should

8
.
28
"remain on the reserve" as he had done thus far.
tions would have troubled Vergennes.

At any time these sugges-

Coming as they did while England was

secretly fishing for separate negotiations with spain29 and ~e French ministry itself was discouraged by the ill-luck of Admiral d'Estaing at
Savannah, the propositions worried Vergennes in the extreme.

Nor was the

Foreign Secretary mollified by Adams' maladroit wording of a request for
permission to reside in France.

In spite of his good intentions of using

"caution, deliberation, and prudence," Adams aggravated by informing the
Comte that neither commission, instruction, nor intimation of Congress dictated his residence in any particular place or country.3D
On his part, Vergennes thoroughly ruffled Adams' temper.

In answer to

the questions posed by Adams, he insisted th.:"lt the minister keep his mission
secret, above all to the court of London--a point in which AdalDs tentatively
acquiesced but later took issue.

More immediately he was irritated by

Vergennes' blunt refusal to speak further of official business until Gerard's
return as "he is probably the bearer of your instructions and he will certainly have it in his power to give me explanations concerning the nature and
extent of your commissions",,3l

Incensed at the implication, but determined

to appear cool, Adams sent copies of his commissions and that of Francis
Dana, secretary to the American peace commission. 32

Nevertheless, the self-

righteous New Englander resented being thought ignorant of the usages of
diplomacy and determined to prove to Vergennes that he did know what was
proper and that he was not going to be

c~valierly

treated.

With the pointed

remark that he presumed Vergennes would "not consider it proper that I should
corr.municate them,lt he declined to give any information regarding his
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instructions, other than that they did not militate against the treaties with
France. 33

Aside from the insulting nature of Vergennes' remarks, Adams was

most anxious that the court of France should not know his in'tructions as he
was dissatisfied with the sections on boundaries and fisheries.

He rightly

surmised that Vergennes would urge him to settle for the very minimum those
instructions would allow.

Even more disastrous, he considered Vergennes

capable of giving the information to the British negotiators and encouraging
them to seek more than Adams intended to relinquish.

On

his part, Adams was

determined to stretch the instructions to their maximum. 34

Thus within a

fortnight of his arrival a mutual distrust between French and American
ministers developed.
On the occasion of transmitting his commissions, Adams called to
Vergennes' attention the fact that all America knew of his mission, and, in
all probability, so did England. 35
appeared to him pointless.

An effort to conceal the information

Unable to assail the justice of the argument,

Vergennes promised to publish the peace commission in the official gazette
when Adams was presented to the king and royal family.36

The American

minister would then be free to give it greater publicity through the Dutch
papers.

~Vergennes

reserved for himself the right to see the proposed

article before Adams transmitted it to the gazettes.)

The commission to

negotiate a treaty of commerce was explicitly excluded from any permission to
publish.

Vergennes counselled great precaution that no information relative

to that commission should reach England.

His closing remark on the matter,

"You will no doubt easily feel the motives which induce me to advise you to
take this precaution, and it would be needless to explain them," remained in

10
the back of Adams' mind for three months before erupting in a far more fiery
exchange.
For the time being Adams 8greed to Vergennes' plans ort publication
although he failed to see the purpose of concealing the commercial treat7
commission. 37 He was of the opinion that the United States had as muoh right
to form a commercial treat7 as to negotiate a peace.,s

On March

7. 1780. he

was presented to the king, but the promised article in the official Gazette
de France failed to materialize.

As Adams was honor bound to insert no notice

on his own behalf in &n7 paper prior to the official announcement. he
searched the columns of every issue until the wait became unbearable.

On the

twenty-first, he inquired of Vergennes whether the omission were an oversight or due to a change of plane with which he was unacquainted. 39 Ten
da7s later. Vergennes found time to explain that upon inquiry he had learned
that placing an article in the Gazette de France was not the custom, and
that, to avoid singularity, he had not inserted the account of Adams'
presentation.

If Adams desired, Vergennes would have a cop7 of the draft

article he now enclosed published in the unofficial Mercure

de

France and

then Adams could have it repeated in the foreign gazettes. 40 Adams would
have preferrjd the bolder plan of communicating his powers immediately to the

.

~

English but bowed in the name of peace.

He immediately forwarded in forma-

tion on the commission to Edmund Jenings at Brussels and suggested to him
that he have some paragraphs from Dutch gazettes inserted into the English
papers.

In fact, he was to keep the commission in the public mind by ref-

ercense. to it now and then.

Jenings was, of course, to avoid using Adams'

name as the originator of these articles. 42

11

Dissatisfied with marking time until peace negotiations got underway-an event of which he saw no immediate indications--Adams began casting about
for other interests.

On

the whole these were so difficult t6' find and his

activities so limited that he inquired of Lovell,4 3 the most active member
of the Committee for Foreign Affairs. whether Congress intended to keep him
in Europe.

He complained, ttA situation so idle and iaactive is not agreeable
44
to my genius."
He had very little in common with Franklin and never
troubled to communicate his commission or very much of his business to his

older cOlleague. 45 For a time Arthur Lee and Ralph lzard46 were in Paris
and Adams enjoyed his discussions and disagreements with them. 47 The preponderance of his time he devoted to collecting pertinent information for the
benefit of Congress and to publishing anything he could for the benefit of
Europe.

To the President of Congress he addressed letters by the score,

sometimes writing three or four in one day.

48 In addition to those things

which he heard, or read, or surmised and passed on to Philadelphia, he
clipped any amount of materials from the assortment of papers and pamphlets
which he procured.
could.

Additional information he solicited from whomever he

To La Fayette he

e~pressed

the view that neither of them could render

Congress a "more useful service" than to collect intelligence "with precision
and transmit it without delay ...49
A task equally important. to his mind, was the publishing of true
information to confute· the false within Europe.

Adams deplored England's

ability to give "her fictions the color of probability • • • and to fabricate
and export large quantities of this merchandise," particularly as fIshe finds
more customers to take them off her hands than she ought. considering how

12
illicit the traffic is. ,,50 He early applied to Edme Genet, editor of the
Hercure de France and intimate of the court, for the "exact truth" to counteract the large quantities of political lies being spread. 5l denet"laid the
request before Vergennes who directed that Adams be invited to seek his information directly from the Foreign Secretary who would be ready to satisfy
his inquiries. 52

Vergennes apparently saw greater advantages in supplying

Adams with accurate information than in permitting him to siphon off bits
from whence he would.

Adams in turn sent some pieces to be printed in

Genet's Mercure but preferred to secure publication in Dutch and English
papers.

Entre to Dutch publications could be managed easily by F. W. C.

Dulll8.s 53 at The Hague as he was personally acquainted with a large number ot
the editors of the most influential papers in that country.

Adams' closest

collaborator in all this work was Edmund Jenings at Brussels. 54

Not only

did Jenings have Adams' commission published but innumerable other pieces
which were sent to him for that purpose.

Jenings, through a friend in

London, could secure the printing of many articles in the English papers.
This appealed greatly to Adams who rejoiced at the good effect it had in
France and more particularly in America to see such things in English. 55

On

occasion Adams would send some of his reflections to be inserted "in the name
of a Dutchman, Swiss, Frenchman, Spaniard, or American or whom you will ft just
80

the sentiments the,. contained would tfreach the eyes of Englishmene".56

Adams offered apologies for laying burdens on Jenings "without number" but
excused the imposition because "1 cannot and will not be idle.
are saving our

1 think: we

count~ in this way.,,57 Jenings, in turn, encouraged Adams

to have his remarks on various topics translated into French and sent to the

13
different courts of Europe and- to the leading men of Holland where he was
sure they would do much goOd. 58
That the irascible but proudly patriotic,;and boundlessly energetic
Adams could remain in France indefinitely without giving or taking offense
was too much to expect of either Adams or Vergennes.

Congress' resolution

of March 18, 1780 depreciating loan-office certificates at the rate of forty
to one occasioned the first outbreak of hostilities.

Early in June, t1. de

Chaumont, friend and landlord of Franklin and respected figure at the court,
fearing that the resolution of March 18 would seriously affect French commercial interests, called upon Adams to discuss it.

Adams contended that the

policy was "wise and just" and that France had no cause for complaint.
France. he argued, derived great good from the American Revolution and,
actually, was under an obligation to the United States as England would be
too powerful for the House of Bourbon alone.

These were hardly sentiments

calculated to endear him to the persons with whom he was supposed to cooperate.

Chaumont was indignant and forwarded a report of the conversation

to Vergennes. 59

In the meantime the papers published the news of the pro-

jected depreciation and thereby caused a clamor.
\~ai

Adams was invited to the

d'Orsay and spent some time in discussion about it with Vergennes and

his under-secretary. Joseph-Matthias de Rayneval.

60

After he had returned to his lodgings, Adams enclosed to Vergennes a
note on the matter from Richard Cranch, Adams' brother-in-law, and also a
newspaper from Massachusetts which reported that the state legislature had
adopted the congressional resolution.
concerned with

regulations~erica

61 Vergennes replied that he was not

made for her own people but that she should

14
except foreigners from the law or make arrangements for their proper indemnification.

The bill as it stood would, he insisted, work havoc with French

commercial interests.

He had, therefore, directed Luzerne t6 represent these

facts to Congress in the strongest light possible. 62 Adams begged Vergennes
to hold up the message until a full explanation of the measure could be prepared. 63 He importuned Franklin to support his request for a delay as he
feared Tory sympathizers and other interested parties could capitalize on
the situation if Luzerne contested the measure. 64
These requests dispatched, he penned a lengthy explanation to Vergennes oontesting French rights to exchange paper certificates dollar for
dollar in gold and silver as Vergennes had desired.

In what he later 'termed

"a decent, though, in a few expressions, a gently tingling rejoinder,,,65 he
maintained that France had little if ,anything to lose.
by European merchants was paid

~ither

Most produoe shipped

in cash or in bills of exchange and

there were certainly not more than $10,000 (he did not aotually know of
51,000) in certificates held by Frenchmen.

Furthermore, the French merchants

had made enormous profits in the United States.

66 He sent a copy of this

letter to Franklin requesting to be corrected if there were any inaccuracies
in detail, but asserting his correctness on the underlying principles. 67
Vergennes was more than a little annoyed--though hardly to the point of
falling "into a passion" or writing a Itpassiona te and ungentlemanly reply"
as Adams later described it. 68

Adams was curtly informed that the explana-

tion had not changed Vergennes' sentiments but that the Comte felt further
discussion between them on the subject would be superfluous.

To the last

part of the statement at least Adams agreed. 69 To Franklin the Comte ex-
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plained that he could not revoke the orders to Luzerne as Adams' arguments
were only "abstract reasonings, hypotheses, and calculations" lacking in a
firm foundation and "not really applicable to French subject..e'." 70·
Neither man, however, vas quite satisfied to let the matter drop.
Each apparently felt the necessity of justifying himself to some one.
gennes naturally chose Franklin.

Ver-

After condemning Adams' point of view,

Verp:ennes suggested to Franklin that the King was persuaded that Franklin
held a view different from Adams--at least in the resolution's application
to foreigners.

He intimated that Congress would also differ from Adams and

"know how to prize the friendship of France. n7l
the waters as well as he could.

Franklin attempted to oil

Confessing an inability to understand the

financial fine points of it, he promised Vergennes that Congress would give
the French merchants full justice, and he assured the Foreign Secretary that
Congress' view differed "widely from those that seemed to be expressed by
Mr. Adams.,,72
A very proud and truculent Adams had been trespassing on Franklin's
territory and he knew it, but he cODsidered himself justified.

Informing

Congress that Vergennes had first solicited his opinion, he sent copies of
the correspondence directly to Huntington, the President of Congress. 73 He
explained his position and bluntly stated:
I am determined to give my sentiments to his majesty's ministers
whenever they shall see cause to ask thom, although it is not within
my department, until I shall be forbidden by Congress, and to this
end I shall go to the court often enou~4to give them an opportunity
to ask them, if they wish to know them.
He believed that he had demonstrated the "injustice and impracticabUitylt
of paying France in specie.

He, therefore, had resented Vergennes' sarcasm
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and so returned him "irony for irony, and sarcasm for sarcasm."

He fully

expected that this mode of reply would effect either Vergennes' abandonment
of that style of negotiation with him or his own recall.

Fr0M the perspec-

tive of 1811, he reckoned his recall to have been the motive of Vergennes'
action.

By the recall of Adams, Franklin would probably receive the commis-

sian for peace and Vergennes would have "our fisheries, our limits, and a
truce secured to his mind.,,?5
Congress, having received Adams' letter before it heard from Vergennes, resolved to inform its minister of its approval of his "industrious
attention to the interests of the United states abroad."

Lovell, in trans-

mitting a copy of the resolution to Adams, assured him that there was no
danger of overexpressing the satisfaction of congress.?6
with their approval, especially as he was "prepared in

Adams was pleased

tfiiil

receive from Congress resolutions of a different nature.,,7?

own mind to
Indeed, he

strongly expected to receive in the near future some less laudatory comments
from Philadelph1a--and with good reason.

The agreement of June 30 to end

their discussion of the redemption of loan-office certificates had signalled only a truce, not a peace settlement, between Adams and Vergennes.
Within a fortnight, Adams, with irrepressible zeal, again unnecessarily challenged Vergennes while that minister was greatly concerned with
his own problems of keeping the allies united. 78 Gratuitously Adams penned
some four thousand words introducing them as "a few observations upon the
present conjuncture of affairs."

Remarking that France's own advantage lay

in the same direction as America's, he explained the necessity of placing
the French fleet in Amerioan ooastal waters and he outlined a plan for its
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deployment.

A French fleet cruising the American ooast, he suggested, would

oounteraot that portion of public opinion which inclined toward England and
was critical of the laxity of the French efforts. 79

Vergenn~s very cour-

teously gave the plenipotentiary information on de Ternay's and Rochambeau's
destinations and on their general directives.

He assured Adams that the

king was most mindful of the American cause even without special solioitation from Congress, and he expressed a hope that America would respond with
80
suitable sentiments and full co-operation.
Before Vergennes had the opportunity to send that information, the
commerce-conscious New Englander had taken another tack.

Referring to

Vergennes' letter of February 24, he reoalled to the Foreign Secretary that
gentleman's advice to keep the commission for a commercial treaty secret for
reasons which Adams would readily sense.

He now commented that upon the most

mature reflection he remained firmly convinced that these powers should be
made known to the British.
him to think so.

He thereupon listed eleven reasons that induced

These reasons centered chiefly on his expectations of the

effect the information would have upon both the English people, who he believed longed for an honorable peace, and upon the government which would
then be forced to explain "their real intentions concerning America." 81
Vergennes had no intention of permitting Adams to make his oommission
known.

lIe, therefore, took time to answer each of Adams' reasons with a

countervailing reason of his own.

"To be solicitous about a treaty of corn-

merce," he introduced his remarks, "before peace is established is like being
busy about the furnishing of a house before the foundation is laid."

An

offer of a treaty of commerce would be tantamount to an alliance--rather
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ridiculous "when the war is raging in all its fury."

He agreed that England

might desire peaoe and good commercial relations, but pointed out that very
few talked of independence, and these few did so more as a ma(tter ot opposition than ot conviction since not a single motion to grant independence was
ever made in Parliament.

The only sensible retlection he could tind in

Adams' brief was the eighth which acknowledged that an immediate announcement
in the tace of the English victory at Charleston would be inopportune.

He

dismissed the arguments for publication as ridiculous since England, once
independence was recognized, would quickly enough remember to proTide for
commercial relations.

In conclusion Vergennes requested that Adams, it he

still, in spite of the very solid reasons given him, remained unconvinced,
should communicate his remarks and Vergennes' answers to Congress and await
its decision.

Vergennes, in the meantime, planned to communicate hie posi-

tion through Luzerne, confident that Congress would hold the official French
position

wort~

of attention.

82 To this Adams conceded that Congress would

beyond doubt agree with Vergennes that the communication should only be made
in union with France.

Although he retained his stated opinions, Adams de-

cided to su8pend any thought of a communication previous to a specific
authorization

f~om Congres8 or the French ministry.83

In spite of this concession to Vergennes and of the acknowledgment
that a communication would hold no advantage commensurate to the inconvenience of acting without French support, the plenipotentiary could not resist
contradicting some of the remarks Vergennes had made.

The majority of the

English people, he reasserted, desired peace; motions, if he recalled accurately, had been made in both Lords and Commons to grant independence;
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granting independence and making a treaty of reciprocity would be an honorable
and advantageous peace for England.

84

Checkmated in that area for the time, Adams moved inteS' another.

The

day after he promised to suspend action on his special commission for commerce, he reverted to Vergennes' letter of July 20 and the remark therein
that the king "without having been solicited by Congress, has taken effectual
measures to support the cause of America.,,85

Without either prudence or

necessity, he directly challenged Vergennes' statement by recalling to the
minister's mind previous congressional solicitation for naval assistance
from France.

Unabashedly, he proceeded to make a further solicitation.

On

the supposition that the Admiral de Ternay might meet the English fleet under
Admiral Graves and the battle be a draw, he suggested that either de Guichen
in the West Indies dispatch ships to reinforce de Ternay or that the king
dispatch additional ships from Europe.

If. immediately on top of their

recent exchange, Vergennes could have borne this piece of gratuitous advice,
he surely would have decided that the limit had been reached when he read
the following statement:
I am so convinced by experience of the absolute necessity of more
consultations and communications between his majesty's ministers
and the ministers of Congress, that I am determined to omit no opportunity of communicating my sentiments to your excellency upon
everything that appears to me of importance to the common cause
in which I can do it with propriety; and the communication shall
be direct in person or by letter
your excellency, without the
intervention of any third person.

sg

This was militia diplomacy incarnate.

With apparently complete unawareness

of the rebuffs he had already received, Adams went on to offer his "poor
opinion and advice to his majesty's minister upon anything that relates to
the United States or the common cause whenever they shall be asked. flB7
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Vergennes, who normally took a week or ten days to answer a communication from Adams, curtly responded to this message within two days.

Not

troubling to conceal his irritation, he bluntly informed Mr./Adams that
Franklin alone was the accredited minister from the United states and with
88
him alone would Vergennes treat of matters concerning the United States.
Thereupon he informed Franklin of the altercation and sent to him copies of
the offending correspondence and his replies with the request that they be
forwarded to Congress.

He frankly added that he did not think--and presumed

Congress would not--that Adams had "that conciliatory spirit which is necessary for the important and delicate business with which he is entrusted.,,89
Franklin took the side of Vergennes, agreeing with him on this occasion more
wholeheartedly than on the former.

He assured the Foreign Secretary that

clearly it was Adams' "indiscretion alone. and not from any instructions
received by him. that he has given such just cause of displeasure."

As for

himself, he disavowed being a party to the correspondence as he knew only
what he read in the newspapers of Adams' business.

He bluntly declared. "I

live upon terms of civility with him. not of intimacy.,,90
In compliance with Vergennes' request. Franklin addressed the material
to Huntington with a few comments of his own.

In the first place. Adams

"having nothing else here wherewith to employ himself, he seems to have endeavored supplying what he may suppose my negotiations defective in." Furthermore, the offense Adams had given was one of the expected inconveniences
of having more than one minister at any court.

It was a matter for Congress

to decide as to who was correct since he and Adams differed.

He was deter-

mined to continue his efforts to please the French court and he presumed
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that both Congress and the majority of people in America would approve of his
policy.

Adams, on the other hand, believed America was too free in expressing

her gratitude as France was, in the Adams opinion, more obli~ed to the
United states than the United States to France.

Franklin regretted the

growing opinion in Paris that the Americans were diverging from the alliance
and envisioning a reconciliation with England.

He refrained from naming

Adams but pointed out that while he himself had been busily fighting this
opinion, some Americans had been "indiscreet in their conversations. n91

The

day after writing this lengthy epistle, hearing that a boat was about to
sail but that it would not be able to take packets, Franklin dashed off a
brief note to Congress.

In it he merely remarked that the court remained

favorable although "some displeasure" had lately been given. 92
tion he left to Luzerne.

The explana-

He did not dispatch his first letter until October

and then, before sending it, inquired if Adams would care to write something
to efface the bad impression the correspondence must give.

Adams, baving

long before sent copies of the entire affair to Congress, rejected the
offer. 93
Vergennes felt that he had too much at stake to permit the matter to
quietly fade away.

He sent Luzerne copies of the complete correspondence

and directed that dignitary to confer confidentially with Huntington and the
leaders in Congress in order to effect a re-evaluation of Adams' abilities.
For the guidance of Congress, Vergennes sent along his own summation.

"This

plenipotentiary will do nothing but raise difficulties and cause vexations."
After digressing on Adams' charaoter faults, he concluded that the minister
was tlincapable of handling political questions and especially of treating
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with the representatives of great powers, who, assuredly, will not accommodate themselves either to the tone or logic of Mr. Adams.,,94 Congress, after
deliberation upon these representations, directed Huntington/to remonstrate
with Adams.

He did so, but attributing Adams' imprudence to his zeal and

assiduity, made his rebuke extremely mild. 95
As far as Adams was concerned, however, the tiff with Vergennes left
him little choice but to leave the country or to forswear further participation in Franco-American affairs until a peace negotiation did materialize.
He was not of a temperament to ever achieve the latter.

On

the other hand,

he was not the man to forsake a mission and return home without an official
recall.

Fortunately, circumstances were already in progress which would

provide him with a refuge.

For some years, he had rather closely followed

events in the Netherlands and was very much aware that a group there had long
desired a closer communication with America.

He had been in Paris as a mem-

ber of the American commission when Dumas notified that body of a plan which
he had received from an Amsterdam official for a treaty between the two
republics. 96

While Adams was still in Paris on that business and in close

contact with Arthur Lee, another member of the commission and a militia enthusiast, Lee declared that Holland would lend America money out of revenge
if Britain continued interfering with Dutch trade. 97 Upon Adams' return to
the United States in the late summer of 1779,98 his official report to
Congress dealt with the possibility of closer connections with the Dutch.
He noted the similarity of manners, of religion, and, to an extent, of constitution between the two republics. 99
those of leading Dutch patriots.

In general his remarks corroborated

Like Van der Capellen, he thought it
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would be well to have a minister in the Netherlands although such a minister
very probably would not be openly received for some time. 100 However, a
minister-designate, even while he remained incognito, could acquaint himself
with the customs of that land and at the same time make America a little
better

kno~~

to the Dutch people.

He should also have an opportunity to lay

the foundations for a future 10an. 10l
Upon his return to France in February, 1780, Adams resumed his interest in the Dutch.

Shortly he informed Huntington that English depredations

on Dutch shipping were changing the attitude both of people and of governmente

Repeating his earlier contention that a minister could effect much

good in that country, he added that such a person sent directly from Congress
might obtain sizable sums if he applied to well-established Dutch commercial
houses. 102 As though with a premonition of his own forthcoming activity, he
sought from a friend the names of the principal mercantile houses of Amsterdam which were reputed friendly to the United states. 103 Toward the end of
March he devoted one of his lengthy reports to Congress exclusively to a discussion of the rapidly deteriorating relations between England and the
United Provinces. l~

Interestingly enough, he prefaced the message with the

comment that he felt it his duty to keep Congress informed relative to events
in the Netherlands until an official minister arrived. 105

In subsequent

correspondence he endeavored to fulfill his self-appointed task, and, in
addition to his own comments, he transmitted copies of petitions, memorials,
and responses in plentiful supply.
It was largely on the instigation of Van der Capellen, probably
fortified by Adams' communication, and most certainly by the Adams' party

24

of militia diplomatists, that Henry Laurens had been commissioned in the fall
of 1779 to negotiate both a loan and a treaty of amity and commerce in the
Netherlands. l06

Circumstances prevented Laurens from leaving the states for

several months after he received his commission.

Concerned about his de-

layed departure, on June 20, 1780, Congress resolved that, until Laurens
was enabled to reach the Netherlands, his commission for a loan should be
transferred to John Adams.

The commission to form a treaty of amity and

commerce was to be held in abeyance until Laurens could inform himself on
affairs in Holland and advise Congress regarding the terms for the proposed
treaty. 107 Laurens finally embarked on the Mercury but was taken with a
packet of his private papers on September 3, 1780.

He was confined to the

Tower of London on a charge of treason and only released in 1782.

Adams

had been apprised of Laurens' appointment and subsequent delays, and he
knew of Congress' interest in negotiations in the Netherlands.

When he de-

cided to visit Amsterdam, he knew that Laurens had not yet arrived, but he
did not know of his capture nor did he know until September 17, 1780 of his
own interim appointment to that country. loB Consequently, his determination
to leave France and spend some time in the Netherlands was entirely his own
choice and the outgrowth of his militia instincts and not the result of any
intimation from Philadelphia.
On the other hand, his decision to travel there was not a sudden

and unpremeditated one.

Almost from the time of his arrival in Paris, he

had intended to go to Holland at his earliest convenience and see if something could not be transacted there to make Amerioa less dependent on
France for pecuniary aid and for military supplies. 109 Another motive,
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which he carefully did not broadcast but which made the projected trip more
enticing, was the realization that for a few weeks at least he could enjoy
more independence and be less obliged to consult the Comte d'Vergennes and
Doctor Franklin on his every move. 110 Consequently, already in March, 1780,
he applied to Veri:';ennes for a traveller's permit to the Netherlands.

Ver-

gennes, very concerned about Adams' declaration that he could reside anywhere and troubled by his own belief that the new minister favored separate
negotiations with England, was loathe to see Adams leave Paris.

Therefore,

requesting that Adams remain nearby where he could be consulted on the matters of his mission, Vergennes offered the inducements of inviting him to
attend court on the weekly ambassador's day and even to dine with the
Comte. lll

At intervals Adams repeated his request for a passport but Ver-

Gennes insisted that he wait at least until mid_summer. ll2

During the quiet

period of early July, between the disagreement over the depreciation of paper
money and that over the communication of his powers, Adams again proposed a
few weeks in Amsterdam.

This time he was advised to

~it

because of poasible

negotiations as a result of Cumberland's mission to Spain. 113 When it became
known that Cumberland was compelled to await further instructions from the
Court of St. James, Vergennes decided that Adams could make the muchpostponed journey before negotiations would again be under way.l14
(iuickly availing himself of the opportunity, Adams arranged his
travel before Vergennes could retract the permission.

ifuen Adams left Paris

he was headed for a country perplexed by a precarious political situation
and burdened with an unbelievably complicated governmental struoture.

Within

its confines there existed all degrees of partisanship from the strongly
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pro-English followers of the Stadholder, William V, to the equally partisan
pro-French liberals commonly referred to as the Patriots. l15

There was but

one thing on which all could agree--the need for Dutch neutr'lity in the
current war.

As neutrals the Netherlanders could enjoy the rich carrier

trade furnished by the belligerent powers and by other neutral countries.
The moment they joined either side their ships would be fair game to the navy
of their opponent.

They would, thereby, forfeit the trade of one or the

other belligerent, jeopardize the cargoes of neutrals, and endanger their
own cargoes.
Unfortunately for them, as soon as France entered the war in 1778,
their strategic geographical position and the maritime requirements of the
two neighboring belligerents, in union with their own inability to defend
themselves either by land or by sea, made the maintenance of neutrality a
problem of major proportions.

France was in dire need of ship's timbers

and other naval supplies, normally obtained from Scandinavia and the Baltic
area, in order to build up her navy and decrease England's superiority on
the high seas.

The Netherlands was the obvious answer to the procurement

problem and the French ministry determined to utilize to the full the Dutch
nlerchant fleet. 116

England, on the contrary, could ill afford to have the

French navy increased.

This would become especially true after Spain entered

the conflict as the combined French and Spanish fleets slightly outnumbered
her own. ll7

Neither could she afford to have the Dutch transporting muni-

tiona of war--which they were doing on a grand scale--to French ports or to
st. Eustatius for the use of the American army.

118

English officers,

therefore, often boarded Dutch vessels and not infrequently haled them into
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Bnglish ports as prizes 'When cohtraband or naval supplies were found in the
cargo.

The British ministry, in spite of a special treaty of 1674 to the

contrary with the Netherlands,

ll9 determined to confiscate all
/ ship's timbers

and naval stores carried by the Dutch if the latter could not in some way be
brought to give up the trade in these.
The couaencement of French hostilities in June, 1778, rendered Dutch
neutrality, as England understood
government.

t~e

word, extremely urgent to the British

To encourage peaceful co-operation from the trade-oriented

Dutch, in mid-summer of 1778, Sir Joseph Yorke, the English ambassador at
The Hague, tried to strike a bargain with the merohants of Amsterdam.

By an

ancient treaty, signed in 1678 and never abrogated, a hostile act by any
country against Great Britain was to be considered a casus foederis and
entitled England to call upon the United Provinces for assistance.

Yorke

offered to barter England's rigbts to assistance by the treaty of alliance
and even to discontinue interference with Dutch shipping to the French

~vest

Indies if the Netherlands would add naval stores to the list of contraband.
':'he offer came too late; the Dutch had already begun to enjoy the fruits of
a rich trade and Sir Joseph was turned down.

British cruisers then began

detaining Dutch vessels in the English Channel and neighboring waters.

B.y

September, twenty-nine ships had been taken; in October, another fortyt woo 120

Resenting this encroachment on their rights as guaranteed by the

1674 treaty, the Dutch presented a protest to Parliament. Great Britain
promised to grant the full immunities of the treaty to the Dutch if they
would simply a.dd nava.l stores to the list of contraband.

In addition, the

English government offered to pay the appraised value of the timbers or
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supplies taken as well as oompensation for the delay and damages to the
oarriers oooasioned by their detent10n. 121 Under the influence of Dutoh
merchants, primarily those ot Amsterdam, the Dutch government rejected these
English proposals.122
In the meantime the French ministry through their ambassador took
steps to prevent their supplies being diverted by England.

The Duke de la

vauguyon123 threatened that the French would board Dutoh vessels and treat
them in the same manner as the English were treating them if the states
General did not take adequate steps to maintain neutrality. 124- This could
only mean that they must furnish convoys for their trade to Franoe.

In an

effort to maintain their neutral status, the Dutch on November 19, 1778
provided for convoying most goods including various naval provisions but excluding ship timbers.

The compromise was satisfactory to neither belligerent.

The British ordered the seizure ot all naval stores; the Duke de la Vaupyon
warned that the French decree of July. 1778, establishing a six-month trial
period on the prinoiple" of free ships make tree goods would be suspended
immediately upon expiration if the States General did not grantunlim1ted
convoy. 125 As the January deadline approached. The Hague made vague provisions for future unlimited convoys to become ettective when means permitted.
On the strength

ot this La Vauguyon granted a brief extension until March 1,

1779. Since the Dutch continued to proorastinate, the new French decree
proscribing enemy goods on neutral ships and levying a special tax on Dutoh
ships entering Frenoh ports went into effect on March 1.

However, the ships

of two Dutch cities--Amsterdam and Baarlem--were permitted to enter French
ports tax free in return for the eftorts of their citizens to procure

unlimited convoy.

This exemption not only assured France of continued im-

ports from the Netherlands. but served to pressure the merchants of other
.
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Dutch cOllUllercial cities to take measures to secure the same advantage.
As the year 1779 progressed, measures and counter-measures were taken
at an ever accelerated pace by both England and France in an effort to control Dutch shipping policy.

Opening French ports to Amsterdam and Saarlem

while charging the customs tax to others secured for France a resolution
from the province of Holland to provide unlimited convoy.
in Holland meant little to France.

Paper resolutions

Providing for their implementation con-

sumed notoriously long perioda of time.

Therefore a French decree of May 1.

1779 declared an additional tariff of fifteen per cent on all gooda except
naval supplies. 127 The Dutch were caught in the dilemma.

If they uaed un-

limited convoy. England was in a position to pounce upon their ships and
destroy their trade as neutrals, to call for their active assistance under
the treaty ot alliance of 1678. or to declare all out war upon them.

Their

rich commerce with France would be lost in the event of any one of these
contingencies.

If they refused unlimited convoy, France was in a position

either to continue her discr1m1nator,y practices and force merchants of all
but favored cities out of business or to extend her tariffs and taxes and
decimate Dutch profits.

The outlook was dismal and the country became even

more divided between the Anglomane followers of William V and the Patriots
who favored France.
Spain's declaration of war on England in June, 1779 was accompanied
by France's formal declaration of hostilities.128 England retorted with a
memorial delivered by Sir Joseph Yorke on July 22 to the States General

warning that the fulfillment of the alliance might be exacted as France was
threatening to invade Great Britain. 129 A cumbersome national government
/

failed to make any response to Yorke's memorial even after he renewed his request on November 26, 1779.

This disregard--as it was interpreted--alienated

Great Britain still fUrther. l3Q The arrival of John Paul Jones on October 4,
1779, at the Texel (a large harbor some twenty-five leagues from Amsterdam)
flying the American flag, and with the Serapis and Countess of Scarborough as
prizes, occasioned still further animosity.131
Fair trade winds in Christmas week, 1779. permitted not only Jones but
a large merchant fleet destined for French and Spanish ports to sail.

The

Dutch fleet, under Admiral Bylandt, was forcibly overpowered in the Channel
by the English Admiral Fielding.132

The people of the Netherlands were

highly incensed at Fielding's conduct.

They were still further aggravated

when, in early March, 1780, the English Admiralty Court confiscated the convoyed ships carrying timbers after that cargo had been purchased. 133
Hardly bad this unwelcome news been received when Sir Joseph Yorke
presented a third memorial (March 21, 1780) demanding a response to his
memorials of the previous July 22 and November 26 respecting Dutch obligations under the alliance of 1678.

Weary of Dutch tardiness, he allowed the

states General only three weeks in which to prepare their answer under
penalty of being declared neutrals and no longer protected by the AngloDutch treaty of 1674.134 A request for more time to enable The Hague to
ascertain the position of the various provinces on the question was rejected. 135 Through the spring and summer of 1780 the Dutch were becoming
more antagonistic to England and the majority of the provinoes voted against
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assisting her.

Consequently on April 17, 1789 England declared all:.a.lliances

and treaties between herself and the United frovinces severed. l36

The com-

manders of English vessels were directed to seize Dutch shipihaving aboard
aD1 goods belonging to the enemies of England or any goods considered contraband by the general law of nations. l37 The results were quickly apparent.
The States General, no longer having much to gain by concessions to England
and still rankling from the Fielding-Bylandt episode, resolved almost unanimously to grant unlimited convoys.

This resolution was followed a few days

later by another to outfit fifty-two frigates and ships of the line to reinforce Dutch convoys. 138
Franc., never loathe to improve upon a favorable situation. immediately
removed all the taxes and tariffs imposed on Dutch shipping the previous
spring.

Indeed, the king restored to the Dutch all sums collected during the

intervening year in virtue of those assessments. 139 The promise of convoy
was exactly what France desired.

She did not want to lead the Netherlands

to join directly in the war effort as this would complicate rather than
facilitate the accomplishment of French objectives.
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Thus, by the time Adams was permitted to undertake his mission to
discover whether some assistance could not be secured in the Netherlands,
that country was rapidly drawing away from its ties with England and
strengthening its trade relations with France.

It had largely been brought

to this position by the peculiarities of its governmental structure.

For

one thing, the processes of deliberation and of enactment of law were cumbersome and unable to handle situations within a reasonable time limit.

This

had been a major factor in the imposition of the French tariffs on Dutch

shipping in 1779.

It hsd also been a factor in the failure to answer

Yorke's memorials of June and November, 1779, and of March, 1780, thereby
losing for the Dutch their privileged status with England.
During his two years in the

/

Adams similarly discovered
it to be an important factor and a constant problem. 141 The nation was a
Nethe~lands,

republic composed of seven provinces held together in a confederation in some
respects analogous to the Confederation established in America in 1781.

The

seven provinces of Holland and West Friesland, Zealand, Utrecht, Guelderland,
Overyssel, Groningen, and Friesland differed in size, wealth, occupations,
and sentiment.

Holland was the most populous and by far the wealthiest,

comprising within its boundaries most of the great cities, including Amsterdam.

This province was literally in a position to control the legisla-

tion of the country as she contributed a large portion of the yearly budget.
She in turn was controlled by her own main source of supply, Amsterdam.
At the head of the state was the Stadholder or hereditary Prince of
Orange.

William V enjoyed the disposal of nearly all offices and was captain-

general and admiral-general of the army and navy.

By his position he was

privileged to participate in the sessions of the States General and to initiate legislation.
body of nobles.

In most of the provinces he served as president of the

As he was governor-general of both East and West Indies

Companies and appointed their directors, and also admiral-general of the Davy
which operated the customs house, he enjoyed considerable influence.

Al-

though personally inclined to be weak and vacillating, he remained quite
142
steadfast in his support of England.
In this he was strongly seconded by
Duke Louis of Brunswick, his former tutor, official counselor, and a strong
Anglophile.
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The final sovereignty of the

~~tion

was vested in the states General,

a senate of the several sovereign states in which each state, irrespective of
size, commanded one vote.

All foreign affairs were ultimaterY directed by

the states General, usually through their secretary of griffier--at this
period, M. Fagel, a strong Anglophile.

Their powers were curtailed considera-

bly as no subject could be voted upon in the states General until it had been
submitted to the provincial assemblies or states for their decision.

This

process was known as taking the matter ad referendum and was an admirable
device for indeterminately prolonging the ultimate decision on a piece of
business.

On the other hand, it was almost impossible not to consume con-

siderable time in the disposition of any business.

No precise rule apparently

designated which matters required the unanimous approval of the states and
which required only a majority in order to be brought again before the states
General for final decision.
The provincial assemblies, wherein a more real sovereignty lay, were
composed of the nobles of the province and deputies of the cities within the
province.

They generally could not act without the majority consent of the

body of nobles and of the city regencies.

Consequently, further delays were

inevitable while these local groups took the problem ad referendum.
The cities formed almost independent republics within the nation.
Burgomasters served as their executives and also as members of their councils.
In desoribing the position of the burgomaster to Congress, Adams compared
them to "little kings."

lative authority.

The city oouncils or regencies were composed of

The regencies appointed the deputies

1 ,

po.,. _

&

~"

states.

In larger cities the deputation consisted of two burgomaster, two

schepins or councilmen, and a pensionary.

The pensionary was the secretary or

minister of the city and generally the official speaker for the city, even in
the provincial assembly. 143 The secretary or first pensionary of Holland,
officially known as the Grand Pensionary--Van Bleiswick during the American
Revolution--was the most powerful figure in the nation, since he served for
practical purposes as the foreign minister of the nation and as spokesman
for the province of Holland which comprised half of the population and over
half of the wealth of the country.
Because of the unusual dispersal of sovereignty and because of the
need for unanimous consent on so many levels for any measure of major importance, it was very difficult for the Netherlands to take positive action.
Needless to say, this very complexity was often used as an excuse for inaction.

;fuenever a matter arose upon which the Dutch preferred not to put

themselves upon the record, their constitution was admirably adapted.

But

no country can long endure on negatives and events were gradually and inexorably becoming such that the United Provinces would eventually need to take
their stand on one side or the other.

Adams, whose militia activities in

Franklin's bailiwick necessitated a journey elsewhere, was in an excellent
position to understand the situation and profit by it.

Consequently he bade

;'aris farewell on July 27, 1780, and with his two sons, John Quincy and
Charles, started for Brussels, the first major stop-over on his way to
Amsterdam.
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lAdams to Dana~ sept. 17, 1782, Francis Wharton (ed.), The Revolutionar Di lomatic Corres ondence of the United states (Washington: Government
Frinting Office, 1) 9 , v. 732.
2

~., It 511.
The word "traditional" in reference ¥> diplomacy is
used in this paper to signify the form of diplomatic exchange prevalent in
the eighteenth century between countries. From the time of the renaissance,
international relations gradually assumed a certain methodology which remained operative into' the twentieth century. In referring to this standard
mode of diplomatic relationship, the Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences
(C. Delisle Burns, "Diplomacy," Ene clo aedia of the Social Sciences, ed.
Edwin R. A. Seligman, (1935), V. 1 7-151 frequently applied the term "traditional. n In his recent work, The Evolution of the Diplomatic Method
(London: Constable and Co., 1954), Harold Nicolson recognized the dominance
of certain norms of diplomacy, but he preferred labelling them tlFrencht!
(Nicolson, p. 53 and passim).
Early diplo~~tic practice laid stress on the observance of protocol
and ceremonial. More importantly, there had developed the custom of preserving in state archives the frequent correspondence, reports, and newsletters exchanged between a representative and his home government (ibid.,
pp. 25-26). French diplomacy retained the devotion to protocol and c;r;monial, and attached great importance to style. The Frenc~ also built on the
system of correspondence and made an art of forwording, with the intention
that they be carefully implemented, preCise instructions to their ministers.
Richelieu inaugurated, early in the seventeenth century, a centralized authority for the formation of foreign policy and established a "professional
service of experts through which that policy could be carried out" (ibid.,
p. 92). ,A century later, the foremost French writer on diplomacy, Franqois
de Callieres, described the diplomatic service of his day. Amateur diplomats
he considered dangerous. A distinctive professional training for men of the
highest qualities, a mastery of European history and polity, and a fluency
in the major European languages were necessary prerequisites for any diplomat
(De la maniere de negocier avec les souverains, (1716). cited by Lennox A.
Mills and Charles H. McLaughlin, World Politics in Transition, New York:
Henry Hol t, 1956, pp. 197-198). France served as the model for all European
countries through the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries
(Nicolson, pp. 53. 62, 72).
Militia diplomats, as envisioned by Adams, could not qualify under the
specifications for diplomatic service sO fenerally accepted in Europe. They
were to deal with foreign courts in an "entirely unceremonious and unsophisticated mode" (Wharton, I, 513). Furthermore, militia diplomats were chosen,
not because of training, knowledge of the country to which they were missioned, or experience, but on the basis of patriotism and a ~jority vote in
the Continental Congress. They were lacking in another aspect. Wharton
listed among "the settled rules of diplomacy" the rule that an envoy should
not be "pressed upon a foreign court by which it is understood he will not be
received" (ibid., pp. 289, 291). Nicolson, in agreement, quoted Calli~res,
to the effecr-that a minister must be well received in the country in which
he resides (Nicolson, p. 67). Contrary to these traditionally accepted
standards, the "militia" diplomats normally set said for countries in which
they were not wanted.

'Adams to Robert Livingston, Feb. 11, 1782, ~., V, 196.

-

4Franklin to Arthur Lee, Mar. 21, 1777, ibid., II, 298.
5Adams to Jenings, Sept. 25, 1782, ,\dams Family Paper(, MSS. (Nassachusetts Historical Society), henceforth cited: Adams Papers.
dherever direct quotes have been used, spelling and punctuation have
been modernized in order to facilitate reading.
6A good account of Vergennes' European diplomacy, especially his
sponsorship of a neutral league in the early years of the war, may be found
in John J. Meng, "The Comte de Ver ennes: Euro ean Phases of his American
DiJ2lomaclt 1774-1800 ;vashington: Ca.tholic University of Amerioa, 1932). In
The Peacemakers, Morris has examined Vergennes' diplomaoy through the revolutionary years and the formation of the paace.
7Immediately after the signing of the Declaration of Independence,
Congress appointed a committee, of which John Adams and Benjamin Franklin
were both members, to draw up a model treaty of amity and of commerce to be
negotiated with European countries. Franklin, Silas Deane and Arthur Lee
were chosen as the first American cOlU!!lissioners in the fall of 1776 to obtain
recognition and to secure loans from foreign governments. After the alliance
with France, they remained in raris as joint ministers. Deane was replaced
in 1778 by John Adams who attempted to bring a little order to the commission's affairs. J~t his suggestion the additional commissioners were later
recalled and Franklin was left as sole minister to France. Adams returned
home in the summer of 1779 and Lee was commissioned to Spain as envoy. In
the meantime, William Lee was appointed commercial agent and commissioner
to Berlin and Vienna. Ralph Izard acted as unacknowledged envoy to the
court of TUscany. They all, as well as several agents seeking to borrow
money in the names of the various stutes, spent a good portion of their time
in Paris and environs. All except Franklin were in varying degrees militia
diplomats.
8Vergennes to Gerard, Dec. 25, 1778, Institut Frangais de \~ashington,
Despatches and Instructions of Conrad Alexandre Gerard, 1778-1800: Co~reS ondence of the First French Hinister to the United ;States with the Comte de
Vergennes, historical introduction and notes J. J. Meng Baltimore: John
Hopkins Press, 1939) t p. 451. Henceforth cited: Gerard DesJ2a.tches.
9Gerard to President of Congress (John Jay), Har. 17, 1779, III/barton,
III, 85. Conrad Alexandre Gerard, the oldest son of a minor French official,
early entered diplomatic service. He held various offices beginning with
Secretary of the French legation at Mannheim and advanced to first commissioner of the Foreign Office and secretary to the Council of state in 1776.
He remained at this post until named minister plenipotentiary to the United
i~ta tes in Barch t 1778. He lias succeeded in his position at the Foreign
Office by his younger brother, Joseph Matthias Gerard de Rayneval, commonly
referred to as Rayneval to distinguish him from Gerard (Gerard Despatches,
pp. 35-47).
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10
Gerard to President of Congress, Mary 3, 1779, Wharton, III, 159.
At this time Congress was split into two parties which John Durand (ed. and
trans.), New Material for the Histor of the American Revolution (New York:
Henry Holt, 1 9, pp. 19 , 205, referred to as the National ?arty and the
states' Rights Party. The former included Washington, Franklin, Jefferson,
Hamilton, Robert Morris, Madison, and the two Livingstone. They were more
inclined to see national interests, more centralized control and a closer
affiliation with France. The States' Rights Party were led by John and Samuel
Adams, Richard and Henry Lee, and included men like James Lovell and Henry
Laurens. They were strongly anti-French in the sense of not becoming politically dependent on France. They thought in terms of state interests rather
than of national interests. Gerard distrusted them as he believed, completely
incorrectly, that they desired to treat with England separately.
By March 10, 1778 there was open confiict in Congress over the management of foreign affairs. A committee of thirteen was appointed to investigate the conduct of foreign affairs in general and of the commissioners in
France in particular. From then until 1781 and Robert Livingston's appointment as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, practically nothing was heard of the
Committee of Foreign Affairs. George C. Wood, Congressional Control of
Forei Relations durin the American Revolution 17 4-1789 (Allentown,
Penn.: H. R. Hass and Co~, 1919 ,p. .3, has found "evidence that the
American foreign relations were largely carried on by the French minister
working through friends and committees in Congress."
11Gerard to President of Congress, May 22, 1779, Wharton, III, 175-78.

-

12Gerard to President of Congress, May 27, 1779, ibid., pp. 194-95.
l.3Gerard to Vergennes, May 14, 1779, Gerard Despatches, p. 64.3.
l4Gerard to a Committee of Congress, July 14, 1779, U. S. Continental
Congress, Secret Journals of the Acts and Proceed s of the United States,
Vols. II-IV: Foreign Affairs Boston: Thomas B. Wait, 1 20-21 , II, 195.
Henceforth cited: U. s. Continental Congress, Secret Journals.
l5Gerard to Vergennes, July 18, 1779, Gerard Despatches, p. 794.
16U. S. Continental Congress, Secret Journals, II, 218 (Aug • .3, 1779).
l7Gerara DeSpatches, pp. 847-848.

l~.

S. Continental Congress, Secret Journals, II, 225-28, 230-2.32.

19Gerard DeSpatches, p. 848. These were marked "received Nov. 6,
1779" by Rayneval, a full three months before Adams' arrival in Paris.
20
Gerard to Vergennes, sept. 25, 1779, ibid., p. 895. The letter in
question (Vergennes to Adams, Feb. 21, 1779, wharton, III, 55) praised Adams
for his "wise conduct • • • as well as zeal • • • for the cause of your
country and the support of the alliance. rt
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Lovell to Adams, sept. 27, 1779; Wharton, III,
tal Congress, Secret Journals, lIt 257.

340;

U. S. Continen-

.
-President of Congress to Adams, October 20, 1779, Wha(rton. III, 387;
Adams to President of Congress, Nov. 4, 1779, pp. 399-400; Adams to Franklin,
DeC. 9, 1779, p. 417.
Thomas Huntington was the President of Congress from Sept. 28, 1779
until July 10, 1781. cRe was succeeded by Thomas McKean but Livingston's appointment to the Foreign Office about the same time caused Adams to address
his official correspondence to Livingston rather than to the President of
congress once he learned of the appointment.
22~

23Arthur Lee quarrelled with his co-commissioners as to whether the
goods being procured for America were gifts ot purchases. He found some suport in Adams when that gentleman replaced Deane in the commission.
24Adams thereby became the subject of some unfriendly compositions.
A copy of one of these, filed in the French archives, in all probability
came to Vergennes' attention. '!'his document, Renenons politique d'un
ci toyen. stated that Arthur Le. was English at heart and undoubtedly recei Ying
pay from England. The au thor continued, "God forbid that I should think Mr.
Adams like him, but I venture to stat. that Mr. Adams is a very cunning man
and no friend of Dr. Franklin. so that it may be presumed the te.s and the
Adams are all so many heads WIder one bonnet." (Durand, p. 28).
25Durand • pp. 207-208. The complete correspond.nc. betwe.n Vergennes
and Gerard is printed in Gerard DeSpatch... Selections from this IIIay be
found in Durand, pp. 198-211. Paul Chrisler Phillips, The West in the Diplomacy of the Am.rican Revolution ("University of Illinois Studi.s in the
Social Scienc.s," Vol. II, Nos. 2 and 3; Urb8.llaJ University of Illinois.
1913), p. 130. attributed "to the conduct of Gerard is due in large measure
the irritation which broke out between the French minister of Foreign Affairs
and the envoys of the United States." He based this on G.rard's champiolliD.$
of Spain's claims on boundaries.
26Vergennes to Luz.rne. July 18, 1779. Durand. p. 215.
27John Adams, Diary and Autobiography, Seri.s I of Th. Adams Papers,
edited by Lyman H. Butterfield and others (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press,
1961). IV, 242-43. The .ditors of this work have e.tablished that this section of the autobiography was written nearly thirty year. after the events
record.d (note, p. 173).
28Adams to V.rgenn••• Feb. 12, 1780, Wharton, III, 492-93.
29Th• agent Hussey was in Spain trying to arrange an accommodation betwe.n that power and England. Th. Fr.nch ministry knew .nough of it to be
d••ply concerned. For d.taUa, refer to Morris. pp. 51-56.

39

3OAdaD18 to Vergennes, Feb. 12. 1780, Wharton, III, 492-93. Vergennes
interpreted Adams' desire to make his mission known to the English as proof
of his desire to settle American independence directly with England and without consulting France. If further proof were needed, Vergennes felt that
Adams supplied it by his claim that his powers authorized him/as fully to go
to London as to go to Paris. Vergennes expressed his irritation over this to
Luzerne, June .30, 1780 (Henri Doniol Ley, Histoire de la pa,rticipa tion de la
France a l'etablissement des ~tats-Unis dtAm~ri ue corre ondance
diplomatique, docllMnts Paris: Imprillerie Nationale, 1 -1 9 ,IV, 414).
31Vergennes to Adams, Feb. 15, 1780, Wharton, III, 496. Vergennes had
already received the instructions forwarded in August but possibly thought
that subsequent additions or alterations may have been made. Gerard's report,
false though it was, that Adams would communicate his instructions to Vergennes (Gerard DeSpatches, p. 848) perhaps influenced Vergennes' bold statement. Vergennes also concluded after his meeting with Adams that the American had not made known the entire nature and object of his commission (Vergennes to Luzerne, Feb., 1780, Doniol, IV, 441). Adams, on the other hand,
judged Vergennes so accustomed to obtaining by payment or intrigue the instructions of foreign ambassadors that he had become unmindful of its tilegality (John Adams, Dian- and Autobiography, IV, 246).

~ancis Dana. (1743-1811), a native of Charlestown, Massachusetts,
graduated from Harvard and studied law under his uncle. It was in his legal
practice that he was first associated with John Adams. When Adams was appointed commissioner to negotiate for peace in 1779, Dana, who was then a
member of the Continental Congress, was sent with him as secretary to the
American legation. When Adams moved to the Netherlands, Dana remained in
Paris to care for affairs there and await Adams' return. In December, 1780,
he was commissioned to Russia to offer American accession to the Armed
Neutrality. While there he was to propose a treaty of amity and commerce with
Russia. His mission was unsuccessful and he returned to the United States in
1783 (DAB).

-

33Adams to Vergennes, Feb. 19, 1780, Wharton, III, 503.

34John Adams, Diary and Autobiography, IV, 247. Adams was unaware
that Vergennes had a copy of the instructions and he even doubted that Gerard
had secured a copy to bring home although ready to concede that it was a possibility since Vergennes had money and there were fifty members in Congress,
one of whom might be interested (ibid.).

35Adams to Vergennes, Feb. 19, 1780, Wharton, III, 504.

37Adams to Vergennes, Feb. 25. 1780, ~., pp. 519-520.
36Vergennes to Adams, Feb. 24, 1780, ibid., p. 518.

38John Adams, Diary and Autobiographl, IV, 252.
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39Adams to Vergennes, Harch 21, 1780, Wharton, III, 266-67.
40vergennes to Adams, Mar. 30, 1780. Charles Francis Adams (ed.)
works of John Adams. Second president of the United states (Bqstoni Little,
Brown and Co., 1850-56), VII, 139. Henceforth cited: C. F. Adams, Works.
41
Adams to President of Congress, ¥ar. 30. 1780, ~., p. 138.
42Adams to Jenings, April 2, 1780 and June 7, 1780, Adams Papers.
Edmund Jenings (1731-1819) was born in Maryland but eduoated in England. He
probably never returned to the United states. He lived in London until 1778
when he removed to the continent, ohiefly Brussels, for the duration of the
war. Jenings corresponded regularly with the Lees to whom he was related.
It was probably through Arthur Lee that he met John Adams in 1780 (~).
43James Lovell (1737-1814), a Bostonian, was elected to the Continental
Congress in 1777 and very shortly became a member of the Committee for Foreign
Affairs. Often he aoted as sole member of this committee due to Congressional
neglect to appoint others. He served with energy and zeal until the appointment of Robert Livingston as Seoretary of Foreign Affairs in 1781. Lovell was
intensely partisan and a leading member of the group opposed to Franklin and
to strong French influence (~).
44Adams to Lovell, Mar. 16, 1780, Wharton, III, 551.
45Franklin to Carmichael. Mar. 31, 1780. Albert Henry Smyth (ed.),
The writings of Beniamin Franklin (New York: Macmillan Co., 19(6), VIII, 53;
to Jay, June 13, 17 0, ~ 92. Dispatches from Congress received in mid-June
finally dispelled Franklin's claimed ignorance of Adams' mission.
46Ralph ~zard (1741/2-1804) was born in south Carolina but educated in
England where he spent several years of his adult life. In 1776 his views on
the revolution made his life unpleasant in England and he started home. While
in P~ris enrroute he was given a commission as minister to Tuscany but, unwelcome in that country, he returned to Paris. Under the impression that as
a dip10matio representative of the United states he had a right to take part
in the consultations between France and the United states he aroused a bitter
antagonism between himself and Franklin. Arthur Lee and, to an extent, John
Adams supported him against Franklin. Izard was recalled in 1779 (~).
47John Adams to Sam Adams. March 4, 1780, Wharton, III, 531. His major
point of disagreement, particularly with Izard. was over the method of addressing France. Izard inclined toward using a "high tone" whereas Adams opposed "the style of menace" although advocating both "frankness" and "candor."
48
Most of these are published in Wharton or in C. F. Adams, Works. The
remainder may be found in the Adams Papers. In the early part of August.
Adams estimated--and this probably is one of the few times he minimized his
activity--that he had already sent about a hundred dispatohes.
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49Adams to La. Fayette, reb. 18, 1780, \marton, III, 501.
50Adams to President of Congress, Feb. 19, 1780, ~., p.

504.

51 Adams to Edml Genet, Feb. 18, 1780, ibid., p. 500. ~natt the father
of the future French ambassador to America, was-tirst secretary for the Department of Foreign Affairs as well as editor of the Mercure and so would have
access to much information. He also served as premier commie of the Bureau of
Interpretation and passed on to VerSennes intelligence from England and
America (Morris, p. 111).
52Gen8t to Adams, Feb. 20, 1780, ~.Jharton, III, 504.
53Char1es William Frederick Dumas was a native of Switzerland but spent
the greater portion of his life in the Netherlands as a man of letters. He
was learned, spoke several modern languages, was a staunch supporter of liberty
and an early defender of the American cause. In 1775 the committee ot secret
correspondence, chaired by Franklin, appointed Dumas special agent in the
United Provinces. He continued in that office until Adams' arrival after
which he served as secretary and translator as well as liaison between Adams
and the Patriots at The Hague. After Adams' return to Paris, Dumas acting
as chargeI d'affairs exchanged ratifications on the treaties of amity and commerce between the United Frovinces and the United States (Wharton, I, 603).
54Adams to J enings, February 25, 178o, Adams Papers. Adams had complete confidence in his loyalty although that loyalty was suspected by Franklin, Jay and Laurens (hbarton, IV, 285 note; John Adams, Diary and Autobiography, II, 355-56 note).
55!l.dams to Jenings, July 14, 1780, Adams Papers.

56 Adams to Jenings, June 30, 178o, \ dams Papers. HuciJ of the material
Adams supplied to both Genit and Jenings was based on articles, pamphlets,
speeches or clippings from England. Thomas Digges who communicated with him
under a number ot pseudonyms was his major supplier ot these pieces. Digges
would forward them to a Mr. Francis Bowen, a merchant in Ostend. From there
they were forwarded to Adams' quarters at the Hotel Valois or to a mutual
friend. Digges' favorite penname was W. S. Church or more simply W.S.C. but
he used others, e.g. Alex Brett. When he thought it best, he addressed Adams
as rtF.R.S." for "Fernando Raymon San," a name chosen because it was the name
of Adams' guide on his trip through Spain. Adams seldom used other than the
correct name for Digges (C. F. Adams, Works, 167-68 note).
57Adams to Jenings, July 18, 1780, Adams Papers. Jenings was always
glad to cooperate,but, aware tha.t some ot the articles could cause embarrassment if their authorship became known, suggested using fictitious names.
58J enings to Adams, July 9, 1780,

~.

59Chaumont to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June 16, 1780. Durand, pp.
225-26.
60Adams to President of Congress, June 26, 1780, ~ihart9ft, III, 818.
61Adams to Vergennes, June 16, 1780. C. F. Adams, Works, VII, 187.
62Yergennes to Adams, June 21, 1780, Wharton, III, 806. Vergennes informed Luzerne that the act, falling heavily on French merohants, would cause
them to fill Europe with their complaints and rumors of American bankruptoy.
Tbis would lead all Europe to question the good faith of America toward her
allies. (Vergennes to Luzerne, June, 1780. Doniol, IV, 415).
Anne-Cesar de la Luzerne was closely related to several of the first
families of France and was a nephew of Malsherbes, Minister of State and personal friend ot Louis XVI. Luzerne's early career was in the military but he
sought entrance to the diplomatic. Probably due to tamily connections he received an appointment as minister plenipotentiary to Bavaria in 1776. On
April 5. 1779 he was appointed to suoceed Gerard and with his secretary,
Marbois, sailed for the United states aboard the French frigate Sensible.
John Adams returned to Boston aboard the same ship which g&ve the two men
several w~eks in which to become aC4uainted. Luzerne formally took office as
minister plenipotentiary on September 27. 1779 (William Emmett O'Donnell,
The Chevalier de la Luzerne; French Minister to the United states. 1779-1784
l'Brugea: Desclee, nd~}. pp. 3744.
63Adams to Vergennes, June 22, 1780, Wharton. III, 808.
64Adams to Franklin, June 22, 1780,

ill!!., 807-808.

65Adams to the Boston Patriot, May 15, 1811, C. F. Adams, Works, I, 655.
66Adams to Vergennes, June 22, 1780, Wharton, III, 808-816.
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67 Adams to Franklin. June 29. 178o, ibid., p. 824.
68
Adams to the Boston Patriot, May 15, 1811, C. F. Adams, Works, It 655.
69Yergennes to Adams, June 30, 1780, Wharton, III, 828; Adams to Vergennes, July 1. 1780, p. 829.
?Overgennes to Franklin. June 30, 178o,

lli!., p. 827.

71 Ibid •

-

-

72Franklin to Vergennes, July 10, 1780, ibid., p. 844.
73Samue1 Huntington (1731-1796), the eon of a Connecticut farmer was
self-eduoated. He held various state office. between 1765 and 1775 at which
time he was elected to the Continental Congress where he served until 1784. He

was president of that body from September of 1779 until July 1, 1781 when ill
health forced him to resign the office (~).
74Adams to the President of Congress, June 26, 1780, ,,/harton,

rII,

819.

/

75Adams to the Boston Patriot, May 15, 1811, C. F. Adams, Worko, I, 655.
voiced the same idea two years earlier. LJohn Adam!?, Correspondence
Late President Adams Originally Published in the Boston Patriot. in a
of Letters (Boston: Everett and Monroe, 1809), pp. 284-85. Henceforth
J." Adams, Boston Patriot.
76 ...
Gaillard Hunt and W. C. Ford (eds.), Journal of the Continental
Congress, 1774-1789 (Washington: Government Printing Office. 1904-1928~,
XVIII, 1147 (December 12, 1780); Committee of Foreign Affairs to John Adams,
ryec. 12, 1780, C. F. Adams, Works, VII, 341.
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77Adams to Dana, Feb. 8, 1781, Wharton, IV, 252.
78 The English agents, Cumberland and Hussey, were in Spain to negotiate with Floridablanca for peace. At home, Vergennes faced both Necker's
peace offensive, made more formidable by a report of a treasury deficit, and a
more direct appeasement offer by I4aurepas, First Minister to Louis XVI
(Horris, pp. 88-111). He was probably also aware that on June 27 a bill for
conciliation with America was proposed in Parliament. Although rejected, it
evidenced English interest in dealihg separately with the colonies (David
Hartley to Franklin, July 17, 178o, Whartoh, III, 864-865).
79Adams to Vergennes, July 13, 1780, Wharton, III, 848-855.
80
Vergennes to Adams, July 20, 1780, ~., pp. 870-71.
81 Adams to Vergennes, July 17,
1780, ~., pp. 861-63.
82Vergennes to Adams, July 25, 1780. ibid., pp. 882-83.
returned with points of difference, ibid., IV, 3-6.

-
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90Franklin to Vergennes, August 3, 1780, Durand, p. 231. Franklin
apparently had remained uninfo~med of Adams' instructions until June when he
recei ved a copy from Jay. (Franklin to Jay, June 13, 1780, ;tJha.rton, III, 784).
91Franklin to President of Congress, Aug. 9, 1780, Wharfon, IV, 22-23.
92pranklin to President of Congress, Aug. 10, 1780, ~., p. 25.
93Franklin to Adams, October 8, 1780, C. F. Ad~ns, Works, VII, 314;
Adams to Franklin, Nov. 30, 1780, ibid., p. 337. Adams later commented that
he had dispatched copies by severar-conveyances without making any comment as
it would require a forty page paper to adequately explain (John Adams,
• Boston Patriot, pp. 283-85).
94Vergennes to Luzerne, Aug. 7, 1780, Durand, pp. 232-33. Vergennes
also took the opportunity to inform LUzerne of Adams' intention of disclosing
his powers. Vergennes expressed himself much in doubt of Adams' adherence to
the alliance and complained of the minister's facility in portraying American
ingratitude for the favors of France. He directed Luzerne to suggest that
Adams be recalled.
That Vergennes was much angered is demonstrated by his reversion to the
affair in another letter of October to Luzerne. At that time he told Luzerne
that it was desirable that Adams have no part in the peace negotiation. Congress should rather invest that power in a person whose zeal would be "enlightened, peaceable, and conciliatory"--a.ll qualities he believed that Adams
lacked, (Vergennes to Luzerne, October 22, 178o, George Bancroft Transcripts!
Archives Franpaises ztats-Unis LNew York Public Libra~). Henceforth cited:
Bancroft Transcripts: Fran~ai8e8--Etat8-Unis.
95rruntington to Adams, Jan. 10, 1781. Wharton, IV, 229.
96Dumas to the Commissioners at Paris, Feb. 16, 1779,

~., III, 21.

97A• Lee to Committee of Foreign Affairs, Nov. 11, 1778, ~., II,
840.
98Adamst in Paris since April, 1778 as a member of the peace commission,
was left without any specific occupation when Congress on September 1;, 1778
appointed Franklin as minister plenipotentiary to France and disaolved the
commission. Although this change had been made partially upon his own recommendation (Adams to Sam Adams, May 21, 1778, Wharton, II, 591-93), he was
disappOinted when the official notice arrived in February, 1779. Immediately
he informed Vergennes and requested passage home as he had no further duties
in Europe. He set off for Nantes to embark on the first ship available.
Various delays prevented embarkation until June 14, 1779. He disembarked at
Boston on August , and repaired to his home until re-commissioned on September
25, 1779.
99Adams to President of Congress, Aug. 4, 1779, \V:harton, III, 281.

lOOVan der Capell en to Livingston, July 16, 1779, \-!. H. Beaufort (ad.),
Brieven van en aan Joan Derck Van der Capellen Van de Poll ("Werken uJiitgegeven
door het Historisch Genootschap," New Series, Vol. 27; Utrecht: Kemink and
Zoon, 1879), pp. 113-15; Van der Capellen to Trumbull, July 6,/1779, pp. 108109. Henceforth cited: Beaufort, Brieven Van der Capellen.
Biographical information beyond that given in the text is supplied in
the footnotes only for those officials who were directly connected with Adams
or when such additional information seemed necessary to an understanding of
their relation to Adams.
Joan Derck, Baron van der Capellen (1741-84) was, until expelled for
his liberal views, a member of the ,states of his province of Overyssel. He
early carried on a correspondence with Governors Trumbull and Livingston advocating an American representative in the Netherlands. Once acquainted with
Adams he became a warm friend and trusted adviser. Shortly after Adams was
recognized, Van der Capellen was requested to return to his rightful place in
the States of Overyssel (John Adams, Diary and Autobiography, II, 454; Helen
Lincklaen Fairchild (ed.), Francis Adrian Van der Kemp (1752-1829: An Autobiography together with Extracts from His Correspondence (New York: G. P.
putnam's Sons, 1903) dealt extensively with Van der Capellen as a very close
friend of Van der Kemp.
101Adams to President of Congress, Aug. 4, 1779, Wharton, III, 281-282.
102Adams to President of Congress, Feb. 27, 1780, ~., p. 526.
103Adams to Alexander Gillon, ~~rch 21, 1780, Adams Papers. An undated
list of persons and firms which the editors of the Adams Papers judged to have
been written by Adams either in Paris or Brussels before he reached the Netherlands is printed in the Diary and Autobiography (II, 144). ~~ether any of
these names were supplied by Gillon or not, they do evidence Adams' interest
in being acquainted with commercial houses. In a letter of March 1, 1780 to
John Rutledge (Adams Papers) Gillon spoke of meeting with bankers and brokers
who assured him that a million guilders could be procured for ten to fifteen
years at five per cent by a person with sufficient authorization. Gillon had
already at that time discussed general terms with the house of Jacob and
Nicholas Staphorst, !fa solid Dutch house of good capital and sound integrity."
The same letter advocated that a minister be sent to furnish accurate information and to prepare a treaty against the day when he might be received. Although Gillon's prime purpose in the Netherlands was to borrow in the name of
South Carolina, he had made Adams' acquaintance earlier in Paris (John Adams.
Boston Patriot) and was to prove helpful to the minister upon his arrival in
Amsterdam. As this letter is found under date of March 1 in Adams' letterbook, it is possible that Adams had a copy of Gillon to Rutledge before July,
1780 when Adams left for the Netherlands. It would have undoubtedly strengthened his hopes for Laurens' eventual success.
104
See below, p~_ 28-32.
105Adams to President of Congress, Mar. 29, 1780, 'i'Y'harton, III, 578580.
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l06Livingston to Van der Oapellen, Harch 15, 1780, Beaufort, Brieven
Van der Capellen, p. 214. Laurens' appointment (U. S. Continental Congress,
:recret Journals, lIt 284-91, Nov. 1, 1779) was described by Wood (Congressional Control of Foreign Relations, p. 53) as "plain example of the workings
of the militia system." He added that "the one thing that Fratl"ce and Spain
did not want the United states to do was to attempt the negotiations of loans
among neutrals."
lIenry Laurens (1724-1792), a South Carolina merchant, planter, and
Revolutionary statesman, held various offices on local and state levels. He
was elected to the Continental Congress in 1777 and served as president of
the Congress during 1778. He tried to stay above factional strife but tended
at times to side with the Adams-Lee group as his attitude toward France was
similar to that held by Adams. Elected in 1779 as minister to the Netherlands, he finally sailed on August 13, 1780 but was captured by the English.
He was eventUally released and joined the peace commission in Paris only two
days before the preliminary articles were signed. The following year and a
half he spent.as a sort of unofficial minister to England until finally he
returned to the United states in 1784, (~).
107commission issued June 20, 1780, U. S. Continental Congress,
Secret Journals, II, 314; commission for amity and commerce temporarily laid
aside July 7, 1780 (~., p. 320).
108Laurens to the Committee of Foreign Relations, sept. 14, 1780,
Wharton, IV,

56;

Adams to President of Congress, Sept. 19, 1780,

~.,

p. 60.

109J • Adams, Boston Fatriot, pp. 102-103; Franklin to the President of
Congress, Aug. 9, 1780, Wharton, IV, 23.
110Gilbert Chinard, Honest John Adams (Boston: Little, Brown and Co.,
1933), p. 153. Francis P. Renaut, Les Provinces-Unies et la guerre
d'Amerique (1775-1784), Vol. I: De la neutralitJ 1 la belligerance (177517J~Pl, (Paris: Editions du Graouli, 1924), pp. 280, 282, added that Adams
mistakenly viewed a mission to the United Provinces as relatively easy since
the presence of John Paul Jones on the coasts of Holland would have convinced
the Dutch of the power of the United States. Adams' own correspondence does
not reflect any such opinion.
lllAdams to the Boston Patriot, ~ay 15, 1811, C. F. Adams, Works, I,
112
J. Adams, Boston Patriot, pp. 102-103.
l13rn April, 1780 Richard Cumberland, an English playwright, at his
own importuning was permitted to approach Floridablanca with overtures for
peace. As these were conditional upon Spain's not insisting upon either
Gibraltar or Minorca, his mission was doomed to eventual failure. (For further
details see Morris, pp. 56-62.)
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.
Adams to President of Congress, July 23, 1780, Wharton, III, 877.
Adams later contended that he probably would not have obtained Vergennes' permission even in July "if the controversy which arose had not made him wish to
get rid of me" (Adams to the Boston Patriot, May 15, 1811, C. F. Adams, Works,
I, 654 ). Beyond doubt Vergennes would have been delighted to )'get rid" of him
if it had been an American-bound vessel that was to be the means. It is
doubtful if giving Adams the freedom of the Netherlands would have appealed
to Vergennes as a good way to rid himself of that restless character. As the
dates of the correspondence clearly indicated, Vergennes not only granted permission before the controversy reached the no-further-communication stage,
but Adams, who began the journey on July 27t was already en route before that
date. The permission was granted some time before July 23 (Adams to President
of Congress, July 23, 1780, Wharton, III, 877), but Vergennes replied at
length to Adams' eleven reasons for communicating with the English on July 25t
and only on July 29 completely cut off communication with Adams (ibid., IV,
3-6, 16-17).
115"Patriot" was a title first assulfl8d by the journalists and pamphleteers of the circle of Van der Capell en to designate persons holding political
views akin to their own. It shortly became a party name encompassing the
political opponents of the stadholder t those citizens who entertained democratic views, and numerous aristocratic members of the city regencies (Petrus
Johannes Blok, History of the People of the Netherlands, Part V: Eighteenth
and Nineteenth Centuries, translated by Oscar A. Bierstadt LNew York: G. P.
Putnam's Sons, 191Y, pp. 204-205. It was primarily with the leaders of
this group that Adams associated.
116 The analysis of Dutch neutrality in relation to France and England
givAn here is based largely on Samuel Flagg Bemis t The Diplomacy of the
American Revolution ("Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and
Political Science," Series XIX, No.2; Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Presst 1911).
Also see Colenbrander, H. T. De Patriottentijd: Hoofdjakelijk naar Buitenlandsche Bescheiden (The Hague: Nijhoft, 1l:S97), It l33-lbl:S.
117colenbrander, I, 153. As of 1778 England had 122 warships, France
had 62 and Spain 63.
118
.
A letter to the British ministry from one of their agents at Amsterdam to the effect that eighteen Dutch vessels sailed from that city alone in
the first four months of 1776 laden with gunpowder for American purchase at
st. Eustatius, a free port of the Netherlands in the West Indies (Irvine to
Suffolk, May 14, 1776, Jared Sparks Transcripts LHarv&rd University L1brari7,
Vol. LXXII), indicated the magnitude of the trade. To prevent detection by
merely cursory inspection, gunpowder was often sent in tea chests or rice
barrels, or other appropriate disguise. The profits from this illicit trade
could command one hundred to four hundred per cent (Edler, p. 39). For
further interesting information on the role of this port in the Revolution
see J. Franklin Jameson, "st. Eustatiu6 in the American Revolution," AHR
VIII (JulYt 1903), 683-708.
-
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119The treaty of 1674 permitted either country to carryon trade with
enemy ports in non-contraband articles. Ships' timbers and the various naval
stores were specifically excluded from the list of contraband in this treaty.
As opposed as F~gland was to the use of these regulations in 1778, she had
willingly profited by them on former occasions vhen the Netherlands were at
war. For a discussion of customary maritime practice and the enactment of
special differences in specific treaties see Bemis, pp. 130-36; Edler, pp.
95-99.
120
Bemis, p. 139.
121Suffolk to Welderen, the Dutch ambassador at the Court of st. James,
Oct. 19, 1778, Bancroft Transcripts: America, Holland, and England. This
letter is summarized in Francis Piggott and G. W. T. Ormond (eds.), Documentary History of the Armed Neutralities, 1780 and 1800 (London: Unlversity of
London Press, 1919), It 105. In this collection may also be found summaries
or excerpts from a representative number of the French and English negotiations with the United Provinces on neutrality in 1778 and 1779.

l2~emis, p. 139.
123The Duc de la Vauguyon vas appointed to The Hague by Vergennes in
1776. Basically his instructions were to arouse Dutch commercial greed to a
point sufficient to assure their neutrality in the approaching Anglo-French
troubles. Beyond this general directive he was given a fairly free hand in
policy. He admirably acquitted himself of his post (Edler, p. 20). M. de
Flassan, Histoire g6neral et raisonn~ de la diplomatie Fran9aise (2d ed.
rev. Paris: Treuttel et Wiirtz, 1811), VII, 279-96, placed major emphasis on
La Vauguyon's efforts to undermine Anglo-Dutch relationships while strengthening Franco-Dutch relations.
124
Edler, pp. 106, 112-113. France would cease to accord the Dutch
the privileges which they had been enjoying in the ports of France. English
property would henceforth be seized if found on Dutch ships. This was no
empty threat as Dutch ships were also the carriers of much goods between
English merchants and the American states (Edler, p. 38).
125Duke de la Vauguyon to States General, December 7, 1778, Wharton, II,
l26piggott and Ormond, pp. 108-109; Bemis, pp. 142-43.
127Paul Fauchille, La diplomatie franqaise et la ligue des neutres de
1780 (Paris: A. Durant et Pedone-Lauriel, 1893), p. 137; Bemis, pp. 143-44.
128Until this time neither England nor France had formally declared
war on the other. England hesitated to draw the full force of the Family
Compact upon herself and France could not afford to risk the implementation
of the Anglo-Dutch alliance until the Patriot party in Holland was strong
enough to prevent its success.
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129Spain and France were assembling an armada to invade England in
July, 1779 (Morris, pp. 27-42, for detailed explanation).
130Edler, pp. 128-129. The Dutch were not entirely neg~ecttul of
Yorke's memorial only timorous in approaching the business. They did at
times withhold convoys even from vessels over which there was no dispute because they were unwilling that ships loaded with timbers should take advantage
of the convoy (Dumas to Franklin, Sept. 14, 1779. Wharton, III, 314).
131Neither the French nor the Dutch government was too pleased with
Jones' sojourn there and made all possible efforts to speed him on his way.
For interesting details of their efforts see the correspondence in Wharton,
III, 404-431. Renaut, I, 280-282, credited Jones' visit with long-term
effects. He viewed it as more capable of convincing the Dutch of American
power then the "announcement of far-off victories" or the "long dithyrambes"
published by the gazettes.
132Bemis , p. 146; Edler, pp. 129-131. F..dler relying on Colenbrander,
I, 166 stated that 25 or 30 ships were laden with hemp, iron, tar, pitch, and
other materials not excluded from convoy by the states General. In compa~
with them, but not under convoy, travelled 18-20 ships laden with ship
timbers. Fielding, whose courteous request for permission to examine cargoes
was retused, took in the ensuing encounter several vessels found to carry
naval stores. He permitted all others to proceed. Bylandt retused to continue to France and followed the captured ships to Spithead from whence his
government called him home.
l33Edler, pp. 131-32.
l34The return to neutral status would mean that the customary English
adherence to the consolato del mare--namely, neutral property except contraband was safe on enemy ships but enemy property was subject to capture on
neutral ships--would become effective. This would rob the Dutch of their
privileged status under the treaty of 1674 and thereby jeopardize all Dutch
shipping with France, Spain, and America (Bemis, p. 131).
l35Bdler, pp. 134-35.
l36Adams to President of Congress, April 10, 1780, iv.barton, III, 605,
613. The declaration was enclosed in Adams to President of Congress, April
28, 1780 (pp. 635-636).
l37Enclosure in Adams to President of Congress, May 13, 1780, ~.,
pp. 675-76.

138Edler,

p. 136.

139Memorial of La Vauguyon and French decree enclosure in Adams to
President of Congress, May 2, 1780, \iharton, III, 645-46.
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14°Bemis , pp. 147, 169; Mens, The Comte de Vergennes, p. 91; Flassan,
VII, 284.
141F..d.ler, pp. 11-12 note, correctly maintained that an putline of their
constitution was essential !tin order to make the proceedings there during the
revolutionary period comprehensible." Bemis found the same thing to be true
(Bemis, pp. 117-18). The account given here is based upon the information
found in Edler and Bemis unless otherwise noted.
142He was the son of Princess Anne, the daughter of George II of
England. He portrayed his mother's devotion to her native country (Bemis,
p. 119).
143Adams to President of Congress, Jan. 14, 1782, Wharton, V, 99.
144J • Q. Adams' Diary, July 27, 1780, Adams Papers.

CHAPTER II
/

LIFE AMONG THE MYNHEERS, AUGUST-DECEMBER, 1780
Arriving in Brussels early in the evening of Saturday, July 29, Adams
/

deposited Charles and John Quincy at their lodgings, the Hotel de L'Imperatrice, and immediately set out to find Edmund Jenings, with whom he had frequently discussed America and her proper stance vis~-vis France, England,
and the Northern Powers.

He failed to find Jenings at home but met another

itinerant American, Ralph liard, on the street and exchanged bits of information with him.

Later in the evening Jenings came to their hotel and the two

men spent some hours in discussion.

The next four days Jenings devoted al-

most entirely to the entertainment of Adams, while his nephew, Mr. Bordley,
took more particular charge of showing the Adams boys the sights of Brussels.
William Lee often attended the Jenings-Adams briefing sessions and by Adams'
departure time Thursday morning, the three men were convinced that they were
kindred spirits in the cause of independence.
The travellers spent a night in Anvers and on Friday, August 4, the
1

,

Adams group entered ,the Netherlands and rented rooms at the Hotel du Marecha!
de Turenne at Rotterdam for the weekend.

While on a quick foray about the

city, Adams became acquainted with Mr. Dubbeldemuts, a Dutch financier.
dined with his new acquaintance and several English gentlemen.

He

Later in the

day the Dubbeldemuts coach picked up the minister and his two sons to take
them to the financier's country estate for the evening.
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Sunday they toured
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the city more extensively.

John Quincy Adams noted the great number of

English churches in Rotterdam and comaented that he had heard that nearly
half of the inhabitants were Englishmen but that very few Fre~h resided
there. 2

In a note to Jenings, Adams corroborated his sonts findings.

He

wrote that he had been to hear a "sensible" English sermon and u a very good
prayer excepting a very unnecessary petition for a certain king that he
might have health and long life and that his enemies might not prevail against
him."

Adams could have no part in this prayer, so he substituted "an enjacula-

tion which was very sincere that he might be brought to consideration and
repentance and to do justice to his enemies and to all the world_,,3 This
preponderance of English in one of the major cities of the Netherlands perhaps was both a cause and a result of the long friendship existing between
the Low Countries and England.

It also foreshadowed a difficult time for

anyone who wished to turn Dutch affection in another direction.
A brief boat trip on Monday morning brought the group first to Delft
and from there to The Hague, which they reached about one in the afternoon.
In this city, Dumas showed them the sights, and introduced Adams to various
persons friendly to America.

Tuesday afternoon, they returned to Delft,

some five miles from The Hague, where Dumas desired to introduce a leading
gazetteer to Adams.

The next morning Dumas and Adams called on the Duc de la

Vauguyon, the French ambassador at The Hague.

The afternoon was devoted to

a trip to Leyden and contacting friends of Dumas there.

Although neither

John Quincy nor his father made diary mention of meeting Jean Luzac, the
editor of the Leyden Gazette, they very probably did meet him.

At least

Adams began sending a steady stream of articles almost immediately to Luzac
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for publication and within a few weeks, was writing to his friends that
4
LUzac's paper was "my vehicle for conveying the news."
Early Thursday morning the Adamses boarded a boat for the last stage
of their trip to Amsterdam.

Within the hour they reached Haarlem, where they

spent the greater rArt of the day, and then around four in the afternoon be-

san

the two hour boat trip to Amsterdam.

The location of the Amsterdam wharf.

nearly two miles from their hotel. necessitated a walk which Adams used to
good advantage in meeting several American gentlemen.

Among them was a Mr.

Bradford who had travelled to America with Adams in 1779 and was then residing
a t The First Bible Inn with other Americans.

The next morning, August 11,

the restless minister set himself about the business of contacting any and
all who might be friendly to or innuential in the cause of America.

While

he was gone to visit the various Americans residing at The First Bible, a
Frenchman named Duneville brought Commodore Gillon to visit.

That evening

Gillon sent word that he and the burgomaster Hooft had combined efforts to
find more suitable lodgings for the minister and the next day Adams and his
party moved to Madame Schorn's, a private dwelling near Gillon.

This move,

Adams later wrote. was made because he wished to be "more removed from the
observation of spies," the Hotel de Ville where he first took rooms being
the resort of a variety of groups including many Englishmen. 5 De Neufville.
a Patriot banker with whom Adams was to have frequent dealings in the months
to come, invited the family to his country seat at Haarlem for Sunday.

On

Monday Adams dined with another renowned banker, Staphorst. who eventually
was one of the partners in a successful loan negotiated by Adams.
During the succeeding weeks Adams put in very busy days.

When he was

not out visiting other Americans or Dutch merchants, bankers, and publicists,
he was entertaining them in his own apartments.

John

'~incy' s

diary for the

remainder of August, until his father put the two boys in a Dutoh boarding
school, is filled with his father's comings and goings and the names of
Gillon, Neufv1lle, Staphorst, Hooft the burgomaster, Vischer and Van Berckel
(p'enaionaries or councilmen), Guild and LeRoy (Americans living in Amsterdam)--all important connections for a diplomat to cultivate.

Gillon accom-

panied Adams on many of his visits as this young man spoke the Dutch language

6

I

and could act as interpreter and had special entres because of his Dutch
relationship.

Since Gillon was oonveniently a next-door neighbor, communica-

tion between the two men was not easily supervised by the "spies" of the
Hotel de Ville.
While Adams was warily being watched even by his confederates--partially in hopes that he might be doing good but with trepidation that he might
"inadvertently do evil as a stranger,f1 7--the roving minister was taking his
own measure of the situation.

In order to be prepared for whatever oppor-

tunities might arrive, Adams visited the booksellers, bought a grammar,
dictionary, and history in Dutch and proceeded to learn something of the
language and country.
within the country.
paradox."

8

He expressed amusement at the political speculations

"Everyone has his prophecy, and every prophecy is a

It seemed "as if they had studied for every impossibility and

agreed to foretell it as a probable future event. n9 After a few weeks in
Amsterdam he wrote home to assure Abigail that he was spending his time
agreeably and was very pleased with Holland, a "singular country • • • like
no other."

He admired and wished his countrymen would emulate the frugality,
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industry, and cleanliness he had observed as he believed that these were a
source of the immense wealth and great prosperity there.
10
"very sociable t however, in their peculiar fashion."

He found them
/

The "peculiar" way of thinking portrayed by the Dutch never failed to
attract his attention--sometimes to intrigue him; at other times, to exasperate.

"The country where I am is the greatest curiosity in the world.

This nation is not known anywhere, not even by its neighbors.
language is spoken by none but themselves.
nobody, and nobody converses with them.'f

The Dutch

Therefora they converse with
He admired them nevertheless.

doubt much whether there is any nation in Europe more estimable than
Dutch in proportion.
world.

"I

th~

Their industry and economy ought to be examples to the

They have less ambition, I mean that of conquest and military glory,

than their neighbors. but I don't perceive that they have more avarice.
they carry learning and arts I think to greater extent.
curiosities, public and private, are innumerable."ll

And

The collection of

Less than three months

later, when all his efforts to borrow money seemed in vain, a very different
analysis nowed from the Adams quill:

"Such a nation ot idolaters at the

shrine of Hammon never existed I believe before.,,12

He returned to his orig-

inal kindly regard for the Dutch when his work began bearing fruit.
Adams arrived in the Low Countries at a time of political indecision.
The government was divided between those who favored a return to the old
friendship with England and the comparative safety of the treaty of 1674 and
those who tavored the growing rapport with France and the lucrative trade
awaiting them there.

The English partisans were busily trying "to perplex.

delay, and cross everyting."

They .were accused--and probably were guilty-

of efforts to "intrigue more here than in all Europe besides."l, By August,

14

1?80, when Adams arrived on the scene, the Armed Neutrality --approved by
France, hated by England--was serving to orystallize opinion !n the various
groups.

}~y,

but by no means a majority as yet, viewed adhesion to the

Neutral League as a possible means of retaining both neutrality and trade.
others, reoognizing their proximity to Great Britain and the vulnerability
of their far-nung oolonies, feared retaliation and hesitated to join the
Armed Neutrality without a special guaranty of their colonial pOBsessions. 15
still others were completely averse to any measure known to displease the
English and thereby risk war. 16 Thulemeyer, the Prussian ambassador, probably
oversimplified the dividing lines but he had the general idea when he informed
Frederick II that Amsterdamers wanted to accede to the Neutral League without
the guarantees if necessary; the Anglomanes were for temporizing with England, and the Patriots acknowledged the advantages of acoeding but desired
the guaranty and a treaty of alliance as their conditions for adherence. l ?
Regardless of what view each individual group or regency entertained toward
the Armed Neutrality, all had but one ambition, the development of their
commerce and their own consequent enrichment. 18 Their interest centered on
European affairs, not on the struggle for independence in a republic across
the ocean.

The pro-American journalistic endeavors of the few, !.!S.., Jean

Luzac and Baron Van der Capellen, round the Dutch populace unresponsive. 19
Even among the most republican, including those who had reted John Paul Jones,
there were rew who saw a risk at war with England as corollary to sympathy
with the United Statea. 20
Nor was there any very exciting news from America with which the newly-
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arrived John Adams could hope to break through the national fixation.

Eng-

lish victories by Clinton, Cornwallis, and Tarleton in the southern states
21
were being "trumpeted throughout Europe."
The news of Charleston particularly cast a pall upon the Patriots and animated the Anglophiles to talk of
demanding unconditional surrender. 22

The London journals had a heyday re-

porting the American loss, consequent discouragement, and growing intent to
return to England. 23 ~~at these reports went beyond the truth made little
difference in their effect, and all of the Adams inganuity was required to
contradict the impressions fostered by the British press.

A complete knowl-

edge or recital of the facts would hardly have been of much assi$tance.
Actually the loss of Charleston discouraged many stalwart patriots in America
itself of ever winning the South.
was then in the making.

If Adams had only known it, more bad news

General Horatio Gates, appointed by Congress without

Washington's approval, led a weary, sick, and bedraggled army against Cornwallis near Camden, South Carolina,on August 16, 1780.
was a rout.
Adams.

The ensuing battle

C3ltes' mad rush for safety provided poor propaganda material for

For the next two months, Cornwallis harried the South Carolina

countryside until the British defeat at King's Hountain forced him to retire
for a time.

Hopes arose briefly when Rochambeau with six thousand men safely

disembarked at Newport, Rhode Island, on July 10, 1780, but shortly fell
when it became all too apparent that Admiral de Ternay with his ten Frenoh
war vessels was bottlea up in Narragansett Bay and that Rochambeau would not
24
move out from the protection of the fleet.
Congress was as usual beset with internal problems.

The bickering be-

tween the pro- and anti-Gallican forces continued. 25 Maryland had not yet

acceded to the Artioles of Confederation; many states, inoluding the home
state of delegate Sam Adams, were not complying with the Continental Congress'
rule of no more than three consecutive terms for any delegate;/foreign affairs
were conducted by oommittee and frequently controlled by the French ambassador,
and the sessions of Congress were filled with cabals and schemes to discredit
both Franklin and washington. 26
described Congressional muddling.

One member of Congress rather succinctly
"I once read of a people who were at times

led by a cloud; and I have known a people whose Grand Hultiform'd Sanfledrin
were often times in the midst of a J'Og.,,2 7 There was little in all this with
which to enlist a vibrant Dutch interest in America's behalf.

Nevertheless,

that was the motive behind the Adams visit.
The minister had forewarned Franklin that he planned to see what possibilities could be discovered in the Low countries 28 and he was not the man
to postpone any objective once he had judged it as good.

Consequently he

surveyed the entire situation with a practiced eye and began a three-pronged
assault on Congress, the Dutch bankers, and the Dutch people almost immediatelYe

His minimum objective was a loan for the United 3tates.

Dutch reoogni-

tion of Amerioan independence would be a most acoeptable bonus.

His political

intuition plus the information garnered from dozens of interviews with leading
figures during the early weeks of his sojourn in the Netherlands convinced
him that if America desired ohanged United ;3ta tea-Netherlands relations, she
would have to assume the initiative.

His

oorresp~ndence

consequently re-

fleeted his eagerness for the arrival of Henry Laurens, commissioned minister
plentipotentiary to the Netherlands. 29

One of his first letters from sunster-

dam was to Samuel Huntington, the Fresident of Congress, stressing the
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disappointment Laurena' delay caused and the great need for "80me prudent
person authorized by Congres8." He candidly admitted tbat the "prudent person" selected for The lfague probably would not be received for some time, but
he believed the attempt would be amply compensated by the fine position afforded for collecting intelligence and dispersing information. 30 He was in
full accord with William Lee who complained that Congress had not paid the
Dutch the attention that they merited or that American interests required.
He recounted Lee's complaint almost verbatim to Congress, adding that a minister in Holland would influence public opinion in several nations.

Failure

to have a minister there, according to Lee, was a regretable error since a
recognition of independence could prcbably be obtained from the Dutch if they
were properly managed. 31 Since Laurens obviously had not arrived, who would
be more able to manage "properly" than Adams?
Adams, having decided to substitute in Laurens' absence, notified Dana.
(with the injunction to keep the information confidential) that he would
probably remain at Amsterdam at least until the beginning of Noyember. 32
Adams then proceeded to carry out the duties which he presumed would constitute a. minister's obligations; namely, to keep Congres8 informed of the
latest European developments, to influence public opinion in tavor ot his
countr,r, and to secure the needed fUnds to successfully carryon the war.
Among the foremost of these was the business of keeping Congress informed.
Under his commission as peace negotiator, he had been sending Congress information on the foundation and scope of the Armed Neutrality and anything else
that seemed of general interest.
plethora of information.

In his newly-assumed role he dispatched a

No event, inCident, expression, or paper that might

o
have political overtones was too insignificant for transmission.

Every con-

veyance was utilized and letters, sometimes three or four in a day, were
penned for the enlightenment and guidance of Congress.

In

hi~newcenter

of

activity, he was aided by Dumas' access to several important men in governmente

.~t

the same time his own sources of information were expanded.

He

was enabled to coach Congress on such diverse matters as the capture of a
large number of the British West India Fleet and Cumberland's peace mission
to Spain.

Regarding the first of these he related that fifty-five ships with

a large number of soldiers and sailors had been taken and rejoiced that this
opened the "right vein."

He added the gratuitous advice that American priva-

teers should do their share in promoting this "short. eas.,. and infallible
method of humbling the English.,,33 Cumberland's "errand" he looked upon as
a "mere finesse of the British Ministry" to promote their own stocks, loans,
and re-election and to lull the belligerents while actually preparing for
future campaigns.34
Another duty that Adams felt a loyal and zealous minister should undertake was to influence public opinion in favor of his country.
ready assumed this responsibility.

Adams had al-

Within a fortnight of his arrival he had

begun showering the editor of the Leyden Gazette and various other gazetteers
with all manner of articles for publication.
jammed the presses.

Indeed, at times he literally

The commission which he soon received to borrow money

merely increased his persistence and his impatience.

'l'here seemed to be a

great deal of darkness to be dispelled before he could hope to turn Dutch
interest toward the United states.

On first entering the country, he had

concluded that the American cause "never suffered from anything more than

61
from tbe faUure of giving and receiving information. ,,3.5

The longer his

80-

journ among the Amsterdamers, who were Itthe most attentive to our affairs
and the best inclined toward us," tbe greater his surprise at/their lack of
knowledge of the most fundamental facts concerning America.

He bemoaned the

fact that there were very few "who do not consider the American resistance
as the desultory rage of a few enthusiasts, without order, discipline. law
or government.

There are scarcely any who have an adequate idea of the num-

bers, the increasing population, or the growing commerce of America.,,36
overoome this deficiency he went to unlimited efforts himself.

To

He also be-

sought Congress to have printed and made available throughout Europe a complete edition of all state constitutions and the Articles of Confederation.
Publication of such a book he believed would do more to prove the inevitability of American independence than any other act short of a complete military
victory.

He envisioned a volume of this nature being so well accepted that

in a short time it would be translated into every European language; that
even persona who did not know the English language would learn it purely for
the sake of reading this work. 37
Adams was greatly concerned that the sovereigns of Europe would take
measures inconsistent with American needs for no other reason than for "want
of l1ght. u38

In the Netherlands in particular, the British ambassador, Sir

Joseph Yorke, was busily engaged in directing the propagation of false reports.

Only the presence of a minister, amply supplied by Congress with

frequent and correct information, could succeed in negating the effects of
Yorke's activities or in dispelling the fears of the Dutch sufficiently that
a loan could be successfully floated. 39

To counter British propaganda that
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the "rebellious colonies" were suffering great distress and were on the verge
of submission, Adams dispatched numerous articles for publication in important
journals.

()ne of the foremost of these journals was the Gazette de Leyde

edited by Jean Luzac.

As soon as he was settled in Amsterdam, Adams sent

Luzac several items including a copy of an act of the Massachusetts legi8lature establishing an Academ,J of Arts and Sciences.

He also inclosed a

copy of the Proceedings of the ?hilosophical Society at Philadelphia and
suggested that learned societies in Europe might like to exchange notes with
the American groups.
Dutch that

th~eople

Such articles Adams assured Luzac should convince the
of major American cities, far from being discouraged to

the point of submission, felt sufficiently secure to indulge in the pursuits
of peace. 40

Luzac immediately supplied an introduction to this effect and

published these articles so well calculated to strike a resonant chord in the
culturally-minded Dutch.

Drawing Adams' attention to the good use he had

made of them, Luzac requested the minister to send more. 41
As soon as Adams received an official copy of the Massachusetts constitution as accepted by the convention, Adams forwarded it to Luzac.

He

appended the explanation that this would be the first European publication of
it as only the report of the committee had been previously printed in either
European or English papers. 42

He was particularly desirous that Luzac re-

produce it as "many gentlemen here are inquisitive concerning the American
forms of government. 1I

The publication of this document, at least a portion at

a time. could serve the double purpose of gratifying curiosity and of promoting the American cause.

By way of personal note, he pointed out to Luzac

that he himself had had a not inconsiderable part in the drafting of this

constitution and that he was particularly "ambitious" to see it translated by
the editor of the Leyden Gazette, which he esteemed "the best in Europe, both
in point of style and method.,,43 Luzac, pleased to receive the original
edition, promised to bave it translated and inserted as soon as place became
available:

"The abundance of material • • • has forced me to delay it in
44
spite of myself."
Adams was partially responsible for this shortage of

space since Luzac had translated and published a number of extracts from
the American papers Adams forwarded to him.45

Adams also transmittei a copY'

of the constitution to Edmund Jenings in Brussels.

Jenings immediately for-

warded it to a friend in England for publication there.

46 This became a

familiar pattern in Adams' propaganda activities--release articles through
one or more local papers and send them simultaneously to Jenings to be forwarded for publication in England.
Following close upon the release of the Massachusetts Constitution, he
introduced, through the European press, an English publication which appeared
to give support to the Americans.

This was his abridgment of a pamphlet

written by Thomas Pownall, a former governor of Massachusetts who had returned
to England. 4? In this Pownall pamphlet, Adams found "so many quaint words
and dark expressions intermixed with so many good thoughts and so much knowledge of America" that he deemed it worth translating--with modifications.
Consequently, he rewrote the pamphlet, had his version translated into French
by M. Adenet, and sent it to Luzac. 48 After assuring Adams that the brochure
certainly merited publication and that it would inspire many sentiments favorable to American interests, Luzac suggested that perhaps the author had
too vigorously depicted the changes which the American Revolution could make
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in the European commercial system.

He feared the oonclusions that might be

drawn from the pamphlet; American independence would despoil Russia of her
commerce in ships' timbers and various naval supplies, cause iweden to lose
her market for iron, and Holland to suffer in her carrying trade.

Luzac

granted that the author--he had been told only that it was an abridgement of
a real pamphlet and did not know that Adams had done the revising--had pointed
out extensive advantages but he felt that the general reaction would be one
of fear.

He therefore requested permission to add a preface which would

soften the impression these oommercial implioations might oreate. 49
Adams willingly granted the request to add a preface, which he later
commented was worth more than the pamphlet, 50 but he took exoeption to the
idea that the commercial system of Europe would be significantly affeoted by
American independence.
swers prepared.

This argument was not new to him and he had his an-

America was, and for centuries to oome would remain, basic-

ally an agricultural country.

He emphasized that Amerioa' s co_erce could

never increase exoept in proportion to its agricultural growth and that
oenturies would be required to populate the county's vast agricultural area. 51
This was hardly an accurate prophecy on Adams' part, nor was his next point
of much greater validity.

He reasoned that America would import far greater

quantities of hemp, sailcloth, cordage, and linens than could be offset by
any interference on her part in the tar, iron, or timber market--the Atlantic
was too broad and its passage too difficult to enable Amerioans to oarry
great quantities of these to Europe.

On the contrary, he claimed that trade

would improve since America would be importing European goods directly from
the continent rather than from England. 52 Adams' most frequent theme was the

tremendous advantage that trade with an independent America would be to Europe
in general and the Netherlands in particular.
Luzac, satisfied with Adams' reasoning and with the

pe~ission

to add

a preface according to his own taste, proceeded to get the pamphlet into
print.

This French translation subsequently became known in the Netherlands

as the Pens'es.

The process of publication was altogether too slow for Adams

who expressed impatience in the same breath as he ordered a dozen or two
copies. 53 Luzac excused the delay on the plea of family affairs and promised
copies within a few days.54 The promise was not strictly fulfilled as the
printers were extremely slow and the bookdealer Luzac had first contacted to
handle the work refused.

It was, however, ready for distribution by mid-

November and Luzac dispatched a dozen copies to Adams.

The minister quickly

disposed of them and ordered a "couple dozen more n as that was "the critical
moment to do good.,,55
Circumstances shortly presented Adams with a further opportunity to
propagandize.

While dining one evening with a group of merchants, bankerst

ministers, and lawyers, briefly a group of the Patriot party, Adams was asked
a number of questions on various American affairs by the eminent jurist.
Henrick Calkoen.

The conversation proved of great interest but rather slow

and tedious as one spoke no English and the other no Dutch.

Someone proposed

that Calkoen write out his questions and Adams write answers to them.
LeRoy, a mutual friend, volunteered to translate for Adams.

Mr.

Accordingly,

within a few days Adams received a list of twenty-six questions and immediately set himself to the business of answering them through a series of
letters.

Some of these were very lengthy but, as he wrote one or more each
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day, he produced the complete series between October 4 and October 27, 1780.
In these letters he emphasized the points most pertinent to the development of
the opinions and impressions he firmly believed should be pre~lent among the
commercial class in particular.

America's determination to win and to main-

tain independent status, her promisiag financial future once the current
difficulties were surmounted, and the advantage that

aD

immediate loan to the

United states would work to the lender as well as to the borrower were the
ideas expounded in his IDOst colorful and convincing style.

Mr.

Calkoen was

so satisfied with the answers that from the information given he drew up a
comparison of the revolt of the Low Countries from Spain and that of the
colonies trom England.

He concluded that whereas it required a kind of

miracle for the former to be successful, it would require a greater miracle
to prevent the success of the latter. 56 Calkoen's composition stressing the
inevitability of American independence and financial greatness was read to a
society of approximately forty men of letters who regularly met at Amsterdam.
The American minister ever regarded it as an important contribution.

"BT

that means, just sentiments of American affairs began to spread, and prevail
over.the continual misrepresentations of English and St&dholderian gazettes,
pamphlets. and newspapers. ,,57
Shorter items were normally in good supply.

on September 20, Adams

transmitted to Luzac several letters he bad reoently received from America
with the stipulation that the names of the correspondents be withheld. 58 In
well-regulated doses Luzac dispensed the information that they contained.
Excerpts on the popular acceptance of the Massachusetts Constitution (S.
Adams), the revived spirit of 1765 and 1766 with women demonstrating great

".-
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enthusiasm (Rush), and the friendly relations between the American people and
the French soldiers in America (Cooper) were excellent as counter-propaganda.
Franklin in Paris was similarly aware of the need for counter(cting British
propaganda and of the good effect of a favorable press.

Indicating that he

thought extracts should be published, Franklin sent Dumas and Adams letters
from two French officers in Rochambeau's army.

These letters lauded the

American troops and spoke well of the good understanding which existed between American and French troops.59 Adams quickly took the suggestion, requested more extracts, and assured Doctor Franklin that such intelligence was
essential to dispel "the universal and profound ignorance of America" that
he had enoountered in the United Provinces.
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In the task of spreading the knowledge of America, Adams was delighted
to enlist the aid of several new-found friends.

As he searched the bookstalls

for authentic information on the constitution and the history of the United
Provinces, a series of volumes by A. M. Cerisier was recommended to him. 61
The work was so satisfactory for his purpose that he inquired further about
the author and, learning that Cerisier resided in Utrecht, he travelled there
to meet him. 62

Shortly the two men were on the most :intimate terms.

Cerisier

introduced Adams to Mr. Wild, the Swiss bookseller with whom he boarded, and
thus gave Adams a critical supplier of pertinent books and papers.6 3 Cerisier
was also a regular contributor to various papers and could thus be of assistance to Adams.

As he was conversant with English, French, and Dutch, as well

as other languages, he frequently served as the translator of English publications which Adams desired to make available to the French and Dutch reading
public.

Cerisier also turned French and Dutch publications into

F~glish

that

68
Adams might the better utilize them to enlighten himself, to forward to Congress, or to have republished in the Netherlands and in England.
By

means of the outlets at Cerisier's disposal, Adams

~redhis

views

on the many aspects of America's relations with England and with Europe.

In

a comparison of the American debt with that of England, Adams depicted America
as being the more solvent.

He averred that the United States could undergo

another hundred years of war without her debt being proportionally greater
in 1880 than Britain's currently was. 64

In regard to finance (one of the

subjects of greatest interest to the Dutch) he pointed out that at the prevailing exchange rate of forty to one, a one and one-fourth million dollar
loan would annihilate all the paper bills in circulation. 65 These speculations were sent to Cerisier with a gentle suggestion.

"Your

obser~tions

on

American credit I shall expect with impatience as they will undoubtedly throw
much light upon our affairs.,,66

His impatience was well founded.

The Dutch

were extremely wary of America's ability to pay her bills. 67 When Cerisier's
enthusiasm for America led him to propose publishing a separate periodical
to serve her cause, Adams was quick to encourage hill.

68

Among the first to seek out an acquaintanceship with Adams was the
Baron Van der C3pellen.

He initiated a correspondence with the minister and

recommended to him several worthy friends, among them--Adrian Valck of Rotterdam, the financier, Tegelaar, and Francis Adrian Van der Kemp.69

Both Van der

Capellen and Van der Kemp wielded extremely influential pens and some of the
most famous Patriot propaganda pieces during the revolution were the result of
their indeavors. 70 It was largely through these men that Adams could feel
the pulse of the intellectual groups and key his arguments and his rebuttals
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accordingly.

Bad news from America inevitably produced among the intellec-

tuals a feeling of despondency and the prediction of ultimate failure. 71

This

reaction, however, was invariably turned to good use by Adams' ready explanation of each misfortune as being of minor importance, or of temporary duration,
or as being vastly exaggerated and misrepresented. 72

Time consumed explaining

his viewpoint Adams considered well spent since his correspondents were in
strategic positions to influence the various groups from whom America would
have to receive support if she ever hoped to borrow money in the United
Provinces.
Because Dutch opinion fluctuatjd with every foreign news item, and
since many items in the fall of 1780 tended to support the Anglophiles, Adams
used every avenue he could commandeer to counteract the effects of these news
bulletins.

Stories of Cornwallis' victory at Camden, South Carolina, caused

consternation in the Netherlands.

He brushed the victory off as greatly

exaggerated and of no lasting consequence. 73

Arnold's defection only proved

that Americans were as firm against bribes as against arms since Arnold had
led no soldier, sailor, "nor even his own valet" to the English camp.74 It.'hen
the English gained a temporary advantage in the South, he stressed the
Southern militia's lack of experience in war--a defect time would remedy as
it had in the North where the English could do "nothing but show their illwill.,,75

IrJhen the English took st. Martin, Adams again dashed off articles

which Cerisier was free to use as he wished provided he did not mention their
authorship.76

The unrest caused by the widely publicized English versions

of each of these misfortunes in conjunction with the shattering disclosure
of a privately projected Dutch-American treaty imperatively urged Adams to
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some literary counteroffensive.

He discovered an effective weapon in narra-

tives written by Generals Howe and Burgorne to explain their failures in
Amerioa.
late.

In November he sent Cerisier a copy of Howe's Narrative to trans-

Although Howe had oarefUlly avoided giving any information either on

the weakness of England or the strength of America beyond that whioh was
necessary for the vindication of his own conduot, Adams seized upon the account.

He declared that it contained enough !lto convince

~

impartial reader

that there was neither light nor integrity in the British ministry; that the
intent of England was evil."?? It seemed to him that the Howe translation
made a great impression beoause it presented a convincing argument on the
impracticability of either subduing or regaining America. 78 Pleased with the
result of that pamphlet, Adams asked Digges to send a copy of Burgorne's
apologia.

This, too, Cerisier translated and published to substantiate fur-

ther the impression made by Howe's Narrative.?9
Adams was too much of an aotivist. however, to spend all his time
banishing ignorance by submitting propaganda pieces to the gazettes or reports
to Congress.

Congress would undoubtedly benefit by a steady flow of informa-

tion but it was desperately in need of money.
anyone.

Adams was as aware of this as

Further. he believed that complete dependence on France to provide

finanoial support made America too subservient to her ally.

This was a major

reason, to his way of thinking, why ministers should be sent to a number of
the foreign courts with the necessary commission to initiate loans. 80 Short11 after his arrival in the Netherlands Adams had imparted some of these impressions to Franklin.

In response, Franklin used the occasion to express

his opinion of "militia diplomacy."

If

I have long been humiliated with the
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idea of our running about from court to court begging for money and friendship,
which are the more withheld the more eagerly they are solicited, and would
.

.

~

perhaps have been offered, if they had not been asked."
could not go uaanswered.

Tlrlds challenge

Adams agreed that he, as well as Franklin, felt the

mortification of soliciting funds but only "because the sol:1.citations bave
not succeeded." He could see no reason to be ashamed of the need to borrow
money after six years of successful warfare against a powerfUl nation which
had been borrowing reauJ.arly from all the countries of Europe.

He then de-

li vered a clear de tense of his theo1'1 ot "militia diplomacy" as a justitication ot his own activity.
To send ministers to eve1'1 great court in Europe, especially the
maritime courts, to propose an acknowledgment of the independence of
America and treaties ot amity and commerce, is no more than becomes
us, and in mr opinion is our duty to do. It is perfectly consistent
wi th the genuine system ot American policy, and a piece of respect
due from new nations to old ones. • •• It is necessary for America
to have agents in different parts ot Europe to give some information
concerning our affairs, and to refute the falsehoods that the hired
emissaries of Great Britain circulate in every corner of Europe, by
which they keep up their own credit and ruin ours. I have been more
convinced of this sinoe my peregrinations in this oount1'1 than ever.
The8~iversal and profound ignorance of America here has astonished

lie.

Practically no letter from Adams to Congress tailed to reiterate the
need for a properly commissioned minister in the Netherlands where.. he thought,
money for investment was plentiful.

Designedly, the majority of those he met

on his trip from Brussels to Amsterdam were bankers or publicists.

Upon

arrival at Amsterdam he lost no time in securing dinner engagements with
bankers of renown such as Neufville and staphorst.
men led Adams to adopt a
Provinces.

I'OS7

Conversation with these

view of the possibilities for a loan in the

He concluded that several of the more substantial banking houses

72

would willingly stand security on loans in return for American produce.

If

Philadelphia would contract to supply the produce, convoys could safely deliver it either to the Netherlands or to St. Eustatius in thelDutch West
Indies.

Such a system would not only aid in securing a sorely-needed loan

but it would automatically extend the commerce between the two republios and
thus help change the political attaohments of the DutOh. 8,
Consequently, Adams rejoiced when he reoeived an interim oommission,
valid until the arrival of Laurens or some other properly appointed person in
his stead, to negotiate a loan with the Low countries. 84 This finallyafforded him the opportunity to apply the theories he had been expounding and
to do so without the immediate surveillance of Franklin or the Frenoh court.
After sending for Thaxter, his private secretary who had remained in Paris,
he informed Abigail that he had determined to remain in the Netherlands until
further orders. 85 He hastened to assure the Committee for Foreign Affairs
that he would use his utmost abilities, but, for the first time, he added the
warning note that he could promise nothing.

At the same time he indireotly

assured them that they had made a very prudent choioe of negotiator, partioularly as his four or five weeks sojourn in the country had furnished him the
opportunity of becoming aoquainted. 86

He reoeived the commission on September

17 and proceeded direotly to ask friends and aoquaintances for aid and advice.
Sinoe he had no real political authority, he and his advisors agreed that it
would probably be better not to make his mission known to the states General
but rather to handle the loan as a matter of private credit. 87 He soon discovered this to be a very slow method sinoe it forced him to conduot the
business with great secrecy and caution.

The problem of communication com-

~.
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pounded the difficulty.

Moat of those to whom Adams wished to apply spoke no
88
English and their French was as sketchy as his own.
One of the first to whom Adams appealed for advice

was~enrick

Bicker,

a wealthy merchant, member of one of the most respectable families, and a
loyal Patriot.

Bicker immediately recommended the House of Vollenhoven as it

was "wholly Dutch, biased neither by France nor England.,,8 9 This company,
however, refused to take the risk on the grounds that its trade was fixed in
the Baltic and could not well be extended to North America.

Vollenhoven had

suggested Van Blomberg as broker, and this worthy gentleman set up another
appointment between the minister and Vollenhoven in hopes of changing the
banker's first decision.

To no avail!

The company continued to refuse. 90

When informed of this refusal, Bicker expressed his regrets but took the
opportunity to advise Adams not to apply to them a third time.

He remarked

that he was not surprised to find that the general credence in the solidity
of the United states was somewhat less than Adams liked to believe.

To this

he significantly added that real confidence could be developed only with
great patience and "after the appearance of some person properly accredited."
Bicker would have liked to be more helpful but hesitated to recommend others
whom the minister might contact as too many refusals could constitute a
serious drawback to an otherwise excellent project. 9l
Adams needed neither Vollenhoven's refusal, Bicker's advice, nor the
advice of other friends to demonstrate to him that a minister plenipotentiary
was needed before

a~

large sum could be procured.

He had scarcely reoeived

the commission to inaugurate a loan when he addressed Congress on the necessity of having at The Hague a minister empowered to oonclude political and

74
commercial treaties. 92

Under his tutelage, Francis Dana, the Secretary to the

Peace Commission, sent a similar message to Congress. 93 Adams bad been told
quite frankly that neither was money as plentiful nor
strong as he had thought.

Americ~credit

as

It appeared somewhat "mysterious" to the Good

mynheers that the person delegated to secure a loan was not simultaneously
empowered to negotiate treaties of alliance and commeroe. 94

In subsequent

letters the same message--a commission to treat politically was essential to
negotiations for a loan--was placed regularly before Congress. 95 These lettars eventually bore fruit in securing the coveted commission but some
months elapsed before the letters arrived in Philadelphia, were acted upon,
and the new oommission reached Amsterdam. 96

In the meantime he continued to struggle against difficult odds. When
he had first appeared in the Netherlands, he had entertained high hopes of
easy negotiations once he had a commission to borrow.

He hardly had the com-

mission when the first fears of not being immediately successful entered his
mind.

Two weeks later he reported that he was still busy inquiring as to the

best house and the best terms but that he would postpone a final decision
until Laurens' arrival.

Shortly, the conflict between England and the Nether-

lands caused Dutch interest to turn another direction and forced Adams to
50ft-pedal his efforts to obtain a loan.

When he could again take up the

matter in earnest, intervening events had further diminished his prospeots of
suocess.
In mid-October, news reaohed him, via Thomas Digges, that Laurens was
in the Tower of London and not apt to visit the Netherlands for Bome time.
The British had captured a number of papers in Laurens' custody.

Among these

7'
was a draft treaty drawn up in 1778 by John de Neufville, at the behest of
Van Berckel and several of the Patriot burgomasters of Amsterdam, and by
\1illiam Lee of Virginia.

The treaty was primarily commercial4.n character,

and it was not intended to become effective until pacific relations were reestablished between England and America.

Furthermore, it had been conceived

by agents acting on their own or, at most, as representatives of only a small
segment of the sovereignty of their respective countries. 97 Nevertheless, it
was

sei~ed

upon by England and used as a weapon against the adherence of the

Dutch to the Armed Neutrality.
Since the previous spring Russia had been forming a league of the
Northern maritime powers in an effort to protect neutral shipping on the
principle of free ships make free goods.

Denmark and Sweden soon joined

Russia but the United Provinces remained uncommitted.

Unwilling to sacrifice

their trade in ships' timbers and naval supplies, the Dutch merchants had
drawn upon themselves the anger of the English government.

Some of the

Netherlanders saw the Armed Neutrality as a providential answer but others
feared English retaliation in the Dutch Indies.

All were paralyzed at the

thought at war.
Through the summer and early fall of 1780 a desultory correspondence
was carried on between The Hague and st. Petersburg.

The Hague wanted the

League to guarantee her colonial possessions; St. Petersburg re,tuaed.

Before

the Netherlands could be admitted to the League, Russia insisted that The
Hague officially notify the belligerents of its determination to accede; the
States General hesitated.
toward England.

This seemed too much like unnecessary defiance

France was content to let nature take its course, but England
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could not permit the Netherlands enlisting against her the support of the
entire Neutral League in a free-ships, free-goods policy.

Lord Stormont,

English minister of Foreign Affairs, determined that there wa'but on alternative, regardless of the inconveniences it would involve.

If the United

provinces joined the Armed Neutrality, war would be inevitable. 98
were bard pressed to find a way out of their dilemma.

The Dutch

ItAll parties are

divided over what Holland will do in the Northern Confederation.

Neither the

Stadholderians nor Republioans, nor Anglomanes, nor Franoomanes are
agreed.,,99

Finally, William V and the Nobles of Holland, fearful that their

leadership was failing, desperately insoribed their opinion in the resolution
book of the States General in an effort to prevent accession to the League.
The proposed oonfederaoy, they deolared, gave insufficient security to justify
exposing Holland to the wrath of England.

They urged that the more unjust the

English conduct, the more careful must be that of the republic since she was
unable to defend herself. 100 In spite of this formal opinion and the sound
reasoning whioh prompted it, on October 10, the states of Holland and West
Friesland, the weathervane of the states General, resolved to aocept the con101
federation on Russian terms.
At this cruoial moment, England received a boon in the form of the
papers taken from Henry Laurens.

Yorke presented these papers, especially

the Lee-Neufville draft treaty, to the Prince and the powerful Anglophile
Secretary of the States General, M. Fagel, as also to the prince's mentor,
the Duke of Brunswick.

After consultation with the other two, the prince

presented the draft treaty to the states of Holland where it oaused oonsiderable astonishment.

The States required Amsterdam to report on this matter on

~
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october 25.

102

Yorke had been certain that the affair would "thoroughly cool

the ardor for the Northern League," but his assurance received a shock when
Amsterdam and Van Berckel rather calmly admitted their part ~thetreaty.l03
The burgomasters then issued a pamphlet to justify their conduct and published
a French translation of it in the Amsterdam Gazette.

Their explanation was

the obvious one--one which has never been contradicted--that the treaty was
contingent on the colonies working out an accommodation with Great Britain and
that it would be presented for ratification only when that condition was tulfilled.

Or as Adams succinctly put it, "The English might as well have al-

leged a treaty between the rooks on the trees and the storks on the houses
as a cause of war. n 104
Yorke and stormont, however, had determined to persist until either
the Netherlands bent to the English will or until war with them could be declared and thus the Dutch forced to stop shipping naval stores to the allies.
Both men were convinced that the Hollanders had been treated with too much
moderation; 105 the burgomasters' attitude did little to dispel this conviction.

Yorke assured his superior that an immediate declaration would have a

great influence on the Northern League. 106 stormont followed the lead and
sent a strong memorial to be presented to the states General unless the
Provinces showed clear signs of refusing to acc~de to the Armed Neutrality.l07
Not only did Yorke judge it unlikely that the Provinoes would refuse but he
knew that votes sufficient to guarantee accession had already been submitted
to the Secret Committee.

Yorke then rushed his memorial to the States

General on November 10 in the hope that some positive votes might be changed
before it was too late.

His memorial demanded a formal disavowal of the
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conduct of the Amsterdam regency, prompt satisfaction proportionate to the
108
offense, and an exemplary punishment of Van Berckel and his accomplices.
If the Dutch refused the impossible terms presented, England gould declare
war and thus put the Netherlands into the position of belligerents and beyond
the pale of the Neutral League. 109

,llien the States General hesitated to print

the memorial, Yorke bad both Dutch and French translations inserted in

~

Hague Gazette so that all Europe should understand the distinction England
was drawing between this quarrel with the Netherlands and the Neutral
110
League.
The Yorke memorial caused a violent fermentation especially at Amsterdam.

For the succeeding weeks fear permeated the Dutch; all interest seemed

centered on this memorial which the States General had taken ad referendum.
La Vauguyon informed his court of the general indignation and called the

memorial an "act of arrogance."

However, France was not anxious to bave the

Netherlands join the belligerents and his home office directed La Vauguyon
to advise Holland to disavow the entire proceeding of Amsterdam. 111 Yorke
agreed that there was great alarm, especially on the Exchange, but believed
that the greater part were unwilling to break with England.

He still hoped

it would produce a reconciliation on British terms. 112 Adams sent a copy of
the memorial to Congress with an explanation of the impossibility of censuring
the burgomasters since the Amsterdam regency formed an integral part of the
sovereignty of the nation and also paid a fourth of all the taxes.

He re-

marked strong symptoms of resentment throughout the country and noted that
insurance rates had gone to twenty or twenty-five per cent, but he was not
quite ready to predict that war would result. 113 The memorial he described
as "a masterpiece ••• a curiosity."

Because of the tone of it, he thought
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simple non-accession would not satisfy the British who had practically declared war against Van Berckel and the burgomasters. charging them with faction, cabal. and a host of similar crimes.

But he judged thai if the republic

did not join the Armed Neutrality. it would be "wholly owing to this memo114
rial."
Finally, on November 20, 1?80, the States General voted for accession and signed the formal agreement with Russia in St. Petersburg on January

3, 1781.
During the period of confusion, Adams had kept Congress informed of
developments.

At first he viewed the disclosure of the documents taken from

Laurens with moderate placidity and determined to make the best possible use
of them.

In the belief that they were in general quite harmless, he assured

Huntington that "on the whole

gil seems

to be rather a fortunate event that

these papers have been publicly produced.,,115

He hoped to turn sentiment

against the English for their treatment of Laurens and so collected information on Laurens' confinement and forwarded it to Dumas for publication.
Dumas inserted it in the Lelden Gazette after deleting two or three lines because he feared the reference to "white eyes lt would be too apt to compromise
the writer. 116

Adams sanctioned this touch of prudence and submitted that the

title might be "misleading as Nerone neronior is nearer the truth."ll?

It

was not long before he had ample cause to reverse his first judgment of the
wisdom of producing the papers.

The events of the succeeding months turned

United States-Netherlands relations from poor to much worse.

Looking back at

the situation years later he wrote, "ThB discovery of the Lee-Neufville draft
spread universal coneternation throughout the seven Provinces.

I do not re-

member to have found one person who pretended to see the wisdom of it. fll18
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other developments also, Adams faithfully reported.

In one letter he

drew a parallel between Boston and Amsterdam, between ctis, Hancock, or Adams
and Van Berckel.

In another, he saw England pursuing the sam( pattern as she

had in America--separate the people from their regency and the other cities
of Holland from Amsterdam. 119 His surmise vas reasQnably correct as the
Yorke-stormont correspondence showed that these two ministers contemplated
declaring hostilities only on Amsterdam and actually did lay battle plana
120
After the republic
which would wreak the greatest vengeance on that city.
voted accession to the Armed Neutrality on November 20, Adams informed Congress that, in the opinion of many, the republic would not have taken this
step but for the discovery of Laurens' papers.

For his part, he did not ex-

pect England to honor the Netherlands' decision.

He vas certain the Court of

st. James would prefer risking a war with all the maritime powers to accepting the principle of free ships, free goods.
him to be in an "embarrassing 8i tua tion. It

The Netherlands appeared to

The pro-English prince commanded

the army and navy, and was in general supported by the nobility and the
clergy.

Counterbalancing this advantage, Yorke had apparently erred in giving

Laurens' papers to the prince rather than presenting them directly to the
states since this made William appear as Yorke's tool, hardly a factor recommending him to the Dutch nation.
antagonized many.

The intemperateness of the memorial also

After expatiating on the pros and cons, Adams opined that

"all these things • • • far from aiding our affairs • • • have put an entire
stop to them for the present.

The nation is trembling for their commerce,

their money in the British funds, their East and West India possessions, and
no man dares engage in a measure that may in some degree increase the
alll'll"m

,,121
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on November 23, three days after acceding to the Neutral League, the
Province of Holland determined to disavow the action of its burgomasters in
the offending treaty and put the entire matter before a Grand Qbmmittee acting
as a court. 122 England refuse. to accept these measures as ample satisfaction and presented another memorial with a solemn warning that silence regarding it would be interpreted as a refusal to comply with England's demands. 123
As the situation continued to deteriorate, Adame fired off impressions more
rapidly.

The general purport of all this correspondence was that the Nether124
lands would have peace at &n1 price.
Adame explained the determination of
the Dutch to remain neutral as partially due to their long-standing de testation of the French.

Matq

of the Dutch people hoped they might escape English

wrath by joining the Armed Neutrality.
to offend such a powerful league. 12'
increase.

England, they presumed, would hesitate
Fears and tumults, however, were on the

Franklin was concerned that if the states General complied with

Yorke's memorials, Adams would be in jeopardy. 126 Adams was probably too
occupied to worry excessively about his own safety at the time, but at a
later date, he reminisced that "the apprehension, at this time, was very
general, that Mr. Van Berckel and one or two of the burgomasters, Hooft at
least, were to be immolated like the De Witts; and not a few expected that the
American ambassador would not escape. ,;J.27
After Yorke presented a second and even stronger memorial in December,
Adams noted that, to a Dutchman, war was the "greatest of evils," and that
Yorke was playing on this by a series of memorials "to keep up the panic."
For his own part he found this panic a nuisance as well as dangerous.

While

it continued, his work was almost at a standstill since "no man dares engage

-
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for me; very few dare see me."

If the prince's denunciation had "excited an

alarm" and Yorke's first memorial fta terror," the second memorial "corroborated and augmented it." A few persons, however, were beginning to feel "the

128 To Jenings he predicted that Yorke

indignity as well as the terror."

would "kick and cuff and pinch this people until he forces them into a little
spunk."

He confided that he found men more willing to "cry shame" on the

last memorial but credited Yorke with the astuteness to push intimidation
only far enough to prevent the Dutch from being of help to America or lending
Adams money, not far enough to declare war. 129
Until the capture of Laurens, Adams had kept his commission to negotiate a loan secret from all but a very few.

But, once convinced that the

business was entirely in his hands, at least for the foreseeable future, he
proceeded to contact prospective brokers and bankers in earnest.

After

Vollenboven's refusal to undertake the loan, Bicker recommended Bowens and
Sons, relatives of his

OWD.

This company displayed 80me interest for a few

days but was soon intimidated by the furor caused by the prince's denunciation
of Van Berekel and the magistrates. l30 Importuned to reconsider by Adams,
they made some inquiries which convinced them that there was no hope of
success and so, on the day of Yorke's first memorial, they again declined the
trust. l31

In the meantime, the broker, Blomberg, had taken seriously ill and

could not properly attend to his business.

This situation presented Adams

with a major problem since brokers who spoke French or English as well as
Dutch were rare.

Bowens suggested Christian Tenkate and William Van Vlooten

but Bicker was not enthusiastic about either of these.

He agreed that they

were capable but feared that they might be influenced by their own interests.

"...---------,---------------------------------------------~8~3~
In addition, Van Vlooten resided in Utrecht and, although he might well control the money for investment there, that area possessed insufficient capital
l~
.
for the project Adams contemplated.
Thus, after all his e~orts, Adams
found himself without a broker or a banker.

To compound the difficulty,

Congress not only remained blissfully unheeding of the financial straits of
her minister abroad, but even complicated his situation.

By simple resolution

they determined that Adams should pay the bills drawn on Laurens. 133 No
simple resolution, however, was able to make money available with which to do
so.

This task required hard work and involved multiple disappointments.
On two occasions only had Adams received some little encouragement in

his efforts.

Van der Capellen wrote of a relative who was inclined to invest

twenty thousand florins.
a time
tions

wh~n
wer~

Adams conditionally accepted the offer dependent on

a house would be chosen and terms fixed. l }4
destined to be months in the future.

Both of these condi-

A seoond hope was offered by

Franklin who notified Adams that the king of Spain had offered his guaranty
for

payme~t

of interest and principal for a $150,000 loan to the United states

to be taken up either in France or Holland.

Because of loans being floated

by the French government, Franklin felt the offer could not be used to full
advantage there and passed the information on to Adams.

This gentleman

responded that he received it nas cold water to a thirsty soul.,,1.36
tunately, it proved a mirage and nothing further came of it.
bills were being presented.

Un for-

In the meantime,

Adams was forced to refer these to Franklin for

payment and to add the information that he had been told that other bills
totaling some twenty thousand pounds were on the way.137
After months of discouragements, Adams confessed that there were no
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prospects of borrowing any money at all.

The events of the past year had

extinguished any credit that might have been available.

rfEven the Burgoyning

of Cornwallis" would be insufficient to convince the Dutch tba-t they ought to
lend to America. l38 To Huntington, Adams described the reasons for the unavailability of money.

In the first place, the Dutch traditionally admired

the English and hated the French and time would be required to eradicate these
prejudices.

In the meantime, British arms being consistently successful, the

Dutch were little encouraged to invest in a losing cause.

Another reason for

hesitancy was the long-undetermined question of the Netherlands' accession
to the Armed Neutrality and the impropriety of upsetting delicate negotiations.

Finally, the publication of Laurens' papers and the

of Sir Joseph Yorke had upset the entire country.

a~gry

memorials

These reasons combined

"have thrown this nation into a state of astonishment, confusion, and uncertainty to such a degree that no house I have yet thought it prudent to
apply to dares undertake the trust.

The times are now critical indeed.,~39

\ilien Gillon asked Adams for assistance in procuring a loan for South Carolina,
Adams pointed out the United states' money could not be at his disposal to
give and, furthermore, there were representatives also from Virginia, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts in Europe soliciting.

To aid one of them would give

the others similar rights to seek his assistance.
he was simply unable to assist.

Aside from these reasons,

"I have left no measure unattempted that

prudence could justify, but have neither procured
least hope of obtaining any • • • •

a~

money, nor obtained the
140

Hopes are all at an end."

J. L.

Austin, unsuccessfully seeking to borrow on behalf of Massachusetts, was advised to find consolation in the faot that he had had "as good luok as anyone
,,141
e1 see

With Adams the expression of discouragement was never synonymous with
submission to it.

He continued to make extensive inquiries and even various

proposals, only to have them politely deolihed.

He, on his

p~t,

was loathe

to apply to small houses until he had exhausted every possibility of engaging
a large concern since the political considerations involved seemed as vital
to him as the economic situation. 142 Oddly enough, Adams viewed Joml
Neufville, the only representative of a major house who held out any hope
for success, as deceiving himself.

Others advised Adams that any effort he

would make while the country was so distraught would be injurious.

He agreed

that little credit would be available while there seemed any danger of England regaining sovereignty in America. 143
Through November and early December the Anglo-Dutch sparring had
elicited from Adams a fresh round of pleas for Congress to commission a
minister plenipotentiary.

He pointed out the advantages.

A commission would

secure external respeot for its bearer; it would give him the right to olaim
the privileges and prerogatives of his position; it would assist in getting
a loan, and it would designate thepne commissioned as the oenter of American
144
affairs in the country.
Since he was already on the soene and ready to
act in that capacity, he began inquiries as to the possible extent of his
powers.

A message to his agent in London requested any infonnRtion Digges

could glean as to whether or not Laurens had a oommission as minister plenipotentiary or only the oommission to negotiate a loan. 145 James Searle,
reoently arrived in the Netherlands, assured Adams that Laurens had the desired commission, but Adams was not completely convinoed. l46

The American

was not alone in his concern about a commission as plenipotentiary.

The
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English ministry was also interested but with different intent.

stormont

directed Yorke to undertake a careful investigation as he had information regarding a proposed connection between the United States and t~ United Provinces.

"It will be essential to watch Adams as narrowly as possible.

He

certainly has some of the powers that were given to Mr. I&urens, but whether
or not his commission is so extensive as that of Laurens I cannot as yet
saye,,147

Yorke assured the Foreign Hinister that the news of one American-

Netherlands treaty had been too badly received to fear further activity in
tllat area for a time.

Less consoling, howevor, was the news that Adams had
148
declared that he had full powers to treat with any buropean country.
Actually Yorke was either misinformed or he misinterpreted Adams' powers since
that gentleman was commissioned to treat only for a general peace, for a
commercial treaty with Britain, and for a Dutch loan.
Adams' own awareness of the limitations of his powers and of the uselesaness of all three commissions in the existing circumstances probably
contributed to the strong note of discouragement in his December mail.

By

the early part of the month the Stadholderian party had become sufficiently
powerful to engineer the disavowal of the Lee-Neufville treaty in all but two
of the cities of Holland.

American credit was "totally annihilated." Any

who would dare undertake anything would likely be charged with aiding and
abetting rebellion.

His every effort frustrated, Adams bitterly reflected,

flFriendship for us in this country goes little farther than an inolination
for our commeroe. 1I149 Conditions were such that every channel he had been
pursuing was suddenly being closed to him.

Men who had formerly talked en-

couragingly of loans now refused to hold out the slightest hope.

During the
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tumult of November, he had rejoiced at the publication of the Pensees and
Howe'S Narrative and had eagerly awaited that of the Burgoyne papers.

Then

there had been so much to be published, but by December a few 'rticles to
Digges apparently comprised the entire propaganda effort.
Adams informed Congress that his work was at a standstill and that,
far from helping him, few wanted to be seen speaking to him.150 Even the
weather was becoming unpleasant and he grumbled to Jenings.
me with nannels and furs like a Dutchman.

"I shall cover

A man's feelings soon remove all

the ridicule of it.,,151 It was nearly a year since his arrival in Europe
"and the dullest year it has been that I ever saw.

Such another, I hope I

shall never see." American credit was "not worth a guinea."

"As to the olive

branch, the seed is not yet sown that is to produce the tree that will bear
it."152 Upon learning that Franklin was again suffering from the gout, he
grumbled that he. "could wish for the gout, too, or anything else to make the
scene agreeable to me, who in this oapital of the reign of mammon cannot find
the air of Passy or the amusements of Paris." Even the good Puritan virtues
of industry, simplioity, and economy were perverted into "only private
virtues that begin and end in self.,,153 He longed to be at home where he
might do something worthy of history, "if I could get there without going

- abandon their dependenoe
after Mr. Laurens."154 He advised his countrymentto
on Europe.

"I wish we were wise enough to depend upon ourselves for every-

thing and upon them for nothing.

Ours is the richest and most independent

country under heaven and we are continually looking up to Europe for help!,,155
EVen attendance at Sunday services prove' an irritation to him.

In Rotterdam

and Utrecht, he chose the Presbyterian service as least likely to be biased

"...
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in favor of England; in Amsterdam he visited Episcopalian and Presbyterian
chapels.

He was annoyed to hear each parson preach and pray for England, the

royal family, and their triumph over their enemies--definiteli a "work of
supererogation in these reverend zealots."

It irked him further to recognize

these servioes as a fair gauge of popular opinion since, in addition to the
numerous English people, many English-speaking Dutch attended these churches
and seemed not to be offended. l56
The year, then, appeared to be ending most dismally from Adams' point
of view when the English took a further drastic step.

Having received no

answer to their latest memorial (December 12), the English ministr,r directed
Yorke to depart from The Hague without taking leave and to repair to Antwerp
to await further orders.157 They also drew up a manifesto in which they
traced the development of Anglo-Dutch friendship, listed the aggravations
presently suffered from Amsterdam, and declared their intention of securing
satisfaction. 158 These actions brought the relations between England and the
Netherlands to a new crisis.

The news of Yorke's departure on December 25

rekindled the ferment but with one difference--which Adams was quick to note
and slow to trust--the English ministry was being rather warmly cursed where
formerly it was only feared.

His friends believed that things appeared to

be improving, but he remained unconvinced for a time. 159 He would concede,
however, that the stalemate might well soon be over and either peace or war
would result.

Peace would be highly preferable to the inhabitants, but, in

case of war, the Netherlands could demand the ai,d of the Armed Neutrality and
thereby add four more opponents to England's enemies.

These possibilities

were something for Adams to watch closely and to be ready to take advantage

\
89
of if an opportunity presented itself.

160

In the meantime, there seemed

nothing to do but await future developments.
/
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CHAPTER III

/

A MEMORIAL PRESENTED, JANUARY-MAY t 1781

The fiDal days of 1780 and the beginning of the new year, 1781, brought
a Dew dimension to the political scene in the United Provinces.

As the news,

and gradually the purport, of Yorke's withdrawal began to permeate the country,
a revitalization ot the public spirit slowly appeared.

From the doldrums of

fear and apathy, so irritating to Adams, a spirit of self-vindication and
national pride began to evolve.

The streets of Amsterdam swarmed with all

manner of party propaganda, each party seeking to out-print the others.
sands of extravagant and incredible reports were circulated.
the scene with both pleasure and consternation.

'rhou-

Adams viewed

He rejoiced to find masterly

defenses of the burgomasters being circulated and told with relish of a popular song designed especially to inspire sailors with resentment toward the
English.

A woman singing this song in the streets sold six hundred copies

wi thin an hour. l

He had been warmly, although inaccurately t assured that more

than four-fifths of the Dutch loved the Americans and desired their success. 2
He observed the republican party become more outspOken and openll compare the
friendship~between

England and their own country to that between cain and

Abel. 3 On the other hand, he recognized the strength of the national prejudic.
1+
in favor of the British and the potencl of the st&dholder's influence.
Official circles were far from riel ding to popular sway.

ID the government

every move was "studiousll delayed." A counter-manifesto, retaliatory letters
101
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of marque and reprisal to balance those issued by the Court of St. James, and
even the decision of the Court of Holland on Van Berckel were so retarded and
their promulgation so clouded that none knew whether war had }(een declared. 5
The prince, the investors in British fUnds, and the merchant groups each had
much to lose and little to gain from war and their influence was powerful in
the states.

Consequently, the American minister staunchly refused to predict

the outcome as he could Itnever depend upon anything here until it is past."6
He did, nevertheless, take a keen interest in events as he conceived the whole
system of Europe being settled within a few weeks by the decision of the
Dutch.?
Although his activities were temporarily restricted to very quiet,
private contacts, he made the greatest possible use of his forced role of
spectator.

He admitted, "! am not able to do much towards midwifing the

great events with which the times are pregnant, yet! don't think the less

8 Once again interpreting popu-

nor the less anxiously about them for that. tf

lar opinion from the Sunday service, Adams was pleased to note that when, on
the Sunday preceding Christmas, the parson of the Presbyterian church began
his customary prayer for the king of England, he was stopped by a murmur.
On Christmas Day the prayer was interrupted by "still greater confusion,"
and the following Sunday the "offensive clause" was completely omitted. 9 The
theater proved another excellent place for taking the pulse of popular sentimente

He attended a production of the national tragedy, after which the

actors, according to their custom, addressed the audience.

On this occasion

their address was interlarded with phrases betraying the republican spirit, a
quote from a popular street song, and a solemn injunction not to be slaves.
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All these were received with strong applause.
'N'hen a new stage plaY', "De
Ruiter," appeared, there was applause "a tout rompre lt for every line in which
the

,,;,

En~ish

were roughly treated. 11

Other encouraging signs appeared.

/
The presses continued to turn out

innumerable pamphlets, handbills, songs, and poems, but more and more the
preponderance of these were against the English, and, not infrequently, they
contained favorable hints concerning the Americans.

Private family groups

and small social meetings also displayed strong anti-English sentiment.12 On
a trip through the major cities of the Province of Holland, Adams deteoted a
growing spirit of resentement toward England. 13 In spite of all these good
omens, he was wise enough not to become too sanguine.

He recognized that the

populace reflected the first strong feelings of resentment but that this sentiment had not yet proven capable of accepting the shock of heavy commercial
losses.

14
Time would demonstrate that Adams was more justified in his premonition

than even he realized.

Between the English manifesto of Deoember 20 and

Yorke's departure from The Hague on December 25, an estimated two hundred
Dutch ships with oargoes valued at fifteen million florins were seized. 15
The wealthy St. Eustatius in the West Indies was struck on February 3, 1781,
and the value of its oapture was thought to be more than three million pounds
sterling. 16

Fortunately for Adams' future negotiations the news of these

losses did not reaoh the Netherlands until popular spirit had, to a degree.
solidified.

Even so. there was great distress at the news. especially at

Amsterdam where the losses were the heaviest.

This oity, the acknowledged

leader of the republican and anti-English foroes, resolved to send deputies
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to England to work out an accommodation. l ?

The other cities of Holland, decl

ing that they would not "debase themselves by courting the robbers," refused
to support Amsterdam in her resolution and no delegation was 'ent.

Dumas was

quick to note that their manly statements would have been more noble if their
18
losses had been on a par with Amsterdam's.
On the other hand, the English
population in some of these cities, for example, Rotterdam, was quite considerable; so the unwillingness to compromise with England was all the more
remarkable.

The anti-English climate of opinion, which had by that time

waxed strong enough to prevail over Amsterdam's anguish, was not primarily due
to

th~

efforts of John Adams but some part of the credit must in justice be

given to him.
As soon as the first hint of favorable signs appeared, Dana advised
the minister to use the opportunity presented by the English.

The manifesto

of December seemed to have "thrown open the door wide, and let us enter without hesitation."

If, however, Adams should find the door not quite open,

Dana, as one good militia diplomat to another, suggested entering anyway.

He

counselled that at times it was not only "necessary to step over a prescribed
line," but also that when one did so to promote the interests of his country,
he was "entitled to much merit.,,19 Adams took encouragement from such advice
and in January (1?81) resumed his activities to enlighten the Dutch concerning
America, to borrow money, and to seek recognition.
As a first step, he again began to flood the presses with articles.
Those sent to Digges usually appeared in the Courant, the choice of most
Londoners for early American news.

20

This channel

o~

communication was short-

ly blocked by the British who inaugurated a much sterner policy of aurveil-
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lance and concentrated on the stoppage of all traffic in illegitimate oorrespondence.

Digges warned Adams that "the times are too much against us yet
.

to open the contraband commeroe which we formerly dealt in suice.stully."

21

Correspondence between them gradually dwindled to the point of extinction.
Communioation with Luzac, on the other hand, had been facilitated.

Adams'

private seoretary, Thaxter, living in Leyden with the minister's sons. could
personally deliver artioles and he apparently made many trips to the editor
of the Leyden Gazette. 22 Probably the major pieoe of work translated and
printed by Luzac was the pamphlet, The Crisis. 23 but he frequently printed
news items and artioles favorable to the Amerioan oause.

Dumas regularly

channeled to Luzao publishable material sent to him first by

Adams.

Official

news and items ot unusual importance the minister generally .ent to Dumas at
Tbe Hague to enable him to impart these items to various key figures before
their appearanoe in print.

Such, tor example, was the procedure with the

congressional resolution praising Adams tor his stand of the preceding April
on paper money.

24 A series ot revolts--in Washington's army, among the

Vermonters, and of the Pennsylvania Line--provided stories which the English
press dramatized. 25 Dumas begged for information and also for Adams' impressions in order to "tranquilize the weak and diminish the joy of the illintentioned.,,26 Adams, in turn, colleoted his information froll a numbt'!r of
correspondents--Dana, Franklin and his nephew W. T. Franklin, Williams,
Mazzei, the Lees, and others throughout Europe as well as a large number of
friends and relatives in America.

Thus he was able to contradict the false

reports which were designed ohiefly to give the impression that the spirit of
rebellion was decreasing and that shortly the Americans would sue for peace.
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He, on the contrary, stressed the motive of independence which fostered these
revolts.

The revolt of the Vermonters was purely to maintain their independ27
.
ence from New York;
the revolt in Pennsylvania was for redr'ss of minor

grievances.

The actions were far from being a return-to-England movement.

The only two men of the Pennsylvania group who suggested joining the English
were promptly hanged by their fellow revolutionaries without further

.

ado~

28

Prominent among all the publicists, Jenings continued to prove of
inestimable worth to Adams.

In 1781, Jenings became acquainted with the

editor of Lettres Ho11andoises who lived in Bruase1se

This editor was favor-

able to the American cause and glad to print articles to further it.

Indeed,

he requested material for a brief account of the situation in America as a
special article to introduce his seventh vo1ume. 29 One of the first pieces
Adams sent to Jenings to be forwarded was a pamphlet written by Ca1koen in
defense of the Amsterdam burgomasters.

For the most part, the logic of this

pamphlet saemed irrefutable to Jenings, but he warned Adams that there was
one theme of it which would cause trouble.

The fear was that the United

States would develop in extent and in power and thus become a dangerous commercia1 rival.

The old fear, earlier expressed by Dumas and then by Van der

Cape11en, would be resurrected if the passage in 4uestion were printed.
Jenings was not himself apprehensive of American rivalry but had heard the
arguments from others and so had prepared a set of answers to assuage the
fears of the doubtfU1. 30 Adams signified his approbation of Jenings' proposed
answers, and Jettings proceeded to draw up an article for publication.
chief premises of this article werel

The

1) There was no cause for any commercial

jealousy between Europe and the United States.

Rather. mutual advantages

107
would accrue, with the Dutch profiting most from the increased trade.

2) The

United Jtatea had neither need nor desire to supplant the Dutch carriers but
these would benefit more if American independence were aCknowiedged and a

3) In the evant that England were to regain her

cownercial treaty signed.

colonies, she would prevent a free commercial system.

Therefore, the article

concluded, Holland's own welfare depended on a treaty of alliance and commerce. 31
A week before Jenings submitted these proposals, Adams had requested
him to collaborate with the editor of the Lettres Hollandoises on the subject
of an alliance between the United Provinces and the United states.

To that

request, since he already had it in mind to attempt a treaty of amity and
commerce, Adams appended the hint that there was good reason for introducing
Jenings' speculations at that time.

Jenings was quick to pick up the hint

and to apply himself assiduously to promoting the objective.

Consequently

three subsequent issues of the Lettres pointed out the advantages in increased
wealth, power, and commerce to the Netherlands from such an alliance.
Jenings, fearful that the message might not be understood, took great pains
to emphasize the need of

IiUl

alliance since "the more strokes given • • • will

make the nail go better.,,32
Fortunate to have someone willing and able to apply those strokes,
Adams C0l41d devote time to other problems.

At almost no time during his so-

journ in the Netherlands was he free from bills drawn by Congress.

Invariably

these had to be referred to Franklin for payment as his own efforts to effect
a loan were long unsuccessful.

He had very quietly applied to several houses

as soon as he received the commission to negotiate a loan, but all refused.
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political conditions during late November ana December, 1780, rendered any
further effort unavailing for the time being.

No event, however, could keep

the busy mind of John Adams from observing, plotting, and preparing.
Neufville had been suggested by Van der
of America. 33

~~pellen

John de

as an old and zealous friend

He was also the head of a large and thriving banking business.

From the time of his arrival in Amsterdam, Adams had been acquainted with
Neufville and had found him to be the only banker who, once Yorke had presented his fatal memorial, believed any loan could possibly be realized.

Some-

time in January of 1781 the two men agreed to draw up terms and experiment
with a loan.

Neufville presented a rough dT9.ft of terms 34 which served as a

basis for discussions between Adams and the banker during February.
Adams attributed his willingness to experiment
insistence of Neufville. 35

~t

4~ter,

that particular time to the

It might have been more accurate to say that the

co-operation offered by Neufville encouraged Adams to open the loan earlier
than prudence or common sense would have dictated.

Adams had personally

made "all the solicitations that decency would countenance" but had failed.
His friends and advisors, with the single exception of Neufville, warned him
that he would ru:J.n the entire business if he tried to negotiate without first
approaching the States General and William V.

The problem was that. before he

could approach these, he would need a commission to treat with them.

The

minister conceded that his advisors were in all probability correQt, but that
he r:1Ust follow the di:oectives of Congress as given to him and try the experiment. 36
The directives of Congress. whether correctly or incorrectly interpreted by Adams, were certainly one of the reasons for initiating the loan,
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but there were also other reasons.
ly being presented for payment.

In the first instance, bills were regular-

He had not a "Bingle ducat" and there was no

certainty that F'ranklin could continue to meet the obligatiomS.

Both he and

Franklin had repeatedly besought Congress to stop drawing on accounts that
were non-existent, but its plig}lt was such that Congress turned a deaf ear.
Adams solemnly warned that, if FTanklin were to fail him, he would simply protest the bills.

That seemed preferable to engaging for them and then, being

unable to pay, being sent to prison or declared bankrupt. 37

Naturally, he

was loathe to protest any bill drawn in the name of Congress as this action
would be ruinous to American credit.

In addition to the very material pres-

sure of outstanding bills, a more subtle pressure could be applied by Neufville through other Americans living in the Provinces.

Neutville confidently

predicted a considerable sum and importuned the minister constantly.

Since

the banker was a good host and extremely popular with the Americans in Amsterdam, he might easily convince them that the only obstacle to a loan was the
lack of authorization from Adams.

Not desiring to be charged with negligence

or obstinacy by his confederates and reasoning that no harm could be done as
America had no credit to lose, Adams capitulated.

Mutually agreeable terms

for the loan were worked out with Neufville. 38
The loan was launched at the beginning of March, 1781, but it fared
very badly.

Neufville attributed the poor returns to having opened it too

600n, but Adams disagreed.

He was of the opinion that it was "better too

soon than too late" since an opportunity once missed was a complete loss.
Further, it was only by trying the experiment that he would "know whether we
have credit and friends or not. 1139

However, he was not entirely satisfied
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with Neufville's management.

itJhen he had asked Bicker about Neufville the

previous fall, Bicker had refrained from answering the query.
covered, had a "public and a secret manner of speaking."

Others, he dis-

Co~equently, in a

formal letter, they would describe Neufville's as a very solid concern with
sound credit; at the same time, they would, if asked in confidence, caution
the inquirer to be careful.

Adams found Neufville honest and well-meaning

but not a clear-headed businessman.

40 Consequently, when the loan was slow to

materialize, Adams requested the banker to send some of the countersigned
obligations to him as he intended to function as his own broker, banker, and
41
undertaker.
Even while devoting his very best efforts, Adams was careful
to counsel Congress to expect nothing for several months at least and assured
them that the initiation of a loan at the time was regarded as a dangerous
42
measure "whi'h nobody but an American would have risked."
His luck at borrowing was no greater than Neufville's, and any hopes either had entertained
were scuttled by the news of the lOBS of St. Eustatius--news which reached
the Netherlands about the twentieth of March.

However, when Neufville ex-

pressed relief at the minister's "indifference n to the slow progress of the
10an,43 Adams was properly indignant.
was far from indifferent.

By return post, he retorted that he

lIe could agree with the banker only that, although

his reputation among some people might be affected by success or failure, it
meant little to him in a personal way-

The important point was that he had

his instructions from Congress, and he considered it his "indispensable duty"
to follow these directives and make the attempt.

44 His reply concluded on a

more conciliatory note by appealing to NeufYille's pride and business instinets to make a success of the affair.

In spite of Neufville's efforts,
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no more than five thousand florins were ever borrowed under this loan.

Of

these, three thousand were lent by Luzac who had promised that amount before
the loan was ever opened. 45

There were a number of reasons f6r the ill-luck.

Many of the Dutch felt a dread of embroiling themselves further with England.
Especially was this the case in March and April when there was a strong expectation that peace would be restored to the Netherlands through the pending
Russian mediation. 46

Others feared to invest their funds in a losing cause.

Many merchants had lost heavily at St. Eustatius and no longer had the wherewithal to lend to America.
estimated.

This last cause, however, should not be over-

Failure was not primarily due to shortage of money for investment;

a Russian loan, also opened about the first of March, netted 2,200,000 florins
within approximately three weeks. 47
Whatever activity Adams undertook was to some degree related to the
projected treaty with the Netherlands--a subject that weighed heavily on his
mind.

Propaganda was undertaken to inform the people of the similarity in

ideals and desires between the two republics.

In that similarity, he be-

lieved, lay the foundation for a treaty as well as a loan.

Regularly he

discussed with friends and acquaintances and then transmitted to Congress the
views they expressed of the absolute impossibility, even the danger, of attempting a loan without first possessing powers to negotiate politically.
The longer he applied himself to the work of enlightening popular opinion
and of initiating a loan, the more convinced he became that some political
connection was necessary between the American minister and the Netherlands
government.

He had undertaken his propaganda and loan activities even when

advised against doing so.

In

the same manner he had been advised against
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even mentioning a treaty.

48 Nevertheless, he determined to attempt some con-

tact with the Dutch government.
Late in January, 1781, he sought Dumas' opinion of the/propriety and
the prudence of attempting to be "introduced to one or more persons in power.
the Grand Pensionary

or

Holland, or any members of the states General, in

order to have some conversation upon American affairs: 49 To Adams the entire
matter seemed very obvious.

Since it was to the mutual advantage of both

countries to form a connection, it shoUld be to their mutual advantage to
discuss their relationships and through these discussions to obviate any difficulties Yhich lay in the path of such a connection.

Dumas hastened to

agree that a treaty was one of the two major objectives to be attained--the
loan being the other--but disagreed
to undertake it. 50

th~t

the present was an auspicious time

In January and February the country was still waiting for

an answer from Russia as to what help the Armed Neutrality would give them in
their trouble with England.

Everything depended on her answer to their appeal.

If Russia acceded to the Dutch request for aid, it would be necessary for
America to appeal for recognition first to Russia as the leader of the Northern confederation.

Once America was recognized by Russia, her problem of

attaining recognition from the other maritime powers would be considerably
simplified. 5l

If Russia should not succour the Netherlands and if the Dutch

wished to remain neutral, it would be impossible for,them to compromise their
position by forming any connection with an American minister. 52
The minister and Dumas viewed the role of the Netherlands from different angles.

Adams' attention was focused primarily on the Netherlands.

Neutral League played only a subsidiary role in his thinking.

The

Dumas viewed
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Russia and the Neutral League as of first importance.

Much of his correspond-

ence with the minister in the spring of 1781 counselled caution until the decision of Russia on Anglo-Dutch affairs became known.

Absolu~ely

could be undertaken politically without Russian concurrence.

nothing

Congress was

informed that it would be sufficient time to take an1 steps toward seeking
recognition of American independence when the expected rupture between Russia
and England took place.

Until that time, any negotiation would be useless.

Under no condition should any previous application be made to the Netherlands,
Dumas insisted, since that country could not act without the concurrence of
the Northern alliance. 53 Adams informed Congress quite to the contrary.
minister to the Netherlands was essential.
nation • • • will be disgusted.

A

nIf a minister is not sent, this

It is certainly ill policy to neglect a

nation which is more likely than any other to be affectionately attached to
us, as they are the center of the commerce of the world; as they are lovers
of liberty, ••• and as they are of the Protestant religion."

He offered

various combinations of political alliance for Congress' choice; a minister,
who also bad a commission to represent the United States in the other

~ritime

countries, could be sent to the Netherlands; a minister could be sent to
Russia to treat with all the neutral powers, and a second person sent to reside in the Netherlands and handle special interests there; t.inally, a minister might be sent to each of the maritime powers. 54 B.J each of these alternatives, Adams specifically provided a minister to be stationed in the Netherlands.

It was inconceivable to him that Congress should choose to authorize

no one to negotiate with these countries.
Since Dumas, the obvious person to arrange private introductions, re-
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fused to do so,

~dams

governmental circles.
to him.

By

was forced to hunt for another avenue of ingress to
Article X of the Treaty of Alliance with France occured

this article France had agreed to join America in Anviting other

powers which had received injuries from England to make common cause with
them.

He opined that if Congress or someone authorized by Congress proposed

this to France that country could not and would not refuse to fulfill the
treaty.55

He ~epeated his reasoning on this to Dumas and to Searle asking

each for his reaction.

Searle being in Paris Adams requp.sted him to confer

with Dr. Franklin on whether Franklin believed

hL~self

still possessed of the

proper authority to make and to implement such a suggestion.

This was an

important question since the former commission composed of Franklin, Arthur
Lee, and Adams had, until dissolved in 1779, power to treat and to make a
treaty of commerce with any nation in Europe.

If the dissolution of the com-

mission did not annul this authorization, Franklin would have succeeded to it.
The next question would be whether or not he still possessed it.
tion across the ocean was both slow and uncertain.

Communica-

Searle assured Adams that

Laurens had been made minister plenipotentiary to treat with the Netherlands.
If Searle were correct, Laurens' authorization would supersede that of Franklin. 56

Searle also informed Adams that Congress had given to Adams Laurens'

commission as minister plenipotentiary.

Adams, never having received such a

commission, concluded that either Searle was mistaken or that Congress had
forgotten to transmit it.

He possessed only the authorization to secure a

loan in the Netherlands and for the time had no intention of claiming any
other. 57

He was convinced, however, that Congress should be contacted and

authorization secured before the Northern powers settled their own affairs

115
with England, and America lost her opportunity to gain their assistance.

Duma!

agreed with Adams that it was high time Congress proposed that France join in
extending an invitation to the neutral powers.

For the purpo(e of issuing

such an invitation, Dumas presumed that either Adams or Franklin possessed
sufficient authorization.

Adams willingly conceded that the point of author-

ization, once the feat was accomplished, would not be of great moment in an
event of so much importance to America.

He was certain that Congress would

gladly ratify any accession of the neutral powers to the Franco-American
Alliance whether initiated by Adams, Franklin, or even by Louis XVI without
consulting either of the Americans. 58

He did, however, believe that a prior

commission would be of material importance in initiating an adherence of the
Netherlands or of the neutral powers.
A letter from Adams to Congress reminded that body of Article X of the
alliance and warned that, if the expected hostilities between the neutral
powers and England were to materialize, the "first moments of warmth and enthusiasm occasioned by this rupture, will be the most favorable" to invite
them to join the alliance.

To this he appended an explanation of the quandary

as to who was authorized to issue the invitation.

He strongly urged Congress

to remove all doubts by granting a formal commission to someone to treat with
the Northern powers and with Russia. 59

In another letter addressed to Con-

gress, but never sent,60 he expressed his sentiments a little more fully.
interim commission should be given to someone since Laurens, who reportedly
was authorized, would not be able to fulfill his duties for some time.

If

there were people who might feel it derogatory to accept an interim commission, there were others who willingly would do so in order to serve their

An
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country.

At any rate neither prudence nor good sense could sanction congres-

sional neglect of the Dutch.

He went on to add that he was not particularly

anxious to be the one commissioned but that he would accept
pointed.

t~

task if ap-

He would consider it his duty to render this service since he looked

upon himself as an "expensive article" to the United States, his present commission being "extremely honorable to me, but totally useless to the public.,,61
Following his general attitude that every opportunity to render service
to his country must be grasped, Adams next sought the opinion of Dumas on proposing to the States General a pact regarding war vessels.

In the name of

both wisdom and humanity the Dutch could permit their war vessels, privateers,
and merchantmen to take their prizes to American ports and even to trade there.
In return they could give a similar permission to the American captains to
use the Dutch facilities.

Dumas assured him that the proposal was valid and

no real objection could be levelled against it.

He was, nevertheless, strong-

ly against any such step for the time being as it would only serve to embarrass Their High Mightinesses and could accomplish nothing. 62 Again Adams
conceded--partially.

He accepted the idea that it was too early to present

any proposal to the states General as a body but he maintained that "hints
and ideas tt might be made to individuals as a means of "familiarizing them with
such speculations."

He then grasped the opportunity to tutor Dumas on the

proper role of a diplomat whose appointed function did not consist in waiting
until "things go of themselves" after the critical moment was past.

Rather,

a diplomat should emulate the midwife and make preparations for the crisis to
insure that all might go well.

The Hague diplomats, carefully shunning him,

-
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doubtlessly would not have appreciated his concluding piece of rusticity:
"And the corps diplomatique, with all their superb pomp, are but a company of

63

grannies."

/

Hardly had the ink dried on this pronouncement when Adams on February

8, 1781, received the Journal of the Continental COngress. He read therein
that he and the other ministers abroad had been commissioned to accede to the
maritime regulations drawn up by the neutral powers.

As Congress' resolution

was taken as a result of a letter from Adams the previous April, he was jubilant.

ttTbus you see that I began the mischief, and I assure you I am ready

to finish it, if properly invited, and a very little invitation will do.,,64

Rum-

Having this information was one thing; being able to use it was another.

mage through the mail packet though he would, he could find no commission for
the purpose nor any resolution authenticated by the secretary.

Dana was re-

quested to consult Franklin and others as to the proper step to take in this
contingency.

In the meantime Dumas was sent a copy of the Congressional

Journal with the directive to have the extract published in its entirely unless he saw some cause for not doing so.

Adams acknowledged himself anxious

to be recognized as the instigator of "such fine compliments to the Empress,
and the display of so much simple wisdom in Congress.,,65
Possibly Adams could not repress himself until Dumas responded.

In any

case, the Amsterdam Gazette published a translation of the article from the
Journals on the same day that Adams transmitted a copy to Dumas.

Dumas ex-

pressed great pleasure at the news itself but deep regret that it had been
published so precipitately in the Amsterdam paper.
find errors in the translation published.

He was doubly annoyed to

One "vicious error" certain to

11

cause trouble, was in translating as though the United states bad been invited
when the original text established the condition "if invited thereto." La
Vauguyon had pointed out this particular problem to Dumas

and~greed

with him

on steps to be taken to repair the error.

The Amsterdam translation would be

treated as one not proceeding from Adams.

Dumas would then issue what might

be considered the Official translation from the original possessed by the
minister.

In order to effect this, Dumas requested Adams not to take the

translator to task or have him make the necessary corrections in a future
issue. 66 Dumas had a second cause for regretting the Amsterdam publication.
He had desired to use the information for political ends first and then give
it to Luzac to publish.

Dumas thought he recognized in the resolution an

easy means of securing a connection, perhaps an interview, between Adams and
a minister of a foreign court residing at The Hague.

This arrangement would

now be rendered more difficult and possibly unattainable.
gretted that Luzac's interests had been neglected.

Dumas also re-

He reminded Adams that

Luzac was an old and trusted friend and had merited the preference rather
than a man who was a recent convert.

He went on to warn the minister not to

be too communicative in political affairs, especially not to those motivated
by self-interest or jealousy, and intimated to Adams that gazetteers could
belong to this group.

Piqued at Dumas' criticism, Adams informed him that

anything published in the Journal was free booty to any novelist and so an
item could not be saved for a favored editor.

Congress meant it to be pub-

lished as quickly as possible so that captains of vessels who were not formerly governed by the regulation would know and abide by the new rule.
addition, the confidential use to which Dumas desired to apply it before

In'

publication was not possible as\dams had no authenticated copy except that
found in the Journal. 67
A fev weeks later the proper commissions arrived.
then to decide on appropriate action.

Du~

and Adams met

They agreed to present a memorial to

the states General and to the ministers of the three other courts involved.
Adams then retired to Leyden to compose a proper memorial and a series of
letters to Van Berckel. La Vauguyon, and the ministers of Russia, Denmark and
Sweden.

In this memorial. presented on Maroh 8, 1781. Adams introduced him-

self as the minister plenipotentiary from the United States.
tion to whom he was accredited.

He did not mer.-

Regarding the enclosed resolution of Ootober

5. Adams stated that, as the American Revolution "furnished the occasion of
a reformation in the maritime law of nations," he hoped it vould not be
thought improper that the United States should participate in the benefits
and duties flowing from these regulations.

68 The letters to Prince Galitzin

of Russia, to Baron de Saphorin of Denmark, and to Baron d'Ehrenswerd of
Sweden eaoh enclosed a copy of the congressional resolution with a courteous
request that it be transmitted to the minister's respective court as Adams
was unable to personally present it at the court in question.

Adams sent

these letters to Dumas for any additions he thought it expedient to make.
When satisfied with their contents, Dumas was carefully to seal and deliver
them in person. 69
Dumas oalled the next morning at the home of the president of the
States General but that gentleman was out so the delivery of all the packets
was deferred until the following day.

On Harch 10 he delivered the correspond

ence beginning, according to Adams' directive, with the President of the State
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General.

The President questioned him about the contents of the letter and

its origin.

After answering these questions, Dumas was permitted to leave the

packet together with his own name and address.

He next

attem~ed

to visit the

ministers of the Northern powers, but, as it was the day for their courier, he
gained admission to the home of the Danish minister only.
promised to send Adams' letter to his court.

This gentleman

At the other houses. he oould

only leave the packet with his oard and hope for satisfactory actioh.'lO Adams
sent a copy of the resolution to La Vauguyon, also, with the infor:nation that
he had already communicated it to the other ministers concerned.

He requested

La Vauguyon's concurrence in the measure if an appropriate occ&lion should
arise.

La Vauguyon notified Adams that it would be completely impossible for

him to seoond the measure without the express order of his court.?!

Concern-

ing this reply Adams later commented that ttknowing perfectly ",ell the game ot
the Count de Vergennes and his ambassador, it was precisely what I expeoted. n ?2. Within the week Adams was impatient for a reply from the states General and began to fear that the president might have the constitutional right
to pocket, to suppress, or even to deliver to the stadholder papers addressed
to Their High Mightinesses.

The president, Dumas assured him,

~s

not per-

mitted to either suppress or to deliver to another person papers addressed to
the States General.

The States General. however, could neglect or defer

answering such papers as long as they wished.

In the present situation,

especially until England responded to Russia's current overtures to act as
mediator between England

ana

the Netherlands, Adams should expect a lengthy

wait.?'
With that small consolation the minister had to be satisfied.

In spite
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of Dumas' faithful efforts, further information on the fate of the memorial
was sketchy.

In the first place, Dumas often had difficulty in contacting a

member who could give him the desired information. 74

The

Ba~ was a rendez-

vous spot when the states General was in session but the deputies had to return frequently to their own cities or provinces for directives because they
did not constitute a sovereign body.

Also, anything as insignificant as the

memorial was relegated to the background while more pressing matters concerned Their High Mightinesses.
states General.

March had been a very busy month for the

The government of the United Provinces was clumsy and every

piece of business took an unconscionably long time.

In spite of this hand!-

cap, the states General had finally issued a counter-manifesto against the
British and had acceded to the offer of a Russian mediation of their difficulties with England. 75

The discussion over the augmentation of the army or

navy or both was a party issue which consumed valuable time but never reached
decisive aotion.

Consequently, a matter of as little immediate concern as

Adams' memorial went begging for a hearing.

Early in April. Visscher, a

pensionary of Amsterdam and a member of the States General, informed Dumas
that, as far as he could ascertain, the President had sent the memorial to the
Seoret Committee.

This committee, composed of the

~lrst

deputies of the

respective provinces, could be expected to grant a general hearing on the
measure.

The next report sounded the death knell.

To his surprise Dumas

learned that the memorial had been turned over to the greffier or seoretary.
Such action was the equivalent of rejection since any matter remitted to the
greffier was considered finished unless resuscitated by a new order. 76

In

all probability Adams did not accept this news as the heartbreaking blow it

,..
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might have been to him under different circumstances.

He was already too busy

with other plans.
As soon as Adams read in the Journal of the Continental/Congress that
all ministers were empowered, if occasion presented itself, to guarantee
American adherence to the principles of the Armed Neutrality, he cast about
him for an exact definition of his political powers.

He was already convinced

that the possibilities of a loan without some quid pro quo were small.

He had

sounded Dumas on proposing an agreement with the Netherlands regarding mutual
permission for all ships of either country to enter the ports of the other,
only to be told that it was a good idea--but not yet~??

Huch of February was

devoted to exchanging opinions on the possibilities of implementing Article X
of the Treaty of Alliance with France.

When he informed Dumas that. according

to Searle, Laurens had a commission, his correspondent replied that i f Laurens
had any powers they were at the bottom of the sea and useless.
they had applied only to the Netherlands.

Furthermore,

Since he was now empowered to

pledge American adherence to the principles of the Armed Neutrality, Adams
should immediately apply to Congress for powers to treat with all countries
concerned, beginning with Russia.?8

It seemed that every path ended at a

brick wall unless and until he could discover some way of communicating on a
political level.
If this were the case, he would look for the means.

ay mid-February

the minister was toying with the thought that his powers to negotiate a loan
implied the power to do whatever was necessary.

Congress had expressly

promised to ratify whatever was related to the object of a loan although no
mention was made of treaties or alliances.

"If such a treaty should be
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necessary to accomplish a loan, I suppose the power is sufficient to negotiate
and execute it and accordingly I should not hesitate to enter into conferences
I

upon the subject • • • even to execute in all the forms a treaty, one article
of which should be a loan to the United States.,,79 When asked by Bioker if he
had any power to treat with "bodies politic and corporate," Adams sent a copy
of his commission to Bicker to judge for himself.

In the accompanying note

he pointed out to his friend that no power to make treaties or alliances had
been given to him in express words.

On the other hand, the members of the

commission which had made the treaties with France in 1778 lacked not only the
power but also the title of either ambassadors or ministers plenipotentiary.
Therefore, he assured Bicker, there was a precedent to follow.

If a loan de-

pended on a treaty he would readily execute a treaty, provided one article of
it should be a loan, and he did not doubt that Congress would ratify it.
Bicker was not convinced; he saw in the commission only the authorization to
80
raise a loan.
Just at this point all quibbling over the possible use and extent of
his powers ceased with a definite commission to the Netherlands.

On

the re-

port of a committee to whom Adams' letters of September 24 and 25 were referred, came a oommission giving him "full power, general and specific, to
act in that quality LOf oommissione!?, to confer, treat, agree, and conclude
with the person or persons vested with equal powers by the States General of
the said United Provinces, of and concerning a treaty of amity and commerce."
The commission added that Congress would ratify "such treaty, conventions,
and agreements as he shall judge conformable to the ends we have in view."
With this commission he received a detailed plan of a treaty and the inatruo-
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tiona to adopt this plan in "whole or without any essential alterations. 1t
Above all, care was to be taken to accept nothing inconsistent with the
treaties already concluded with France. 8l

Unfortunately, the fequisite let-

ters of credence to Their High Mightinesses and to the Prince of Orange were
not enclosed.

These were promised by the next conveyance since

Hun~ington,

the President of Congress, had thought it undesirable to delay all the dispatches until these credentials were prepared.

Two days after the commission

and instructions were dispatched, the credentials were drawn but the "next
conveyance" failed to deliver them to Adams until April 6. nearly six weeks
after he received the commission. 82
Without credentials there was little Adams could do in a ministerial
way.

He applied to Bicker, Dumas, and others for advice but was told to do

nothing "tor fear of throwing betore the people new objects of division and
dissension.,,83 The country was too overwrought to listen kindly to any proposal which could further endanger hopes for peace.
peace.

"They are furious for

Multitudes are for peace with England at any rate, even at the expense

of risk of joining in the war against France, Spain, America, and all the
rest.

They are in a torpor, a stupor such as I never saw any people in be84
fore."
It was a relief to him to know that ultimatel)" he would bave the

requisite commission.

For the interim he was sufficiently busy without it.

His loan opened the first of March and he was busy signing his "obscure name
.
85
nine and twenty thousand times" to obligations and coupons.
He was decidedly more interested in the memorial on adherence to the Neutral League
which he did present to the States General on March 8 than in a commission
sans credentials.

Oddly, he did not even acknowledge to Congress the receipt
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of his commission for nearly a month although he had corresponded with Philadelphia in the meantime.

When he did write, he emphasized the lengthy process

any request for recognition would follow.

After lying upon

t~e

table for a

long time, the request would be taken ad referendum, i.e., sent to the various
provinces, cities, and bodies of nobles who composed the sovereignty.

These

would "deliberate, and deliberate, and deliberate" before returning any answer.

He would do all in his power to secure the desired treaties but felt

"obliged to say that no commission that was ever given required more patience,
fortitude, and circumspection than this."

These were, he added with nearly

as much truth as humility, fl"nrtues which I much fear have not fallen in sufficient quantities to my share.,,86
The only action he took during March primarily as a result of his new
duties was to assure Dumas that he had every intention of continuing to use
that gentlemants services. 87

On

one of the last days of the month. he penned

a rough draft of a memorial requesting recognition of American independence
to be presented to the States General when the opportunity arose.

The arrival

of his credentials on April 6 seemingly moved him to make another rough
draft.

88 A considerable rearrangement of his thoughts took place between

these two drafts but the message was unmistakably the same.

In the first, and

with two very minor changes in the second, he proposed that in case he would
not be accepted as minister plenipotentiary, he had a right and duty to attend
the peace conference wherever it might be held.

In addition. he had the right

to demand all the privileges and prerogatives granted by the law of nations
to a minister plenipotentiary travelling through or temporarily residing in a
country other than his destination.

These lines definitely evidenced his
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recognition of the possibility that he
Provinces.

His third, and

fina~

r~ight

not be accepted by the United

draft completely omitted this paragraph and

worked on the assumption that he would be admitted. 89

The

on~

other major

change between the early drafts and the final one was the omission in the
final form of several paragraphs stating his reasons for being in France, his
inability--due to English indisposition to treat--to fulfill his previous commission, and his subsequent reasons for having left France and entered the
Netherlands.
The arrival of his letters of credence encouraged him to greater
activity.

.After

di~re5sing

on the complicated series of conveyances by which

they reached Amsterdam, Adams promised Congress that he would try to present
them shortly although the prospect was dim.

He tried writing a note to inform

La Vauguyon of thf'! new commission and to express his readiness to confer with

the French ambassador whenever it seemed necessary for the common good to do
so.

For some unexplained reason, he left the note uncompleted.

La Vauguyon

finally received word of the commission in a very formal note a few days before A.dams presented to the states General a memorial seeking recognition. 90
Since he was now endowed with a more permanent character, Adams felt
he should establish a residence suitable to his position.

He decided to re-

main in Amsterdam as it was the most convenient city for the merchants who
had bills of exchange to settle through him.9l

It was also a favorite city

for Americans, both resident and travelling, and a residence there would'
enable him to meet more of these people.

As most of his time, until the

previous month or two, had been passed in Amsterdam, he had made numerous
acquaintances in the city whom he was loathe to leave. 92

He contacted the

-
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firm of Sigourney, Ingraham, and Bromfield as the best acquainted with American ideas and requested that they procure a suitable dwelling for him.
Elaborating on his definition of suitable, he directed that th6 kitchen, four
bedrooms for gentlemen and two for servants, a large reception room and a
room for transacting business were to be immediately furnished.
take care of the house and a cook were to be hired.

A man to

The firm was not to spend

above three thousand guilders a year on the establishment. 93

Planning more

carefully for his needs, he soon decided that two men servants should be
hired--one for the affairs of the house and the other for footman and valet.
A carriage for four passengers was to be provided along with horses and
coachman.

To do things in proper style, Sigourney and Company were to pro-

cure three sets of livery to consist of deep blue cloth coat and breeches with
scarlet oape and scarlet waistcoa.t, and a hat and great coat.

His next set

of directions dealt with such incidentals as the number of tea cups, knives,
forks, and table napkins to purchase.

After penning these quite explicit

orders, he admitted it was "new work" to him as he had never troubled about
furnishings for a home before. 94
In mid-March irancis Dana in Paris received a commission to st. Petersburg.

Instructed by Congress to consult both Franklin and Adams regarding

this commission. he notified Franklin of it.
and Vergennes, he planned a trip to Amsterdam.

After meeting with the doctor
Before Dana departed for the

Netherlands, Franklin gave a half-hearted consent to the Petersburg mission
but used the occasion to express his sentiments again on militia diplomacy.
He informed Dana that he felt America erred in offering an alliance before it
was desired.

He though it far preferable not to have issued commissions for
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ministers to the several courts, including those of Spain and Holland, to
which comr'lissions lud been given, until Congress had ascertained privately
whether they would be received.

He argued tJ:J.at each refusal ~s an additional

slight and made the business of getting connections at other courts more dif. lt • 95
fJ..cu
Dana departed Paris on Sunday, April 9 and so undoubtedly was in contact with Adams before tbat individual completed a letter addressed to Franklin.

In this letter Adams couched a stront:: rebuttal to Franklin's wait-until-

invi ted policy and advocated his own more aggressi vo method.

:£"irst, he de-

clared that ::..urope was really in America's debt and in justice owed America
the help she asked.
If America could dissemble enough to threaten other nations with
a return to Great Britain they would be ready to hang themselves to
prevent it. But ,America is too honest and sincere to play this game.
England would have all the mountains of Mexico and Peru in a few
years if America should join her. Yet we are slighted. God forgive
them, and enable America to forget their ungenerosity.
He then turned to expound the propriety and the reasonableness of American
requests.
4merica has fought Great Britain and Ireland for six years, and not
only Great Britain.!. but many <Jtates of Germany, many tribes of Indians,
and many negroes LsiS7, their allies. Great Britain has been moving
earth and hell to obtain allies against us, yet it is improper in us
to propose an alliance! Great Britain has borrowed all the superfluous wealth of Europe, in Italy, Germany, Holland, Switzerland, and
some in France, to murder us, yet it is dishonorable in us to propose
to borrow money!
Put if, in spite of these facts, European nations were determined to maintain
tLeir neutrality, he would gladly settle for a complete neutrality.
Let all Europe stand still, neither lend men nor money nor ships to
England nor America, and let them fight it out alone. It would give
my share of millions for su§g a bargain. America. is treated unfairly
and ungenerously by Europe.
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He further justified his diplomatic creed to Dana in a final grUIllble before
involving himself even more deeply in the direct action he admired.
United states were proposing nothing dishonorable.

The

Any Europe~ court which

did not recognize American aims as consistent with its own, had a right to
"candidlyaay so" and there would be no harm done. 97
Verbal sparring with Franklin was not allowed to deter him from the
greater duties he was now prepared to initiate.

"The black cloud that hung

over the whole of the seven provinces; the solemn gloon that pervaded the
whole nation; the universal undertainty and the timidity that had seized upon
all minds, determined me to bring my own mission to a trial.,,98

It appeared

to him that he had much to gain and little to lose by such a trial.

He was

anxious to receive recognition from as many countries as possible before
peace negotiations were opened.

He feared that countries at war with England,

but anxious for peace, might accede to Britain's desire for stiff terms toward
America unless restrained by their own previous recognition of the United
States. 99

He assured Congress that an exposition of all his reasons and

motives for acting at that particular time would require too much time and
space for him to enumerate them.

In general, he felt that his measures would

be more effective if performed immediately than if they were delayed since
"every moment's delay would have been attended with danger and inconvenience."lOO
More and more during the early weeks of April, Adams devoted his time
to consultations with friends, many of whom were members of the sovereignty
and among the most respected men in the country.

These consultations con-

vinced him that it was time to polish a copy of his draft memorial describing
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his mission and to present it with his credentials to the Prince and to the
states General.

If they rejected it, he would simply leave the country.

they accepted it, his mission would be accomplished.

If

If they took it ~

referendum. which was the action most to be expected, he and his friends would
benefit from an increased safety and security.

While the national delibera-

tions dragged on, he would enjoy a quasi-diplomatic position which would secure the protection of government, public faith, and national honor. lOl
Dumas cautioned Adams that, when he came to The Hague to present his
credentials, it would be prudent to first arrange a meeting with La Vauguyon.
By doing so he would retain the ambassador's personal friendship and gcod
will.

There was no expectation that La Vauguyon would approve of the con-

templated action but a lack of courtesy could result in strained relations
that would be harmful to the project.

By giving the Duke "verbal knowledge,"

Adams could avoid submitting the action or the details of the plan to the
determination of La Vauguyon or Vergennes.

102

Adams apprehended difficulties

in this interview but recognized the prudence involved.

He was certain that

Vergennes knew of the appointment--perhaps even before he himself had learned
of it--aad had probably instructed La Vauguyon to throw every conceivable obstac1e in the way of any action Adams might take.

As distasteful as the

interview with La Vauguyon promised to be, Adams judged it preferable to the
consequences of neglecting the confrontation.

Consequently, he dispatched,

with Commodore Gillon who happened to be travelling to The Hague, a very
formal note apprising La Vauguyon of his commission and credentials. 103

La Vauguyon requested an immediate interview in the event that Adams
was contemplating any specific action.

Upon Adams' arrival at the Duke's
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residence, La Vauguyon spent two hours trying to persuade him not to present
his credentials.

La Vauguyon explained that he had not received any instruc-

tions which would entitle him to make even the slightest
official capacity.

obse~ations

From his own personal viewpoint, however, La

in an

V~uguyon

ar-

gued that it was not a good time to present credentials or request recognition.

La Vauguyon supported his argument with all the local knowledge that

he had gathered through several years' residence in the Netherlands.

He sug-

gested that Adams contact some of the Patriots and assured the minister that
these would support the ambassador's reasonings.

104

felt that he knew better what the Patriots approved.

Adams characteristically
He had been in frequent

consultation with such persons as Van Berckel, Van der Capellen, Van der
Kemp, and Luzac and had their full approbation.

In his own mind, he believed

them unanimously of his opinion that the American negotiations, both commercial and political. should proceed but "should be kept as distincb as possible
from all French influence.,,105
The following day the Duke returned the call and the two men spent the
entire morning and into the afternoon in discussion.

"He went over all the

ground we had trod the day before, and ran all about Europe, especially the
Northern Maritime Confederation. to find arguments against the step I proposed
to take."

When La Vauguyon objected to Adams' intended call on the States

General, Adams found nno solidity • • • mere pretexts" in the ambassador's
objections.

~~

Vauguyon then desired a postponement of the mission but Adams

was too wily to accept that.

He was convinced beforehand that Vergennes

would be "point blank against me." and he preferred to act without being
officially informed of Vergennes' displeasure.

The Duke's 4ext inspiration
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was .to urge that either Adams and La Vauguyon together, or La Vauguyon alone
if Adams preferred, solicit the king for a directive to La Vauguyon to support
Adams.

This, too, Adams rejected as he was well aware who dir'cted the ldngts

decisions in foreign affairs.

He then informed La Vauguyon that he was de-

termined to proceed and would not change his mind even if he had a resolution
of the king' s council right before his eyes.

He insisted that tiae was

precious and these negotiations could be spun out for years.

Adams then

closed the discussion by declaring that no ambassador, minister, council, or
court was responsible for his actions.

He alone should bear the responsibili-

ty for the•• l06 There was no choice for La Vauguyon but to yield.
Each man took a dim view of the other's logic.
"His topics appeared to me extremely frivolous."

La

opinion that it was Adalis' argument which was weak.

Adams tersely stated.
Vauguyon was of the
"He responded to my ob-

servations with very .ague reasonings which did not appear to me to be well
founded.10? Notwithstanding. the two men parted as friends.

La Vaug\lyon

promised his support as a private citizen although the proposal was contrary
to his opinion and advice.

Adams, from that time, always expressed deep

respect for the personal character of La Vauguyon.

Future contacts between

the two men were much less·infrequent and much more friendly--the Duke aDd
all his family received Adams with courtesy and even "the freedom and familiarity of triendship*"loS Adams always spoke highly ot the ambassador and was
generous in praising their mutual relations when asked about the. by Livingston.

La Vauguyon on his part was most careful to assure Adams of his estee.

and good will and was pleased to receive AdallS. in return .109 These exchanges
o~

courtesies may have given no direct aid to the AIIerican but they certainly

I"""'"
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prevented a serious division in the Patriot party and, conceivably, a cause
lost before it had time to mature. 110
Vergennes' reaction was sympathetic toward his ambassadOr at The Hague.
He assured the Duke that he had taken the wisest course, but Vergennes was
"not astonished at the little success. • • •

I have had in various things to

treat with this American plenipotentiary and have never been able to overcome
his stubbornness."

As for the business itself, "the step on which he has

consulted you appears to us out of place in every respect and it can only be
displeasing to the states General as it is not yet their convenience to reeognize the independence of the United States."
directions for the future.

He then gave La Vauguyon

"You will make no step to favor the admission of

his letters of credence and if they are not received, as will probably happen, you will endeavor to convince him that they could not be in the present
circumstances. It

Vergennes had not added the final phrase as a device to re-

move the sting of rejection from Adams' heart in case of failure.
'much more pragmatic approach than that.

It was a

If Adams did not accept La

Vauguyon's explanation, "your words will serve at least to justify our proceedings if Mr. Adams should place us in the situation of making them known
in America."lll

Small wonder that Adams complained that after the treaty was

signed Vergennes gathered unmerited credit.

The Foreign Secretary had his

minister in America formally announce to Congress that France had assisted in
forming the connection between the two republics, at which announcement Con,

grees approved a vote of thanks.

112

The necessary interview with La Vauguyon settled, Adams proceeded to
the next step.

He wrote out and signed two copies of his memorial.

On the
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nineteenth ot April these were addressed to Peter van Bleiswick, the Grand
Pensionary of Amsterdam, and to M. Fage1, the Secretary of the States General.
The memorial to the states General was of considerable 1ength./ It briefly
developed the causes which had led America to declare her independence and
dwelt at greater length on the country's intention of maintaining that independence.

He then explored the topic of natural alliances between the new

world and the old and pointed out that the most natural alliance of all was
one between the two republics.

This statement led to a discourse on the

several political, religious, and commercial ties between them.

As the

Netherlands was a highly commercial country. Adams devoted a large part ot
his memorial to the discussion of the commercial advantages which would accrue
to the Dutch nation through an alliance with America.

He concluded with the

information that he was tully accredited to witness America's friendship and
regard for her sister republic.

In a much briefer memorial to the Prince of

Orange. Adams informed the stadho1der of his commission as minister plenipotentiary and his desire to present his credentials to the Prince.

He briefly

noted that it was in the spirit of renovating old friendships rather than of
introducing new ones that he presented himse1f. 113
Barely had the two copies of the memorial been addressed when the
States of Holland adjourned.

Dumas, whose advice in these details Adams

generally accepted. counselled presenting his memorial when the States of
Holland were in session. This he thought would be early in May. 114 Adams
used the interim to good purpose.

It had been the general opinion of his

friends and confreres that the memorial should be published in the three
languages--French, Dutch, and English.

Copies were to be prepared for every
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member of the sovereignty in all the provinces--somewhere between three and
four thousand persons.

Adams preferred that Luzac make the French transla-

tion because of his great reputation throughout Europe for articles in French.
Dumas, however, pleaded for the privilege and Adams yielded.

By this time

Dumas was completely converted to the policy of prompt action and was as
anxious as Adams to proceed.

His translation was shortly completed and ready

to go to the printers whenever Adams gave the signal. 115 The Dutch translation was made by Luzac's brother-in-law, a bookseller, printer, and gazetteer at Delft.

He enjoyed the reputation of being "one of the most masterly
writers in the nation in their own language."116
The translation in good hands and under control, Adams was free to
marshal other forces and to apply pressures from a variety of directions.

To

Jenings he sent "some broken hints" and rjquested that Jenings expand them and
have them published as a subject of importance.

The general theme of his

"hints" was the importance of American independence to the Dutch and the dire
consequences to the latter if, in the future, America and England joined
against a Dutch nation that had been unfriendly.

These hints were complemen-

tary to those of a former letter to Jenings in which he dwelt extensively on
the idea that the Hollanders could not justly say that they had nothing to
gain from the war.

They had a great deal to lose and the question was one of

retaining and defending what they had.

As usual Jenings responded immediately

and by April 30 had met with a collaborator to get the "hints" into good
form. ll7 Contrary to all his former ideas, Adams wrote to Franklin that he
was inclined to begin protesting bills.

American bills of exchange were in

excellent credit and much sought as they were selling above par.

If a set
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were protested, the mercbants would get busy and exert their influenoe to rebuild the credit.

"There is an appetite here for American trade as ravenous
/

as that of a shark for his prey; and if they saw any prospect of having their

118 Even the aid of his wife

trade broken up they would do much to save it."

was requisitioned although her help would neoessarily be long in arriving.
Having informed her that he was destined to stay in Holland for some time, he
requested that she have one of his early writings, The Dissertations on the
Canon and Feudal Law, printed either in pamphlet form or in the newspapers.
She was then to send a copy by every opportunity until sure that one had
arrived.

He mentioned his anxiety to have it for a speoial purpose.11 9 The

partioular use to which he put it was to have a reprint made and addressed to
Their High Mightinesses to help their deliberations on the justioe of the
cause he represented.

This reprint he later included in the volume of papers

which he caused to be printed relative to his reception as minister.

120

On the first of May Dumas carried to Van Bleiswick a note from Adams
requesting an interview for early the next morning as Adams had something of
importanoe to oommunicate.

Van Bleiswick, Grand Pensionary of !\msterdam,

was the most important oitizen of the republic and, therefore, his good will
was of paramount importance.

At the ensuing interview Adams told the Grand

Pensionary of his commission and of his intention to communicate his powers
and credentials on Friday, May 4, to the States General and to the Prince.
Van Bleiswiok suggested that there would be a problem involved in accepting
these since Amerioa's independent status was not yet recognized.

Adams

failed to see that this should present any barrier since the Netherlands were
at war with England.

To this reply, Van Bleiswick merely smiled and agreed
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that they had a common enemy.
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Accordingly on Friday morning, Adams, on the

advice of La Vauguyon, visited Van Bleiswick again in order to give him a copy
of the memorial.

Van Bleiswick declined it with the advice t~t it was not

the custom for foreign ministers to present to him any missive intended for
the states General.

He suggested that the copy intended for him should rather

be presented to the Secretary, Fagel.

He also warned Adams of the conduct to

be expected of the President of the States General when the minister approached
tha t gentleman .122

Bleiswick had cause to be well informed on the forth-

coming reaction of Van Lynden van Hemmen, the President for that week. 123
After his interview with Adams on l4ay 2 t Van Bleiswick had informed the
Prince of Adams' intentions.

Together they concerted a plan which William V

outlined to Van Hemmen.

A meeting of William, Fagel, Van Bleiswick, and Van
12ft.
Hemmen was then called to discuss the appropriate action for all to follow.
After leaving the home of Van Bleiswick, Adams approached Van Hemmen.
This gentleman responded exactly as predicted by Van Bleiswick and as agreed
in their conference two days before.

He refused to accept a copY' of the

memorial as doing so could be interpreted as diplomatic reCOgnition of America,
a step for which he could not assume the responsibility.

He was willing, how-

ever, to listen to Adams and to report the business immediately to Their High
Mightinesses.

He assured Adams that it would thus be referred to the delibera-

tions of the several provinces.
rangement he could procure.

Adams accepted this promise as the best ar-

Nevertheless, he informed Van Hemmen that it was

his intention to have the memorial printed and distributed so as to avoid misconstruotions. 125 Since no copy of the memorial was accepted by the States
General, none could be published and thuB distributed to all members of the
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sovereignty by that body.
this objective,

~.,

Adams chose the only method which could accomplish

make copies available himself. 126

smiled at this proposal but made no comment.

President Hemmen
/

After Adams' departure, Van

Hemmen appeared before the states General to make his report.

The deputies

of all provinces except Zealand asked for copies of the President's report to
transmit to their respective provinces.

This was what was technically known

as taking the affair ad referendum. 127
While Van Hemmen was making his report, Adams visited Baron de
Larrey,128 secretary to the Prince, to deliver the briefer memorial intended
for the Prince with a oopy of the memorial to the States General.
secretary promised to present it.

The

Since the President had declined to accept

the memorial, Adams and Dumas decided to dispense with taking one to Fagel,
the Secretary of the States General.

Approaching him under these conditions

seemed improper although it had been Van Bleiswickls suggestion.
fore returned to Adams' lodgings to await results.

They there-

About two hours later,

de Larrey brought the unopened packet with the Prince's explanation of the
impropriety of his receiving any letter from Adams before the

~tion

had

recognized American independence. 129
Adams had now done all in his power to secure an official acceptance
of his memorW and credentials.

In view of the fact that he had apprised

the President of his intentions of having the memorial printed and distributed,
he felt no qualms in proceeding.

Therefore, Adams signed the French transla-

tion made by Dumas and ordered Dumas to have it published.l}O The next
morning the minister again visited La Vauguyon to inform him of the actions
and reactions of the previous day.

The ambassador once more promised to
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support Adams in his private capacity although he was still of the opinion
that the measure was taken at a most unfavorable time. 13l
Before Adams departed from The Hague, La Vauguyon explained to him
that in all probability ministers of the republic would wish to know the
French position on the action taken by Adams.
form them that he had

ha~o

The ambassador intended to in-

communication or instruction from his court on

the subject and therefore could not take any stand.
sume a neutral position.1 32

In brief, he would as-

Adams was very agreeable to this proposal as it

was all he had hoped or expected from the French ambassador.
La

V3.uguyon had second thoughts.

Soon, however,

Delicate negotiations133 between France and

the Netherlands could be jeopardized by the embarrassments Adams' memorial
might have caused the States General.

Expediency required that he convince

the leading members of the republic that the action, in spite of his disclaimer, was not secretly French instigated.

His intention to dissociate

France from any unpleasantness in connection with the memorial took on a new
urgency.

La Vauguyon contacted Van Bleiswick and various republican leaders

and assured them that the proceedings of Adams were not concerted with
France. l34

In order to prevent later criticism from Adams he carefully re-

frained from passing adverse judgment on the step itself, but emphasized his
own non-participation in it.

Apparently he carried off this maneuver with

a considerable degree of success.

Even such l\nglophiles as Schultens and

Van Goens,13; although normally inclined to suspect French intrigue, were
persuaded that he had condemned rather than assisted the work.

An intelli-

gence report sent to England also interpreted La Vauguyon's attitude as adverse to Adams' project.

Further, it sought to explain the French failure to
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countenance Adams' action as a sign that France was disposed to abandon the
"rebels" to their fate. l 3£)

The Prussian ambassador, Thulemeyer, who could

generally furnish a reasonably accurate running commentary on men and events,
was not so easily convinced.

He informed Frederick II that La Vauguyon

seemed discontented with Adams' proceedings but that he himself privately
thought the French minister had probably been the author of it.137
This deduction Vergennes was as anxious to avoid, or to dispel, as was
La Vauguyon.

He instructed his minister to explain to those who might ap-

proach him that not only had he not concerted the step with Adams but he had
done all in his power to deter the American.

He was to add that the French

government censored the demarche as being made "out of season."

If Adams

were to apply for further advice, La Vauguyon was to inform the minister that
he had set himself the rule of not hazarding more counsel where that already
given had been so lightly regarded.

At the same time he was to break his

newly-made rule by extending "one last mark of interest."

He was to try to

persuade Adams to withdraw his credentials quietly and await more favorable
circumstances for presenting them.

In the meantime La Vauguyon was not to

worry about the complaints his actions would probably elicit from Adams.
Vergennes had already instructed his minister in America, the Chevalier de
la Luzerne, to present the facts of the case as they affected French conduct
and principles to Congress.

He was justifiably convinced that Adams would

receive little sympathy there. 138
Vergennes had more important things in mind than merely preventing
Adams from recewing congressional sympathy.

He had long been working through

1uzerne to have Congress put a check on the precipitous minister before Adams'
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ventures could seriously disrupt the Count's careful diplomacy.

Vergennes

expressed the opinion that the minister's actions were not according to the
intentions of Congress but rather the outgrowth of Adams' own)'e:xalted imagination" and his desire for "a political role.,,139

The presentation of the

memorial and credentials and their subsequent rejection by Prince and states
General tended to compromise the United states and so furnished Vergennes
another opportunity to demonstrate to Congress that Adams was irresponsible.
Luzerne was therefore to urge Congress to transmit to Adams "instructions
capable of moderating his ardor."

To prevent further risks to delicate French

diplomacy through similar rash actions by Adams or anyone else, Congress was
to be persuaded to "prescribe once and for all to all its agents in Europe"
that they take no action of a political character without previously consult140
ing France.
Adams remained blissfully unaware of, or blissfully unperturbed by, the
French machinations.

He was far too busy.

I was minister plenipotentiary for making peace; minister plenipotentiary for making a treaty of commerce with Great Britain; minister plenipotentiary to Their High Mightinesses the States General;
minister plenipotentiary to his serene highness the Prince of Orange
and stadholder; minister plenipotentiary for pledging the faith of
the United states to the Armed Neutrality; and what perhaps at that
critical moment was of as much importance to the United states as
any of those powers, I was commissioner for negotiating a loan of
money to the amount of ten millions of dollars, and upon this de- 141
pended the support of our army at home and our ambassadors abroad.
Never bashful about letting his light shine upon the mountain, he described
himself as "ardently engaged and indefatigably occupied" in the business of
discharging all these duties.

142 Although Adams admittedly was not the master

of the understatement, his activity probably matched his words.
Before leaving The Hague he had directed Dumas to have copies of the
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memorial printed and distributed. 143 Dumas assumed the responsibility for
omitting a short section at the beginning and the end in which Adams mentioned
his commission to the Netherlands.

He ordered an initial allotment of five

hundred copies in each of three languages--Dutch, French, and English.

Of

these, three hundred were to be placed with the bookdealer who had charge ot
printing them.

The bookdealer, in turn, would sell or distribute them to his

correspondents throughout the seven provinces.

One hundred sets were to be

sent to Adams for whatever use he wished to make ot them.

Dumas himself

would take charge of the final one hundred sets and distribute them to those
persons who properly should be among the tirst to receive oopies.

lIe would

also provide the gazetteers with copies as soon as possible so that they
could reprint and thus aid in spreading the knowledge of it.
informed, was perfectly satisfied with the arrangementse
to see it printed and distributed as soon as possible

SO

Adams, when

His only desire was
that the Dutch might

see that their prosperity and very existellce depended on an earl,. connection
with the United states. l44
distribution began.

On

l~,. 11 the printing was completed and the

The bookdealer, according to previous arrangement, sent

packets of the memorial to his oorrespondents in all the principal cities.
Adams received a hundred sets.

He carefully dispatohed two copies to La

Vauguyon and distributed the remainder where he believed the,. would have the
greatest effect.

Dumas estimated that he sent out nearly one hundred and

fifty copies that first da,..

Already on the next morning, the twelfth, word

was received at The Hague that Amsterdam was reprinting the Dutch and possibl,.
the French translations. 145 As soon as the memorial was made publio, the
majority of the journals of the oountry inserted oopies.

In order to avoid
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breaking up the memorial into shorter seotions, the widely circulated Courier
of the Lower Rhine added an extra news sheet.

In the course of the week the

memorial was well known throughout Europe as well as in the republic.
The reception accorded it was favorable beyond expectation.
Anglophiles were able to find very little to dispute in it. 147

146

Even the

Dumas posted

men in various centers to discover what the general reaction was and to send
him word.

These assured him that they had heard no criticism of it but a

great deal of praise.

Adams discovered the same to be true in Amsterdam,

where the popular cry became flHsalth to Myn Heer LSii/ Adams, and health to
the brave Americans, II

148 but he was too seasoned a public figure to take

praise at its face value.
beyond the applause."

He candidly wondered "if the effect will advance

Dumas' early pollsters had also inquired about the

probable result but "everyone keeps a profound silence on that."149 Adams
very naturally informed Congress of the step he had taken and enclosed copies
of both memorials.

Although he was pleased to add that the printed memorial

was well received, he cautioned Congress that "the public voice has not that
influence upon government in any part of Europe that it has in every part of
America."

Congress should, therefore, not expect any immediate results. 150

He himself did not.

Dumas submitted the opinion given him by a friend that

it might take three or four weeks for the various cities and provinces to
act.

Adams, not expecting a reply that soon, was perfectly willing to give

time for deliberation.

He would be satisfied with a response in eight or

ten weeks, particularly as he presumed the Netherlands would postpone a deci5ion until

~lssiats

course of action was known.

If Russia did not join in

the war effort, he believed it probable that the Netherlands would willingly

l~

.
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accept an invitation to join the Franco-American alliance.

The first step

toward this would be the acceptance of the memorial and the concomitant reception of the American minister.

/

The rapid dissemination of the memorial led to some errors in printing
and in editorial comment.
than Dumas.

In general, Adams took these in stride much better

In the Courier of the Lower Rhine, the editor stated that Presi-

dent Van Hemmen had accepted the memorial from .l.dams and would serve as its
patron.

This inaccuracy worried Dumas, but the minister's only reaction was

to thank Mr. Manson for the extra page he had devoted to the memorial and for
his editorial comment. 152

Dumas' special animus was reserved for the author

of the article on the memorial in La Politique Hollandais.

This unfortunate

gentleman irritated Dumas by claiming that his English translation was made
before The Hague translation appeared.

He further offended by making several

errors in translation, all of which Dumas carefully pointed out to Adams.
offset any

fu~rm

To

donft by the publication of these errors, Dumas sent an amend-

ing article to the Courier of the Lower Rhine, the paper most widely read and
most apt to correct misimpressions successfully.

Du~4S

concluded his criti-

cism of La Politique Hollandais to Adams with a warning on a matter on which
he and Adams had disagreed earlier.

He cautioned Adams to be careful in con-

veying information to the gazetteers since they were not all as discreet,
as prudent, or as sincere as Luzac; and some of them could be led to betray
confidence by a public that flattered them. 153
his answer apparently has not survived.

If Adams responded to this,

The plenipotentiary was more inter-

ested in several errors he had noted in the English copies--only one of which,
however, he considered of material importance.

This was the use of the word
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"treaties" with France and s,2.lin where he had desired the word Ifrelations.n154
Dumas checked the original English manuscript given to him by Adams and informed Adams that the word "treaties" appeared in that copy.l~
Other business besides his memorial encroached on the minister's time.
His ultimate objectives were to achieve a loan, a commercial treaty, and
recognition of American independence.

The memorial was the only method he

could devise to achieve these objectives directly from the States General.
There was a possibility that the same ends could be achieved indirectly
through the aid of France and the application of Article X providing for the
admission of other countries at war with England to the Franco-American
treaty of 1778.

Before presenting the memorial to the States General, he took

occasion to formally remind La Vauguyon of this article.

He assured the

French ambassador that, whenever La Vauguyon received word from his court to
take measures in accord with the article, the American plenipotentiary would
be ready.l56

Later in May Adams enclosed copies of his memoriRl and a note to

Franklin suggesting that the maritime countries be invited to join the
alliance under Article X if they declared war on England.
obstacle to inviting the Dutch to join right away.

He could see no

On the other hand he en-

visioned the Dutch furnishing their own self-made obstacles to accession-they simply lacked the necessary determination to join.

"Indeed, the mili-

tary character, both at land and sea, seems to be lost out of this nation.
The love of fame, the desire of glory, the love of country, the regard for
posterity-in short, all the brilliant and sublime passions are lost, and
succeeded by nothing but the love of ease and moneYe,,157
Bills of exchange were regularly being presented for him to authenti-
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cate.

Nearly every week the accumulation had to be recorded for Franklin sO

tllat he might provide the necessary funds.

158

Adams' interposition was re-

quired in approaching the responsible United States officials Lor the purpose
of reclaiming Dutch ships retaken from the English by American privat~ers.159
In the event that the vessel could not always be regained from the privateer,
Adams at least felt his time well spent in securing and publishing the explanation of the court's judgment.

In the meantime Dumas found himself in financial

straits and applied to Adams for succour.

\fuen Adams had received his cre-

dentials, he had invited Dumas to continue in the position of agent or special
assistant which he had been holding under Franklin.

However, no specific

agreement had eVer been mad.e between Dumas and Congress or between Dumas and
Franklin.

Dumas was under the impression that he had been promised the posi-

tion as secretary to Laurens at five hundred pounds a year.

He was having dit-

ficulty meeting current expenses as he was receiving from Franklin only in the
area of two hundred pounds a year--a sum insufficient to support a family.
Adams claimed no knowledge of any promise made by Congress but upon investigation learned that Congress had reduced the grant for a secretary from five
hundred pound to exactly one-half that sum.

He promised, however, to do all

that he could to alleviate Dumas' distress. l60
Adams never wearied of supplying the presses and encouraging others to
do

60.

As a bolster to his memDria1 hopes he had Van der Kemp assemble the

early communications between Van der Capell en and Governor Trumbull relative
to the importance of an American minister in the Netherlands.

Van der Kemp

then translated the Articles of Confederation and the piece, "Heads of Enquiry
and the Answers to It" and printed all as a unit relative to Trumbull's
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letter.

A friend of Van derKemp translated a number of other pieces and

several speeches relative to the Massachusotts Constitution.

with a preface

by Van der Kemp, these were also published as a separate unit./ As

a result

of the -111 efforts of Adams and his friends, Thaxter could write that "the
government and the people of this republic are infinitely more enlightened
161
than formerly upon American affairs."
Toward the end of May word finally reached Adams that Maryland had
ratified the Articles of Confeder4tion and these would now become formally
effective for all thirteen states.

Directly the minister wrote letters, on

the express instructions of Congress, to the States General and the Stadholder
to inform them of the Maryland ratification.

Dumas was to peruse these and

either post them or deliver them in person as he thought wisest.

Adams sug-

gested that mailing the notifications would prohibit questions or disagreements and therefore might be best. 162 Having consulted friends, Dumas, on
their advice, determined to deliver the letters in person as the mowe courteous behavior.

When he did so on June 5. both the president of the week,

Baron Pallant de Glintheusen, and the Frince's secretary. Baron de Larrey.
acdepted the letters and requested Dumas to return the following morning.
that time de Larrey returned the letter destined for the Prince.

At

He apolo-

getically explained that the Prince could receive no United States communique
until the States General had granted that country recognition.

It was a most

convenient excuse for not doing what the stadholder bad no intention of doing
in any case.

Glintheusen also returned the letter--opened--but oharged Dumas

with having deceived him into accepting it in the first instance by
the term "plenipotentiary" when delivering it.

~mitting

On opening the letter he had
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found it signed in this manner and therefore refused to accept it.

Dumas was

disinclined to take it back on such specious reasoning since Adams had openly
assumed the title as everyone, including Glintheusen, knew.

n<e President,

however. concluded the interview by dropping the letter into Dumas' hat, admonished him for having advised Adams to move so quickly, and departed. 163
Neither the minister nor his aide was to be that cavalierly frustrated.
The attempt to act as a quasi-accredited minister having failed, their next
recourse was to print.

Dumas advised against printing the rejected letters

but approved inserting the act of accession itself.

The publication of this

act would publicly and formally give the lie to British propaganda that the
164
American union was on the verge of disintegration.
Internal affairs of the nation similarly claimed Adams' interest since
his own future reception partially depended upon the outcome of these.

On the

day Adams presented his memorial (May 4), Van Berckel demanded either a trial
50

that he could defend himself or a declaration of innocence for his part in

the Lee-Neufville treaty.

It was a question whether the two affairs would

aid or injure each other. 165 In mid-May the city of Amsterdam sent an address
to the provincial assembly condemning the inactivity of the country in military preparations.

This address directed the Amsterdam regents to push in

the States of Holland a negotiation with the court of France for reciprocal
plans of operation.

Adams exulted that this tacitly included the United

States and rejoiced to see finally some of the "old Batavian spirit_,,166

He

assumed a generous portion of credit for the awakened interest on the grounds
that the presentation and publication of his memorial had provided the city
fathers with an opportunity to feel the public pulse.

Since the memorial had

149
been so highly acclaimed, the Amsterdam regency had taken courage and decided
to profit by the new-found public spirit. 167 In reality the new spirit was
just as likely based on exuberance over the news that La Motte/Piquet had met
the English convoy of ships taken at St. Eustatius and had retaken twenty-one
of them. 168 This was the type of news that could really cheer the mynheers.
To increase its charm there was also good news arriving from General Gates in
the Southern states and from the Spanish at Gibraltar. 169
In June the regenoy of Amsterdam petitioned the Prince to dismiss Duke
Louis of Brunswiok from his counsel.

The regents assured the Prince that

they did not acoept as true the popular acousation that the Duke was excessively attaohed to the Court of London, acted in bad faith, or was politioally
corrupt.

They did, however, feel that his usefulness to both the country and

William was a thing of the past and that he should be dismissed from all
public affairs and from William's person and oourt.

Louis had aoted as the

boy William's tutor and the adult William's mentor and intimate friend.
manding his dismissal took oourage.

De-

Adams predioted that the reverberations

of this petition would oause a orisis in business, but he deolared himself
incapable of predicting the final results.

Once again he gave pride of plaoe

to the wonderful acoeptance of his memorial in emboldening the Amsterdam
regenoy. 170
There were other signs of reviving spirit in some of the cities during
May and June--an aooount of whioh Adams faithfully forwarded to Philadelphia.
A proposal was made in the States General for increasing the bounties for
sailors and somewhat improving their conditions so as to help build up the
navy.

Their Grand Mightinesses of the States of Holland were so successful
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in floating a loan for 8,000,000 florins that they decided to raise it to
12,000,000 "for their defense."

Holland and West Friesland consented to aug-

ment their land forces to nearly 18,000 men and also voted the/East India
company a 1,200,000 florin loan at

3%.

Most of the major cities of the prov-

ince petitioned for convoyage to the East Indies.

Deputies from some of the

cities of Zealand joined Holland in petitions for increased defense--a matter
of some note as Zealand was almost entirely under the sway of the Anglophile
stadholder. 17l

But all these and other examples were to the minister "faint,

feeble symptoms of life" transmitted for lack of "more vigorous ones."

He

informed Congress that he had been told that "this vis inertia is profound
policy" but, as far as he was concerned, if it were policy at all, it was
"so profound as to be perfectly incomprehensible."172
Throughout the early months of 1781 Adams consistently distinguished
between the attitude of the people and that of the government.

He rejoiced

at the signs of a rejuvenated courage among the former and groaned at the
"faint, feeble symptoms" of spirit in the latter.
to a degree.

Possibly he misread both

At least the reaction to a loan floated by the French government

would indicate that the populace and their government were much more in
accord in their response to active participation in American affairs than

An important segment of each group were interested in

in-

creased trade and were sympathetic to whatever would promote this end.

On

Adams realized.

the other hand they were unwilling to offer any challenge that might lose for
them the good will of the neutrals.

This was very evident in the manner in

which they accepted a loan sponsored by France.
In mid-April Vergennes informed his minister in The Hague that the
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king wished to stand as guarantor for a Dutch loan of five million florins at
four per cent on behalf of the United States.

He cautioned La Vauguyon that

the idea must be proposed very carefully and directed his mini.ter to contact
their friends in Amsterdam in order to concert with them the time and manner
of proposing it.173

In spite of all his efforts,

La Vausuyon encountered

formidable obstacles to floating a loan publicly destined for the United
states.

This was partially

becaus~

the Americans lacked credit in Holland

and partially because the Dutch were unwilling to compromise themselves with
the neutral powers by even an indirect recognition of American independence.174
John Laurens bluntly informed Congress, nThe event has proved that its being
a concern of the United States was sufficient for political reasons to occasion the overthrow of the business.,,175

Only after the reference to America

as co-sponsor was withdrawn and the king promised to borrow only in his own
name and to assume full responsibility for the loan was there any prospect of
success.

By August Their High Mightinesses were disposed to open it on their

own credit at 4%, the principal and interest to be secured by a general French
bond.

Bince the states General, although permitted to pay no more than 3%

interest for themselves, normally found

sale for their notes, it was correctly presumed that a 4% loan would quickly be filled. 176 The ultimate dese~sy

tination of the money, although remaining a verbal understanding, was not
officially committed to paper.177

In spite of this circumspection, the States

of Zealand refused to sanction the loan until December 4, after which date
the loan, with all reference to America obliterated, filled rapidly.

During

the same interval the loan publicly acknowledged as American stood still at
only a few thousand florins. 178
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Thus the first half of 1781 witnessed wi thin the Netherlands the inauguration of various activities, political and financial, which would require
time to develop tully.

In the meantime, beyond the confines

of the Nether-

lands, situations were developing which could well have hampered or completely
obliterated any possibility of Adams accomplishing his mission.
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CHAPTER IV

FRANCE STEPS IN, JUNE, l781-JANUARY, 1782
Innumerable efforts to effect peace, general or particular, were made
during 1781.1

The English declaration of war on the United Provinces (Decem-

ber, 1780) and the accession of the latter country to the Armed Neutrality
(effective November 20, 1780 but final signatures January', 1781) brought
Russia very much to the foreground.

At first it was presumed by practically

everyone that Russia would fulfill the obligations imposed upon her by the
convention of the Armed Neutrality.

Even Sir James Harris, the English minis-

ter at St. Petersburg. did not doubt Catherine's sincerity in the convention.
He therefore determined to convince her that the Dutch could claim no assistance as the rupture between Great Britain and the United Frovinces was unrelated to that convention. 2

Catherine in reality was anxious to find other

means than war to fulfill her obligations and so informed the Dutch ambassador.

Already in January the empress was reputed to have written to }'rederick

II desiring him to offer his mediation to the United Provinces. 3 Frederick
made tentative efforts through his minister, Thulemeyer, but very quickly
withdrew in favor of a Russian mediation. 4
By the beginning of 1781 England was agreeable to a general mediation
provided it was under the auspices of friends.

Consequently, in January the

Court of st. James verbally communicated to Emperor Joseph II of Austria
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that Catherine had made an earlier offer of mediating the peace.

This was

sufficient inducement to elicit a similar offer from the Emperor who then communicated his intentions to Spain and France.' France respond~d with an invitation to Austria to join in the mediation earlier proposed by Russia.
Catherine accepted Joseph as co-mediator and she agreed to Vienna as the most
suitable place for opening the negotiations.

6 However, she insisted that a

reconciliation must be effected between England and the United Provinces before the general mediation could take place.

The Netherlands accepted the

mediation offered but England objected So a separate peace.? Therefore, the
proposal was drcpped and plans for tne joint mediation were again under way.
Adams, busy about many things, was intermittently aware of these
rumblings of peace negotiations but refused to put any stock in them.

In

January of 1781 his news services informed him of Stormont's efforts to improve English connections with the Emperor and then to secure Joseph's comediation.
Dumas.

He forwarded the information, with his personal reaction, to

"The English are laboring with all their might, intriguing with all

their subtlety, and bribing with all the money they can spare in order to draw
in the House of Austria to some connections with them."

He personally be-

lieved that there was "nothing to be gotten by a connection with them except
8 In mid-March he was still very much of the opinion that the
broken bones."
proposed mediation of Emperor and Empress was "only the artifice of England
to embroil all Europe.,,9 To Jenings he acknowledged, "I don't wish she may
succeed, but I don't much care if she does."

He rather thought Europe de-

served to be penalized for her partiality and, furthermore, America

~s

more

apt to gain than to lose in this eventuality.10 He assured Huntington that
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"England is at her old game of seduction and division, and is laboring under
the pretense of employing the Emperor of Germany and the Empress of Russia in
mediations for peace, insidiously to embroil all Europe in the'" War."

He

personally did not believe there was "the least prospect of a general

11

peace."

America's allies, however, were not equally indifferent.

France was

anxious to bring an end to the war, but was disposed to view the projected
mediation with misgivings.

Austria's traditional friendship for England and

Vergennes' record in thwarting Russian foreign policy12 did not auger well for
French interests in a Russo-Austrian mediation.

On

the other hand, it would

never do for France to' offend two such powerful countries as Russia and
Austria by an outright refusal of their good offices.

The offer of mediation,

therefore, put France in a diplomatic bind which required delicate manipulation.

At this Vergennes was skillful and could hope for success if no one

were in a position to upset his designs.

But here lay the problem.

The

friction between Vergennes and Adams the preceding year had made the French
Foreign Minister fearful of entrusting any--much less such delicate--negotiations to Adams.

As soon as there seemed some possibility of a mediation

within a reasonable length of time, he decided to exert his influence to have
the unwanted minister replaced by someone more flexible.

Consequently,

Vergennes informed LUzerne that although he had now become convinced of
Adams' adherence to the alliance--a matter which he had doubted the previous
July--he very much questioned the plenipotentiary's discretion.
His character and turn of mind are essentially opposed to what is
proper in political intercourse; he is, and will be, a negotiator
as embarrassing for his superiors astor those who have business
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relations with him. I am so convinced of this as to foresee with
a sort of pain Mr. Adams taking part in the negotiations for peace.
The only possible solution was to remove the negotiation from
tion and he sent directives to this effect.

~damsl
/

discre-

"You may see, if possible, in

case another may not be substituted for him, that he may have a colleague
capable of restraining him."l3
As the possibilities of a mediation increased and no word was received
from America, Vergennes' anxieties regarding America and Mr. Adams increased.
A second dispatch of the ninth of March informed LUaerne of further developments.

14 Vergennes wrote that France had not yet sent a formal response to

the imperial courts but had indicated her willingness to accept the mediation
if her allies were similarly agreeable.

Spain had declared it her obligation

to conclude the direGt negotiations with Cumberland before acquiescing to the
general mediation. 15

Vergennes pointed out to Luzerne that "these replies

constitute an eventual acceptance" and that it was important that America also
accept the mediation and, through the good offices of the king, make this decision known to all the powers participating.

As for Adams, Vergennes still

regretted seeing the American entrusted "with a business so difficult and so
delicate as that of pacification because of his pedantry, stubbornness, and
self-importance."

These qualities Vergennes argued, would 'lgive rise to a

thousand vexations to the despair of his co-negotiators."

The Frenchman

probably found no solace in the thought that he would be the chief of these.
Since his earlier dispatch he had reconsidered and now explained that he
realized Congress would experience great repugnance in recalling Adams and
therefore Luzerne should desist from further effort in that regard.

He

should, nevertheless, make Congress feel the necessity of directing Adams to

-

168

subordinate his actions to the directions of the king or his ministers. 16
Vergennes knew the instructions on pacification originally given to

Adams .17

In order to improve the possibilities of a successful" media tion, he

saw a necessity of these instructions being reconstructed along more flexible
lines.

Luzerne was therefore to urge Congress to use all the moderation pos-

sible in drawing up new instructions in order to win the favor of the mediators.

Since London was expected to be difficult to deal with, a truce might

be the solution.

Accordingly. the American plenipotentiary should know Con-

gress' decision relative to this. 18

l1ergennes communicated to Franklin--in

an effort to win his support also--the information that a joint offer of
mediation had been made and the king's response that he was obliged to consult with his allies before acquiescing.

Adams, the man with the commission

for peace negotiations, was given no information at all in regard to this.
Franklin was requested to transmit the in.f01"J1lation to Congress.

Since Ver-

gennes had no doubt that Congress would perceive both the necessity and the
usefulness of the mediation. Franklin was to urge them to send such instructions as seemed proper to their plenipotentiary.

To this appeal Franklin

dryly remarked that he was of the impression that Adams already possessed an1
necessary instruction.

He did, however, in his next communication to Congress

very briefly relate the interview and forwarded Vergennes' request on instructions for Adams. 19
Negotiations proceeded very slowly in Europe but through March and
April the various courts gradually framed their

pr~liminary

conditions.

In

the meantime, Luzerne transmitted to his chief Congress' disavowal of John
Adams' position

•

vis-a~vis

Vergennes the preceding summer.

20

Vergennes was
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not at all satisfied with the scope of the remonstrance given Adams as it did
not in the least curtail his powers in the approaching mediation.

Repointed

out to his minister that Congress had checked Adams only on the one point of
securing French approbation before making known his full powers.

They said

"absolutely nothing of other objects on which I believe some remarks ought to
be made to Adams."

Vergennes desired that Congress would enjoin Adams never

to undertake the "slightest step" without the previous consent of the king.
This, Vergennes believed. was the "only means of restraining Adams and of
rendering us master of his conduct."

lIe was convinced

that~dams

had ttnot

the ability to appreciate fine distinctions which is a requisite of a negotiator" but rather inclined to follow the nnights of his too ardent imagination."

Vergennes did not state his views primarily for the enlightenment of

LUZerne but for that of Congress.

Luzerne was directed to impress Huntington

with Vergennes' opinion and "to make him feel its justice" in order to secure
from Congress a supplement to the instructions given to Adams. 21
In a second dispatch of the same date Vergennes warned that the prospeets for peace were not favorable.

England. he wrote, demanded as prelimin-

ary agreements the dissolutmon of the alliance between France and America and
the return of the colonies to a dependent status.
there were no hopes for peace.

If England held to this,

Nevertheless, a negotiation might open during

the coming campaign and Congress ought to have instructions prepared. 22 A
month later Vergennes informed Luzerne that Adams had assumed the character of
minister to the States General--a stroke-whioh confirmed all Vergennes' bad
impressions of the redoubtable Adams.

The mediation still bore every appear-

ance of being considerably in the future.

The admission of America as a
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negotiating power constituted the major obstacle to initiating the proceeding&
Vergennes advised that the most effectual means of removing that particular
difficulty lay in a decisive American victory over the

Britis}:r'~

In brief,

Vergennes was repeating advice he had given directly to Adams two years previously--America should put more effort into the war and leave the politics
of Europe to France. 23
The reception of Vergennes' letters--all of which arrived at approximately the same time--was Luzerne's signal for action.

He applied to Hunting-

ton for a committee to whom he might communicate the information and the advice that they contained.

24 The appointed committee (Messrs. Carroll, Jones,

\:Jitherspoon, Sullivan, and Mathews) met with LUzerne on May 26 and heard the
French ambassador detail the position of his court.

After the meeting, the

majority of the committee departed, but the chairman (Daniel Carroll) remained
with Luzerne and under his guidance drew up a report for congress. 25

This

report was an abvious repetition of the ideas forwarded in Vergennes' letters.
Huch of the conference, according to the report, had been devoted to observationa on the past conduct of Adams and to suggestions on the future dependence
of both Adams and Congress on the good offices of the king.

Faithful to his

instructions, Luzerne praised the patriotism of Adams but made it abundantly
clear that, in the French estimation, the man's prudence left much to be desired.

The committee was plainly told that Congress should "draw a line of

conduct to that minister, of which he may not be allowed to lose sight."
Luzerne carefully recalled to their minds the ill-fated incident wherein Adams
thought he had a right to declare publicly his mission to treat with Britain.
The moral of the tale was made unmistakably clear.

If Congress had the faith

-
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in the king which his «ajesty's wise and benevolent conduct should have inspired in them, they would easily perceive the necessity of subordinating the
actions of their plenipotentiary to the judgment of his majesty:

Congress,

insisted, should have the Greatest independence in establishing broad

~uzerne

outlines for the minister's guidance, but "with respect to the manner of
carrying them into execution, he was to receive his directions from the Count
de Vergennes."

26

There were other circumstances of which ConFress should similarly be
mindful.

Congress had no connections with the powers involved in the media-

tion and it devolved upon the king to represent the United States.

Luzerne

assured the committee that the king would, as a matter of "prudence and
justice," support the American representative unless "this minister, by aiming
at impossible things, forming exorbitant demands • • •

to!?

misconstruing his

instructions lt would cause a rift between himself and the French negotiators.
In this unhappy event France would necessarily proceed without constant comI:lunication with the American minister and the apparent contradiction between
the allies would have a deleterious effect on the negotiation. 27

Although

Luzerne promptly added th3.t i t was understood that lithe most perfect independency" was to be the IIfoundation of the instructions" given to Adams, his
remarks left no doubt that "independency" was not to wander beyond French
gUidelines.

Having proposed severe restrictions on the plenipotentiary

appointed, he proceeded to delimit the subject matter within Congressional
competence.

On the supposition th9.t Engbmd was in a sufficiently strong

military position to "debate with the greatest energy and obstinacy" any
articles relating to America, he counselled Congress to great moderation in
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drawing up instructions.

To secure the good will of the mediating powers,

the plenipotentiary should be free to yield on any point, save independence.
Following Vergennes' instructions, Luzerne further observed that the great
difficulties which might arise in forming a definitive peace might possibly
lead the mediators to propose a truce and, consequently, the American plenipotentiary should know the intentions of Congress in that regard.
On

28

June 6, while the unsuspecting Adams was anxiously watching the

repercussions of his memorial, the foregoing report was taken into consideration.

The committee proposed the resolution that the plenipotentiary be in-

structed to concur with the king in accepting the proposed mediation but that
he be instructed at the same time to accede to no treaty that did not guarantee
the independence and sovereignty of all thirteen states and which did not
leave the treaties with France in full effect. 29

Accordingly, the only two

stipUlations recommended by the committee were those which Luzerne had indicated--the recognition of American independence and the fidelity to the
Franco-American treaties.

An effort, in the form of a motion, was made by

Witherspoon, delegate from New Jersey, to set guidelines for the settlement
of disputed boundaries.

This resolution was in two parts.

The first stated

that the "desires and expectations" of Congress relative to the boundaries
had been set forth in the earlier instructions of August 14, 1778, and delivered to Adams in the fall of 1779, but that Congress thought it "unsafe at
this distance" to bind the negotiator with "absolute and peremptory directions" on any pOints except independency and the Franco-American treaties.
Beyond this, Adams might use his "own judgment and prudence,1f in accordance
with circumstances, to secure the interests of the United States.

The
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second part of the i;,litherspoon resolution enjoined consultation with the
ministers of France on all subjects and concurrence with them in the negotiations for peace or truce.

Consequently, this final paragraph/was a faithful

rendition of Luzerne's requests.
~rapht

vfhen a vote was called for on this para-

only ',Jard and Lovell, both of f·1assachusetts and staunch Adams defend-

ers, voted "nay.,,30

The instructions, then, consisted of the original resolu-

tion to accede to the mediation and to accept no treaty infringing on the
sovereignty of the thirteen states or negating any part of the treaties between France and the United states, and the additional motion of Witherspoon
to consult, and, in specific cases, to concur with France.
John Witherspoon next proposed an additional instruction relative to
the power to agree to a truce.

By his former instructions, Adams was author-

ized to accept a truce only on a long-term basis and if it were accompanied
by the complete withdrawal of all British land and naval armaments. 31
new instructions provided for ereater flexibility.

The

They empowered the pleni-

potentiary to agree to a truce of any duration thought necessary by the other
belligerents provided that it did not infringe upon the right to complete
independence and provided that Great Britain be not left in possession of
any part of the thirteen states. 32
Adams' ministerial power was thus rapidly succumbing to the chipping
process inaugurated by Luzerne.
sole

~merican

Nevertheless, as long as Adams remained the

negotiator (a negotiator that was concomitantly in process of

parrying a vaguely worded invitation from Vergennes to come to Paris for
peace discussions), there was reason to believe that he would interpret the
instructions as he would wish to interpret them.

It was still necessary to
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give him colleagues capable of restraining him.

A feeble effort in this di-

rection had been made by the committee in the form of a report and resolution,
but the suggestion of adding co-negotiators had been rejected
five to four. 33

~y

a vote of

When the revision of the instructions vas completed, Congress

directed the committee to communicate confidentially the substance of the
instructions to Luzerne. 34 The ambassador vas not satisfied.

He informed

them that the instructions vere incomplete as they entrusted entirely to
Adams' judgment the decisions in regard to peace and the best interests of the
United States.

Luzerne reminded them that their minister vas capable of mis-

interpreting instructions and had von the censorship of Congress for that
very thing.

He pointed out the dubiousness of a man vho embroiled himself

with the friendly court of France being able to placate the mediators, and he
injected the idea that ineptness in diplomacy could easily vitiate the entire
pacification.
Adams.

He also appealed to sectional interests to sever support from

He averred that Adams was so blinded by the interests of the Eastern

States that he would assure to them the right to the fisheries even if, to
secure these presumed rights, he would have to ignore the distress of the
South and the needs of the nation.

Adams, he concluded, would see no danger

in continuing the war to secure the interests of the few states whose allegiance he commanded. 35
After their discu8sion with Luzerne, the committee formulated a plan
of action.

The minister or ministers vere to be made much more dependent

upon French advice and consent.

Accordingly, the committee submitted

recommendations as a basis for further revision of the instructions.

In the

second paragraph of his instructions, Adams had been given the right to "use
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your own judgment and prudence fl to secure the interests of the United States
subject only to the bonds imposed by circumstances.

The committee wished the

above quoted words changed to "are therefore at liberty to se6ure ••• " a.
statement which obviously left him the job but did not specifically sanction
his "own judgment and prudence."
ment was accepted.

When this was brought to a vote, the amend-

It was further recommended to insert after the word "con-

currence" in the directive to undertake nothing without French knowledge and
concurrence, the words "ultimately to govern yourself by their advice and
opinion, endeavoring in your whole conduct • • •• " In the vote on this,
Connecticut joined Massachusetts and Rhode Island in voting "nay."

Bland of

Virginia also opposed and Pennsylvania turned in a divided vote, but the
recommendation was accepted. 36
As soon as these recommendations had been accepted, the committee proposed a reconsideration of the question whether another person or persons
should be joined to Adams in the negotiation.

In accord with the bidding of

Luzerne,37 the committee suggested the addition of two co-negotiators.
was too much for John Witherspoon.

This

Up to this point he had agreed to, and

proposed in Congress, most of the restrictive resolutions advocated by the
French ambassador.

He now thought that to go any further and either discharge

Adams or shackle him with co-negotiators would be "an act of too great obsequiousness," one which would set a poor precedent for the "future conduct
of our affairs.,,38

On the whole, however, Congress was not averse to the

idea but met difficulties in choosing the additional two men.

On Wednesday,

June 13, John Jay was elected and, after some French interference, Franklin,
Jefferson, and Henry Laurens were added to the commission. 39
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Agreement on the major issues reached, Congress proceeded to draw up
the proper commissions--to accept the mediation and to treat of peace.
also gave the instructions a final approval.

40

These new

in8'truc~ions

They
read

very differently from the set Adams had been carrying for over eighteen
months.

~dams

was now only one of five and by many considered subordinate to

Franklin's leadership.

The 1779 boundaries were no longer his sine qua non

but only an optimum which permitted of unspecified amputations.

lio longer

was Adams or even the commission permitted explicitly to use their !town judgment and prudence!! in securing American interests, but they must ultimately
govern themselves by rrench advice and opinion.

This last clause aroused

some antagonism even among those who normally followed the lead of Luzerne
and who were not interested in ltsaving face" for Adams.

41 These argued that

the instructions made the American negotiators extremely subservient to
France.

But Luzerne, aware that he commanded a majority, took the high posi-

tion of insisting that France would accept such a trust only if it were willingly accorded, and oalled for a vote.
ship.

It was no time to lose French friend-

The ruse worked and the instructions were confirmed. 42

Both sides

then settled down to a few weeks of an uneasy truce marred by sporadio exchanges while they prepared in earnest for future warfare over Adams and his
commissions. 43
Adams, completely unaware that he was the subject of these important
deliberations, was reluctant to permit himself any expectation of using the
commissions which he held.

There could be little doubt that, if he had for a

moment suspected that the powers he held were in process of curtailment, he
would have devoted much more thought and energy to the pursuit of any opporKnowin
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of the intrigue in Philadelphia, he proceeded about his normal affairs and
paid little attention to newspaper articles on the Russo-Austrian mediation
proposals.

His friends in Philadelphia, in the meantime, were' working hard

to preserve or restore as much of Adams' independency of action as was possible.
One of the first struggles of significance centered on fishing rights
off Newfoundland.
Englanders.

These fishing rights were a major interest to the New

They had furnished a primary reason for the bargaining to secure

for Adams the commission in 1779.

The belief was current that the British

would sign a peace treaty only if they could sign a commercial treaty with
the United States the same day.

As long as Adams was sole negotiator for the

commercial treaty he would be in a position to delay the entire pacification.
His friends attempted to strengthen his position by making these fishing
rights a sine qua non of the commercial treaty.

When the motion to do so was

first introduced, it was rejected; but Luzerne thought he saw the handwriting
on the wall and rushed the information to vergennes. 44 Early in July Marbois,
charge d'affairs in Luzerne's absence, sent similar news.

He notified the

Foreign Minister that the Adams faction was planning to arouse public feeling
on the question through the medium of the press.

His special concern was a

pamphlet dispatched from his post in the Netherlands by Adams which was causing quite a stir in the New England states.

In this pamphlet Adams stressed

the necessity of independence for Canada., Nova Scotia, and Newfoundland and
claimed that European powers should not participate in the fisheries of those
areas. 45

The disparity between Adams' ideas and those which Luzerne had been

seeking to promote was apparent.

A few days later, a motion was carried to
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revoke Adams' power as sole negotiator for a commercial treaty.46
Hardly had the commercial treaty power been revoked when Arthur Lee
moved to reconsider both the appointment of additional
entire instructions of June 15.
brought up on

AU5~St

commiss~oner8

and the

The motion was defeated then but was again

2 only to be postponed by adjournment.

attended its resumption on August 5.

The same fate

Finally, on the eighth of August, Lee

again moved a reconsideration of the June instructions.

In the debate several

of the most loyal supporters of France deplored the instructions, but they
argued the necessity of accepting them.
sacrifice of national dignity_

Madison admitted that they were a

On the other hand, he insisted that the sacri-

fice was more apparent than real since it was only "ultimately" that France
must be consulted and this was already necessary due to the treaty of 1778.
He also noted that French interest and policy would dictate to them the rendering of every possible advantage to the United states in order to alienate
America from Great Britain. 47 The pro-Galliean Jenifer of Maryland48 agreed
that France would procure "tolerable terms" for America as the best means of
promoting her own interests but admitted, "I trust more to her policy than to
her justice." Witherspoon, who had had much to do with the formation of these
instructions, defended them on the grounds of the disputes between Adams and
Vergennes.

Due to these disputes Congress was bound either to pass theee

instructions or to re4all Adams.
to national dignity.
from their June

They had chosen the former as less wounding

Wben brought to a vote, the instructions stood unchanged

15~ format. 49

The long-awaited news of all these changes reached Vergennes only in
September.

He sent congratulations to Luzerne for his "vigor" in opposing
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the first set of revised directives.

These he agreed had placed too muoh

authority in Adams' hands where, "with his oharacter and his principles,
these powers would haTe been dangerous."
the inorease in negotiators.

Vergennes also expr~ssed relief at

He did not really expect either Jefferson or

Laurens to arrive but was satisfied that Franklin's "sagacity will temper the
obstinacy of Mr. Adams.,,50
The Foreign Minister's joy was perhaps proportionate to the anxiety
which hae preceded it.

On May 21 Hussia and Austria had again officially of-

fered mediation services and enclosed their propositions as a basis for a
general peace.

To reject the offer outright would be tantamount to making

enemies of these powerful countries.
delayed only

80

long.

On the other hand, acceptance could be

Time was running out and still there was no answer to

the Foreign Minister's letter requesting restrictions on Adams and conegotiators with him.

Finally, Vergennes decided that Adams should be on

hand in case the negotiations opened.

Therefore he had

Ber~nger

invitation to Adams to return to Paris as soon as possible. 51
planation--American interests required his presenoe there.

extend an

His only ex-

Such ambiguity

failed to pry Adams loose from the many interests he was busy promoting in
the United Provinces.

He returned a polite letter to the Secretary asking for

more information on the nature of this important business.

After enumerating

the tasks on which he was engaged, he explained that these matters were too
important to be lightly laid aside.

Therefore, unless the Paris business was

of great weight, such as either a general pacification or an invitation to
the United Provinces to accede to the alliance

w~th

France and the United

States, he declined the invitation until affairs could be put in better order.

\
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~Jhen

Vergennes received this response he dispatched just the necessary atom of

information to bring Adams.

Berenger was told to inform Adams that there was

a question of peace negotiations and it was necessary for Verg.e'nnes to consult
with the American peace commissioner. 52
If there had been any very specific information available, Adams would
have been grateful for it.

He had not received any type of official notifi-

cation prior to Berengerfs report although he had been following the frequent
articles on mediation in the public papers.

Aware that he was unacquainted

with official development, he surmised that he was intentionally being kept in
ignorance since "perhaps something has been expected from the United States
which was not expected from me."

Apparently he was not as concerned as he

might have been that France would secure more moderate terms to offer the
mediators directly from Congress than

wou~d

be offered by himself.

He was not

inclined to take an optimistic view of the efforts at mediation as he simply
refused to believe that England was sincere in her pretentions for peace.

The

major part of his hopes--until this expectation was completely destroyed in
mid-June--had been founded on the assistanc& of the Armed Neutrality.

For a

brief time, he feared a private settlement between England and the Provinces
but England's refusal of a separate mediation dispelled that worry until the
following spring.

HI~

found England t 13 substi tu te offer to accept a general

mediation only a little less threatening.

He was persuaded that it, too,

was but an "insidious maneuver of the British ministry.n53
he was unable to fathom.

Russian intentions

He had heard through the Dutch ambassador at St.

Petersburg that Catherine would participate in a general mediation only on
condition that the British accept the rea:l:itime treaty and grant American

\
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independence.

He personally believed the Russian statements "so faint, re-

served, and mysterious" that no faith could be placed in them. 54

Obviously

Adams was not being kept up-to-date on the progress of the mediation.

This

view was being expressed a full month after Russia and Austria had presented
their preliminary positions on peace to the courts of' Versailles, Madrid, and
London.

In spite of' the Dutch ambassador's report, these preliminary proposi-

tions in no way indicated a "must" on independence.

On the other hand, a summary of his views on mediation indicated that
Mr. Adams had a good comprehension of the pitfalls of' any immediate negotiation.

"I confess I should dread a negotiation for a general peace at this

time, because I should expect propositions for short truces, uti possidetis,
and other conditions, which would leave our trade more embarrassed, our union
more precarious, and our liberties at greater hazard than they can be in a
continuance of the war; at the same time it would put us to as
almost as great an expense. 1t

constan~and

Fortunately for his peace of mind he was unaware

that, only a week before he wrote these words, Congress had made possible the
very things which he dreaded. 55
Long before that unsettling news arrived, he had received Berenger's
notice of the proposed peace talks and made preparations to leave Amsterdam
for Paris.

At the

same

time Dana was preparing to begin his mission to Russia

where he hoped to gain recognition as American plenipotentiary.

Since he de-

sired a secretary, he sought and obtained Adams' permission to take the young
John Quincy Adams with him.

Charles, who was suffering from homesickness, was

permitted to accompany Jackson, a friend of his father's, home to Braintree.
Adams left Thaxter to handle his affairs in Amsterdam and Dumas those at The

Hague.

Between them they carried on all the works !...dams had begun--including

the regular collection and translation of all available state papers.
these

wer(~

Some ot

transmitted immediately to Congress; others were retained tor

Adams' signature and transmission after his return trom Paris at the end of
July.56

Once the boys were in safe hands and his various responsibilities

delegated to his assistants, Adams set off for Paris where he arrived on the
evening of July 6, 1781.
'Iihe following morning he applied for an audience with Vergennes but
found the minister in council.

The Count sent a message that unfortunately

he must leave the city immediately on business but that Adams should call
upon M. de Rayneval, Vergennes' undersecretary.

Rayneval would be able to give

him the information which Vergennes wished the American to have.
noon Adams paid his respects to
tion.

R;~yneval

That after-

who told him of the proposed media-

In the ensuing discussion the American learned that England had not

made any specific proposals--a conclusion Adams had reached while still in
Amsterdam--but that Vergennes wished to discuss various poihts before a mediation should begin.

Among these points Rayneval mentioned the problem of

whether Adams was a "British subject" or in what light he was to be considered.
Tlle patriotic Adams bristled at this needling and assured Rayneval that he
was not ·and had no intention of becoming a British subject again.
prefer to be Ita fugitive in China or Malabar."
Rayneval suggested that

~dams

He would

In closing the conference

remain available as Vergennes desired to confer

with him that they might understand each other's views. 57
Two days later Adams received an appointment from Vergennes tor nine
0'

clock on l4ednesday morning the llY! of July.

\;fben he arrived at the Foreign

iiinister's Versailles office, he was shown a copy of the first three preliminary articles offered by the co-mediators.

Since the copy was in French and

the fourth article was carefully concealed by a book, he requested a copy of
the entire communication but was refused. 58

In the course of the conversa-

tion, the French officials informed him that the Spanish answer to these propositions was already prepared and the French answer in process.
gennes nor Rayneval could say

wheth~r

Neither Ver-

or not England had as yet responded.

The

interview finished, Adams rushed to his lodgings to prepare a report to Congress and to begin organizing his own response to the articles proposed by
Russia and Austria.

Ha.ving neither Thaxter nor Dana with him, the minister

was left to write, translate, and make copies of everything himself. 59
Having read but not received a copy of the three articles, Adams

COlll-

mitted them to paper from memory and dispatched a copy to Congress with some
first thoughts on the matter.
~)t.

He introduced them as articles submitted by

Petersburg and Vienna "in consequence of some wild propositions" made to

them by England.

He assured Conl!:ress that it would be a "long time before

anything would come of the maneuver. "

60

A few days later he condemned the project as an English effort to win
desertions from the American army and apostates from the cause of independence
and alliance through the art of "seductions, deception, and division."

In a.

subsequent letter he expressed the opinion that Bngland was using ths_:mediatioll
in an endeavor "to administer soporifics to their enemies.,,61

On the first

proposition--that a separate peace should he concluded between England and the
colonies without the intervention of either the other belligerents or the
mediators unless the latter were specifically requested to attend--he posed
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no objection provided the negotiations were held only after the mediators
acknowledged American sovereignty.

'rlhe second proposi tion--tha t this separate

peace be signed conjointly with the peace among the other belligerents and
that the terms of both peace treaties be guaranteed by the imperial and neutral
powers--he also found acceptable if it were agreeable to France and to Spain.
Tr!e third proposition--to declare a general armistice on the basis of the
stu tUB quo for a yet2.r or longer while the terms of the peace were being worked
out--he strenuously rejected.

To justify this

rejectio~e

urged that there

were numerous arguments, "momentous and decisive," against any armistice.
lOeace, he charged, would be retarded rather than expedited by relaxations
and concessions.

The real recipe for a good and lasting peace was a combina-

tion of successful warfare in the United States and firmness, patience, and
perseverance in the peace chambers. 62
In drawing up his position to present to Vergennes, he was disturbed
a little by the uncertainty whether his answer was entirely for the Foreign
l1inister's own enlightenment or whether Vergennes intended to forward Adams'
impressions to the imperial courts.

He had no objection to either of the

first two articles provided that France had none, but he explained his objections to the third in detail.

A truce, which he admitted was not explicitly

mentioned in the article but had been alluded to in some of Vergennes' observationa, he feared would lead only to a. bl:Jody war once the truce was over.
A short truce would be even more dangerous to America.

lberefore he pro-

claimed his reluctance to enter into any discussion on the subject.

If,

however, virtue must be made of necessity and such a discussion must be held,
there were two express conditions prerequisite to that discussion.

In the

first place, the allies would have to agree that the existing treaties would
remain in full force for t:he duration of the truce period and until such time
as Great Britain did acknowledge American innependence.

The second prerequi-

site involved the complete removal of all British land and naval forces from
every part of the thirteen states.

If these two conditions, which would

indicate virtual independence, were accepted, Adams in turn would accept the
term "truce" rather than hold Britain to the humiliation of a forthright acknowledgment of that independence.

His reasonin€5 he then carried a step

further and inquired how 3ngland could treat with the representatives of
America upon either a truce or an armistice without thereby acknowledging the
independence and sovereignty of the thirteen states.

The interrelation be-

tween representation and sovereignty opened the question of the character of
the American representative at the Congress.

He declared that there was no

justification for discussing American affairs as they pertained to knerica at
any congress in which the American representative was not present.

On

the

other hand, the very presence of an American representative was an avowal of
American sovereignty by the other members of the congress.

The only solution

to the anomaly--and a very obvious one he thought--was for the mediating
powers to issue an article recognizing the United States and inviting their
minister to participate in the Congress. 63
From the position that the presence of a representative from a country
constituted recognition of that country, Adams quickly advanced to the position that he would be willing to confer with a minister from England.

For

the moment, he saw no inconsistency in going to Vienna and treating with
and English minister without waiting for recognition since the !Ivery existence
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of such a congress would be of use to our reputation."

64 This decision may

have res.ted partially on his belief that England was trying to capitalize on
her pretension of desiring peace but was at the same time refusing recognition
as a means of preventing a peace settlement. 65

He was convinced that England

was not sincere and this was a means of calling her bluff.

Accordingly, he

assured first Huntington, and then Vergennes, that he vas willing to go to
Vienna without being previOUsly recognized.

The only preliminary on which he

would remain adamant was that neither an armistice nor the status quo appear
on the discussion agenda.

To the Frenchman he offered the explanation that

his instructions positively prohibited either of these. 66
instructions of June

15~

Although the new

had not yet appeared in Europe, he vas citing more

the desideratum than the absolute even of the old directives, since these had
permitted a lengthy truce under specific conditions.
On

his part, Vergennes had been taking his time and carefully awaiting

development before responding to Adams' remarks on the three articles which
he had permitted the American to see.

Apparently the thought of Adams ar-

ranging oonferences with the English at Vienna galvanized him into aotion.
He dispatched a letter addressed to "Mr. Adams, agent of the United States of
North America."

Since this address was in the handwriting of a clerk and

only the signature in that of Vergennes, Adams was uncertain whether the term
"agentrt was a clerk's "blunder" or the Foreign Minister's "art and design."
Whatever the explanation, the fact irritated the minister and aroused in him
a suspicion that Vergennes was perhaps indicating by this a conformity to the
views of the mediating courts. 67

Regardless of the superscription, there W••e

things that Vergennes was determined to make very clear to Adams in the letter.
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Above all

~dams

must not seize the initiative and start for Vienna.

In no

uncertain terms Vergennes wrote that he had shown Adams the propositions and
requested observations on them because of his confidence in the American's
judgment and zeal for his cauntry--not because things were sufficiently advanced to present the American response to the imperial courts.

Adams was

curtly informed that there were "preliminaries to be adjusted with respect to
the United ::5tates li before Adams could put in an appearance.

In the meantime,

all business must of necessity be transacted through the French

~ourt.

68

The blunt reminder evoked another change of thought from the plenipotentiary and the immediate reply that he bad no intention of appearing in
Vienna or of "ministerially or otherwise" approaching the mediators.

He

stated that he held too poor an opinion of the whole affair to become involved
unless duty called him thence.

He could not, however, resist calling the

Foreign Minister's attention to the inconsistency of the mediating powers
in not inviting him.

He reasoned that in actual fact they had acknowledged a

"belligerent power in America" of sufficient importance to claim their attention.

Also, in the propositions they

co~municated

to the several courts, they

did "imply that America is a power, a free a.nd independent power."

He re-

minded Vergennes that his mission had been sufficiently touted that the comediators could be presumed to be aware that he was in Europe and vested with
all necessary powers.

They could likewise be presumed to understand that he

could not know that there was a congress or be expected to repair to it and
there meet the British for talks unless he were informed of it.
proper per.ons to do the informing were the co-mediators.

And the

Therefore, he had

reason to expect an invitation might still be forthcoming. 69
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In the event that Vergennes had succeeded in forgetting Adams' basic
philosophy of diplomacy, he thought this a singularly attractive occasion to
recall it to the minister's mind.

"The dignity of North America does not

consist in diplomatic ceremonials or any of the subtleties of etiquette; it
consists solely in reason, justice, truth, the rights of rnankind, and the
interests of the nations of Europe; all of which, well understood ;r.e., as
Adams would have them understoog are clearly in her favor."

Then as a part-

ing shot and with a full turn to the argument Vergennes had raised, Adams
assured the Count that he would not insist upon all the niceties of etiquette
but would "certainly go to Vienna or elsewhere, if your excellency should
invite or advise me to go.,,70 Judged from the activity Vergennes had initiated in Congress to restrain or replace him, this apparently was not exactly
what the Foreign Minister had in mind.
When this lengthy letter was followed by another two thousand words
the following day, Vergennes must have been exasperated.

As Adams thought

over Vergennes' remarks, he feared that he had not conveyed his full meaning
in the letter of July 16 in which he had discussed going to Vienna without a
special invitation.

He now explained

tr~t

irrespective of any other consideration.

he did not hold this intention
Rather he based it on the supposi-

tion that the mediating powers planned to accept him in whatever

c~pacity

he

was sent and grant him all the prerogatives of that particular character.
However, since writing the former letter, he had looked over the articles
again and now took issue with the wording of the first article.

There were

no "American colonies" but a sovereign United ,states of J'lJIlerica and the very
word lIeolony" implied ideas long rejected by the States.

Since this term had
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been employed, it now seemed to him that a more explicit recognition should be
a prerequisite of any oonference •

,

There followed a lengthy expose of the in-

. consistency of calling any congress or offering any mediation'if the entire
affair were but the internal one of subjects not obeying their sovereign.
Hediation of its very nature involved only sovereign powers. 71
In spite of his series of letters to the ministry, Adams received only
the one brief communiqueI from Vergennes.

This he considered "poor encourage-

ment" to continue being overly communicative with the French ministry.

Con-

sequently, he began to plan for his return to the Netherlands where he thought
it possible to "negotiate for peace with Great Britain much more rapidly than
in France.,,72

Before he was content to leave Faris, however, there was one

final point he thought necessary to bring to Vergennes' attention.

In a last

epistle, he expounded at length on the constitutional impossibility of the
imperial courts soliciting a minister from each separate state rather than a
representative of the United States as a unit.

He remarked that this scheme

would not only meet with complete failure but would be considered in so unfavorable a light as in all probability to meet with a solemn remonstrance
from Congress. 73

His words were not simply beating the air in spite of the

total silence with which they were met.

'rhe mediators bad discussed and Ver-

gennes had more or less approved a four or five year truce during which each
state would separately declare its intentions regarding independence.

In

fact, LUZerne had been enjoined secretly to feel out the states which seemed
more inclined to submission and was already about it.74

Adams' intervention

scotched this along with the projects for a truce or uti possidetis.
Although at the time his Paris sojourn seemed frustrating and
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discouraging, Adams later took great pride in the results of the efforts he
had made there.

When writing the whole story for the Boston Patriot, he at-

tributed the eventual defeat of this "profound and magnificent 'project • • •
for the purpose of chicaning the United States out of their independence tt to
his correspondence with Vergennes and to his remarks on the three preliminary
articles.

To support this statement he quoted lengthy extracts from the

French reply to the mediating powers and remarked that every idea and almost
every expression in their response was taken directly from his communications
with Vergennes.

Adams was not known for timidity in acclaiming his own suc-

cess but on this occasion at least he was not unique in thus evaluating his
work.?5
Adams could only speculate why Vergennes had uttered no word of approval if, and when, their views so closely coincided.

The "midnight silence"

he eventually concluded was a necessary concomitant of Vergennes' efforts to
have his mission revoked.

He argued that if he were to transmit to Philadel-

phia (which he would be sure to do if he had copies) the king's intended
answer

sO

like his own or any words of approbatiorlpr agreement from the French

court, the results could have been disastrous to Luzerne's efforts to manipulate Congress.?6

His intuition was probably correct.

When Vergennes informed

Luzerne of the general progress of the mediation he gave the impression that
Adams had played merely a passive role of charmed agreement.

"He has appeared

very satisfied with this which we have said and done in favor of his country
and I persuade myself that he will render to Congress an account which will
leave nothing to be desired_"??

Luzerne, in presenting this account to Con-

gress, described Adams as satisfied with the effort Vergennes had made.

He
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reported that the major obstacle to a negotiation was the difficulty of agreeing on the status of America.

This problem, he assured them, Vergennes was

still attempting to solve and in due course would notify them ti~oncern1ng the
conduct which the state of affairs will require from Congress. n ?8

If Ver-

gennes was inclined to accord Adams only token recognition, Luzerne was determined to by-pass him altogether.
Having no faith in the "sublime bubbles" blown by the mediators and
"weary of such roundabout and endless negotiations,,,?9 Adams was in such
haste to get back to the important affairs awaiting him in Holland that he
rode day and night.

In the long run this was not a time-saver as the weari-

ness induced by the trip in combination with the uncommon heat of the summer
and the "pestilential vapors" from the stagnant waters of the Netherlands
brought on a severe fever.

He managed to handle business as usual during the

early part of August as the advance of the fever was slow.

From the latter

part of August until early October he was completely incapacitated and able to
transact no busin.ess; even his beloved letter writing was put aside from the

25- of August until the
near to death.

4~

of October.

For several days he was

deli~ious

and

His recovery was extremely slow and ae did not regain full

vigor until several months later.

80 For a time he despaired of regaining his

health if he remained in the Low Countries.

He believed himself of "so little

use to the publiC, that I cannot but wish it may suit with the views of
Congress to recall me."

However, the skill of his physician, the administra-

tion of an "all-powerful bark," and the self-cure of "obstinate perseverance
in walking" finally restored him to health. 81
His views of the situation in the Netherlands tended to fluctuate.

At
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times, when it was particularly jaundiced, he found no virtue in the Hollanders
at all •. That was the case in a letter he wrote on August 4 but had the good
sense not to post.

//

At the time he fumed about the internal divisions and

animosities, the inertness of the military, and the debilitating talk of
peace.

He even envisioned the Dutch using America as the purchase price for

their own peace. 82 A few days later affairs appeared in a different light.
"This people must have their own way.

They proceed like no other." ·He

demonstrated his point hI regaling Congress with the shrewdness of the government in their system for handling naval prizes.

The owners of privateers

rather than the government gave the captains orders to take their prizes to
any friendly port--specifically including American ports--and to join ships of
these friendly powers "to undertake jointly anything advantageous."

This ruse

enabled the government to claim the orders were merely independent directives
of the ship owners to their captains.

Adams saw it as an indirect acknowledg-

ment of American sovereignty.83
The news of the "glorious victory" on August 5 of Admiral Zoutman
84
over Admiral Parker won general applause throughout the nation and encouraged the Dutch navy and Adams in roughly

equ~l

that if the Amsterdam regency, which had been

degree.
large~y

The minister was sure
responsible for the

enthusiasm shown among Zoutman's officers and men, were to propose treating
with the Americans in the States of Holland, the proposal would meet with
similar acclaim throughout the nation.

For the first time, he opined that

public sentiment was growing sufficiently strong that either a separate
peace or concessions to the British were unthinkable.

A few days later, the

last day on which he tried to dispatch any business before succumbing to the
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fever, he reported the new zest in the Dutch navy and in the country at large
to Dr. Franklin.

With a wonted exaggeration he crowed, "If I ever did any

good since I was born, it was in stirring up the pure minds 01 the Dutohmen,
and setting the old Batavian spirit in motion after having slept so 10ng.,,85
When he had sufficiently recovered from his illness to undertake again
the duties of his office and to re-open his correspondence, he happily observ~d

a continued upsurge in the general attitude toward America.

He praised

the "almost universal" sentiment that "the English are wrong and the Americans
right in this war."
look.

He had several explanations for this ohange in Dutch out-

The commercial cities--and they were the real population centers--were

strongly determined not to relinquish American trade.

The Dutch, also, were

finding the conduct and principles of,the Americans very like that of their
86 Both of these attitudes Adams had skill"venerable and heroic ancestors."
fully and ceaselessly nurtured through interminable writings and discussions.
During his sojourn in Paris and his subsequent illness, he had been unable to
personally produce as much material for publication as he had formerly.

He

did, however, continue to take a vital interest in the work of others and to
sponsor it whenever possible. 8?
On the whole Adams found it a great deal more simple to make his

thoughts known in the Netherlands than back home in Philadelphia.

In spite of

the fact that he was a prolific letter writer--sometimes dispatching to Congress two or three letters in one day--that august body was at times months
88
The
behind in receiving his messages. This caused him no little chagrin.
cause lay partially in distance and the vicissitudes of the weather; ill-health
prevented all correspondence for several weeks, but chiefly, the lack of
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communication was plain bad luck.

He had been advised shortly after he first

arrived in the Low Countries to send his dispatches for
son and Gouvernieur at St. Eustatius.

Con~ress

through Cur-

Accordingly, he had sent several

packets of letters and various papers to their address.

A number of these

were apparently confiscated when st. Eustatius was taken although he knew
nothing of it until a July 26 notice in a London paper reported the confinement for high treason of these gentlemen on the charge of an illicit correspondence with Adams. 89

The illicit correspondence could refer only to the

official dispatches as he had addressed to the defendants such packets obly
with a brief request that they be forwarded to Congress.

Another "half a

cart load • • • all my letters to Congress for 6 or 8 months" were aboard
Gillon's ship.

Gillon left the Netherlands in June, 1?8l,but did not arrive

in the United States until late the following spring.

Letters sent via

several other vessels were intentionally thrown overboard to prevent confiscation. 90 When he could arrange safe conveyance to the French ports, his
correspondence stood a moderate chance of crossing the Atlantic safely.
major difficulty was to get packets to a French port.

A

Opportunities by pri-

vate hand were scarce and letters sent by public post were sure to be opened
and probably copied. 9l

These various difficulties in transmitting correspond-

ence necessitated a great deal of copying and recopying of all communications
in an effort to secure safe conduct for at least one copy.
Huch of his attention was claimed by some of the lesser duties of his
office.

Bills of exchange never ceased arriving.

In each case, the minister

had to judge the authenticity of the bill,92

record it, and apprise Franklin

of it in hopes that money could be provided.

At times this came close to
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being a vain hope.

Adams had barely returned to the Netherlands when Franklin

warned that Adams and the other ministers of Congress would no longer be able
to depend on France for their salaries as the French government planned to
transmit future loans directly to Philadelphia. 93

By June, bills vere once

more being drawn on Henry Laurens who was still confined in the Tower.

Adams

requested Franklin to pay these but described the affair as a "phenomenon"
which only "you philosophers" could explain.

To this request Franklin was

forced to respond that he could not get any money from France and thought it
time to test Adams' earlier avowal that a few protested bills might serve the
American cause in Holland. 94 Adams' own efforts to borrow money were unavailing.

In mid-October his loan amounted to less than three hundred pounds. 95
By late fall political affairs again, after a long, quiescent period,

began to consume his time and energies.

The possibilities of a mediation still

dragged on when on August 24, he had received the nevs of the appointment of
co-negotiators to sit at the peace table with him.
of relief.

His first reaction was one

For one thing. he had no expectations of a treaty materializing

and momentarily thought of going home to wake those who might be lulled to
sleep by dreams of peace.

Secondly, he vas glad to be joined by others pos-

sessing a talent for peace as "my talent, if I have one, lies in making
war. tt96

When he next wrote of the subject, his views were largely the same.

"It is still a great satisfaction to me, because I think it is a measure e8sentially right, both as it is a greater demonstration of respect to the
powers whose ministers may assemble to make peace, and it is better calculated
to give satisfaction to the people of America in all parts, as the commissionere are chosen from the most considerable places in that country."

He also
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found ita "great consolationlt as it removed the possibility of delay due to
his illness, "when, for many days together, there were many chances to one
that I should have nothing more to do with commissions of any ,.ort."

He re-

peated these same thoughts to the President of Congress later and curtly refuted Jenings' remark about a "trial of spirit and fortitude" with the declaration that, on the contrary, it was "more honorable than betore and much more
easy." Even at the end of November he accepted it as "a measure which has
taken off my mind a vast load, which • • • would have been too heavy for my
forces. ,,97
Through December, as his health improved and new possibilities in
Holland whetted his political appetite, he became successively more sensitive
to the motive behind his diminution. 98 When he received his wife's expressions of outrage, he counseled her not to be too upset about the malicious
attempts of his countrymen but "let them take their course and go the length
of their tether."

His system was not only right but was already triumphant

so he could only laugh at "their impotent range and fury.,,99

He explained

himselt a little more fully to his friend Dana when he informed the latter
of the retraction of the commission for a commercial treaty.

Vergennes and

followers had been forced to "adopt our system of war and politics" inoDrder
to succeed in undermining Adams' powers.

"I will consent, upon these terms

to be diminished down to the size of a Lilliputian, or of an animalcule in
pepper water."

He added with disarming frankness that he could be "the more

indifferent" as there was presently no prospect of peace and he had no ex...
pectations of being called to act on these commissions. lOO

By the end of

the year he was convinced that he had been "colleagu.ed" with malice atorethought.

nIt is true that I am a sheep and that I have been fieeced. • •
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No, I had rather say that I am a bird, that my feathers have been plucked and
worn as ornaments by others." Philosophically, he was not of a mind to be too
upset.

"Let them have the plummage if they will; it is but a ,geegaw," and of
little importance until it became possible to get "possession of the bird."101
The prospect of peace appeared too far in the distance to excite him

but a

DeW

commission for an alliance with the Netherlands, received toward the

end of November, was a different matter.

It seemed so perfectly designed to
102
.
fit into the developing situation there.
Through the fall the mynheers

were gradually becoming more sensible of their own relations to England and
to the United states.
activities.

This awareness Adams attributed in part to his own

In August he was exulting at the'beneficial results of the pub-

lication of his memorial.

He extolled it as the very thing needed to "arouse

the nation and bring forth the public voice," and credited it with making
known "with absolute certainty the sentiments of the nation. tt As proof he
cited various instances where public op1n1on had promoted or prevented government action. 103 Other forces were also at work.

Shortly after Zoutman's

encounter with the English fleet on August 5, the States of Holland resolved
that another squadron be ordered to convoy the merchant fleets of Amsterdam
and Rotterdam.

A resolution presented in the States of Holland advocated

concerting naval action with the French and sponsoring the French loan in
order Uto annoy the COllmon enemy by strengthening the Congress of North

America.,~04 In a debate in the States ot Guelderland, regarding the loan to
France for the benefit ot America, the question of alliance with France was
again discussed.

One deputy claimed "he bad rather acknowledge the independ-

ence ot the Americans than contract an alliance with France."

He was answered

19B

by Baron van der Capellen de Marsch, cousin of

C~pellen

tot den Poll the close

friend of Adams, with the observation that an alliance with America was worthy
of consideration.

Capellen supported the observation with a brief homily on

the advantages to be derived therefrom.

Adams rejoiced to recount it as the

first opinion, publicly delivered, in favor of American independence.

Never-

theless, he was wary of believing the battle against the Anglophiles of the
United Provinces was won.

He prefaced his account of Capellen's remark by

explaining that it was as "problematical as ever n what was the political systern of the country or if it even had a system, and closed with the comment
that it would be "long, very long" before the country was unanimously of Van
der Capellen's opinion. 105
It was at this juncture that Adams reported the offer of a Russian
mediation between England and the United Provinces.

1"

England, none too willing-

accepted the Empress' offer but flatly refused to have Denmark and Sweden

participate as co-mediators. 106 The Provinces also accepted Catherine's
services but several of the major cities, including both Amsterdam and Rotterdam, were little disposed to favor a separate peace.

La Vauguyon regarded it

even more unfavorably and tried to sow disunion among the members of the
assembly of Holland to prevent a favorable vote. 107 The war itself furnished
cause both for sorrowing and for rejoicing.
the English on November 27.

st. Eustatius was regained from

On the other hand, on November 21, Negapatam in

the Dutch East Indies was lost and a part of the Dutch African coast would
have been if the French fleet had not come to the rescue. loB
news of all was that of the American victory at Yorktown.

The greatest

By the twentieth

of November the word reached Europe through the Frenchman, Lauzun.

In the

I
!
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Netherlands many immediately concluded that the congress at Vienna would now
materialize.

Adams was not to be so easily deoeived.

He contended that the

"Cornwallization" was insufficient of itself to bring England -to terms to
which the Americans could agree. 109 The victory was not completely barren,
however, as a number of "persons of oonsequence," who were not normally interested in his proceedings, had gone out of the way to congratulate Adams.
Even more encouraging to the potentiary was the personal approbation given by
La Vauguyon to Adams' desire to implement a new commission to negotiate

Dutch-Franco-American alliance.

Ii

110

Nearly a year earlier, on January 9, 1781. Vergennes had informed the
French ambassador in America that England had declared war on the Provinces
and that the resulting situation presented a favorable opportunity for a;,union
between the two republics.

The French court, at that time, advocated that

Congress dispatch a "wise and enlightened envoy" with full powers to complete
an alliance with the Netherlands.

Count de Vergennes insinuated that it was

to be "desired" that this envoy receive his "principal direction" from Franklin, in order to avoid "discordant proceedings" and to "give unity to the
political affairs of Congress."
lowed.

A confirmatory dispatch of February 19 fol-

An authorization to Luzerne to offer the interposition of the king to

effect this alliance between the two republics and a hint that Congress ought
to prepare these measures without delay were the only significant additions
in the February dispatCh. lll

This offer Luzerne first officially presented
112
in May but no action was taken.
Although, from time to time, he expressed
surprise that the king's generous offer should be neglected, LUzerne was soon
busy about many interferenoes of a more imminent nature.

Finally, having
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circumscribed Adams' authority in the pacification to his satisfaction, the
minister requested on July 20 a committee to receive the mess3ges relating to
an alliance.

Immediately the same committee (with the solitary exchange of

two members) as had in June cooperated on the denuding of Adams' commissions
SO

effectively, was appointed to again meet with the French minister.

The

committee submitted their report after the f:Jeeting on July 23 and again on
August 1,113 but no action was taken until August 9.

The report recommended

that the French court be notified thatii.dams already held a commission to
propose a treaty of amity and commerce and that he would be further directed
"to confer on all occasions in the most confidential manner" with La Vauguyon.
Adams, in turn, would be notified of these proceedings and instructed to take
full advantage of the French interposition both through the servioes of La
Vauguyon and through correspondence with Franklin.

114

After some debate the

report was accepted, and the committee was directed to report instructions
for Adams on a treaty of alliance with the United Provinoes.
they reported back.

Four days later

They prefaced their recommendations with the directive

that, if Adams could form a treaty of amity and commerce in which the independence of the United states was recognized according to his previous instructions, he was not to open the subject of an alliance either offensive or defensive.

If, however, he found it impracticable to operate on his previous

instruotions he might form a defensive alliance provided that certain stipulations regarding American relations to France and to the United Provinces
be observed. 115
Further discussion was postponed until August 16 when final instructions, differing somewhat from those of August 13, were prepared for Adams.
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It was this set with the accompanying commission which Adams so rejoiced to
receive in November.

The new instructions, in direct opposition to the

August 13 edition, authorized Adams to seek an alliance with the United PrOTinces and, if possible, a triple alliance to include France. 116
the instructions emphasized recognition of American sovereignty.

In general,
To the

original requirement that the United Provinces must recognize the sovereignty
and independence of the United States was added the phrase "absolute and unlimited, as well in matters of government as of commerce." The clause against
peace or truce until all three countries agreed was amended to proscribe an,
laying down of arms until American sovereignty and independence were acknowledged in a treaty terminating the war.

The clause permitting mutual guaranty

of possessions was deleted--the minister was not to sign any stipulation for
offensive action or guaranty of possessions.

In other particulars, not re-

pugnant to these instructions, Adams might use his own discretion but was
specifically enjoined to confer on all occasions and in a most confidential
manner with the French minister at The Hague. ll ?
NotoDly were the new instructions less subservient to Luzerne's requests than those on paCification in June, but in this instance the deliberations of Congress were not presented to him for approval until after the final
vote was taken.

The Chevalier was made acquainted with the details of the
118
entire proceeding only on August 22.
As he had had difficulties leading
Congress to act at all, he could hardly have caused the business to be reopened.

He could only inform Vergennes of the congressional reluctance and

admit that he had in no way influenced the resolution which differed considerably from his suggestions.

He noted that this was proof that Congress wished
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to conclude "without intervention" a treaty limited in duration and purely
defensive. 119
If Luzerne had been able to get an account to Vergennes in time of his
untiring efforts to motivate Congress. he would
as on other occasions.

h~ve

received congratulations

Vergennes still knew nothing of Luzerne's success

""hen in October (1781) he again directed his minister in a. vein similar to
that used in January and February.120

In October's dispatch Vergennes, al-

though less inclined to believe the Provinces would embarrass their peace
negotiations by opening communications with

~mericat

was still anxious to have

an accredited American representative in the republic.

He was convinced that

sooner or later circumstances would make some type of negotiation possible.
viorried that Adams was transcel:ding his instructions by corresponding with
the opposition in England. l21 he emphasized the importance of his February
observations on the desirability of the envoy receiving directions from
Franklin in order to avoid disparity in the negotiations.

He succinctly

added that Adams was very capable of causing just that. 122 ;:"'11 of these objectives Luzerne had tried to accomplish but Vergennes did not receive the
news until late November or December (1781).

By th.9.t time he had completely

reversed his former expectations on a Dutch-American alliance and had developed the conviction that the Dutch would regard any advances as too much
complicating their own quarrel with England. 123 The Foreign Secretary, therefore, chided rather than congratulated Luzerne for his activity, especially
for giving ministerial form to his insinuations to Congress.

~uzernet

he

wrote. shOUld have understood that the king's offer was a service he wished
to render to the Americans and not one he expected from them.

One

203

cOrilmunication to Congress would have been sufficient to make the offer known.
Vergennes' concluding thought betrayed his

~1noyance

at the indirect repulse.

/l.fter telling Luzerne to stop discussing any French offer of interposition,
he explained that this was the only proper course to "a I1Ilul the defiant resolution" taken by Congress and to make Congress "feel indirectly how much this
defiance was poor gratitude to His Hajesty.,,124
With the news of the Yorktown victory, Adams received this commission
to negotiate, in league with the French ambassador, a triple--or, if Spain
wished to join, a quadru.ple--alliance.

To whomever he wrote, ',dams exulted

that this new commission was "well-timed,1i and at a "strategic time" for
foiling Britain's "insjdious trick."

Only the new commission would prevent

the mediation, which he termed a "master piece" whose "supreme excellence
consists in its matchless effrontery," from succeeding.

He anticipated with

pleasure the announcement of a triple alliance and declared that if Their
High Hightinesses were to make the proposal it "would be the greatest stroke
of policy which they have struck this century."

But experience with Dutch

indecision and dilatoriness quickly pulled him back to reality and he added,
"They are not to be depended on.,,125
Eager to put this commission into execution while the situation in the
Netherlands seemed favorable, he sent Thaxter to inform La Vauguyon of the
arrival of important dispatches.

La Vauguyon called on Adams at his home

about one o'clock the afternoon of November 24.

The two ministers spent ap-

proximately an hour and a half reviewing the possibilities.

They were of one

opinion as to the good effect such a proposal might have in counteracting the
British "artifice" of a separate mediation between Britain and the Netherlands.
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Vauguyon described the subject as "very well seen and the measure very

well concerted."

Nevertheless, he vas more than reluctant to take any de-

cisive steps as he had received no orders from his court.

When the conference

was over, Adams, in compliance with La Vauguyon's request, dispatched to the
French ambassador a copy of the instructions he had received.

In his accom-

panying note he suggested three alternative methods of procedure for the
Duke's deliber.ation.

First, the French minister might make the proposal to

the States General in the name of His Host Christian Hajesty.
two ministers might make a joint proposal.

Second t the

Or third, Adams might make the

proposal as a consequence of his former proposal (April 19) of a treaty of
,
126
oOIlll'nerce.
Immediately after the consultation, the French ambassador returned to
The Hague to receive the final approval of the [states General to the loan to
be floated on French security.

According to their agreement, Adams forwarded

a summary of their conversation and a copy of his commission to La Vauguyon
at The Hague.

Upon receipt of these, La Vauguyon expressed his personal zeal

to concert with the American plenipotentiary but reminded Adams of the necessity of a direct authorization from Paris.

He confided to Dumas that he in-

tended to return to Paris wi thin a few days and there confer ';;lith Vergennes
on the business.

During the conversation he enlarged on Adams' third alterna-

tive suggestion relative to a commercial treaty.

He carefully intimated that

it might be appropriate for Adams to insist on an answer to his earlier
memorial as a preliminary opening wedge. 127 Thus, the subject of the memorial
of April was re-introduced to the minds of all three men.
ri.ant only a very short time.

It would lie dor-
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In the meantime, the ordinarily impetuous Adams was not dismayed by the
forced wait for Vergennes and his minister to decide on how and when they
wished to proceed.

On the contrary, he expeoted the wait to be beneficial.

Time was on his side.

The majority of the people appeared to him to desire

an alliance with France and America and were being restrained from it only by
128
"whimsical fears" and "party quarrels. 1t
Since a goodly number of newspapers
and pamphlets were busily advocating an alliance, Adams judged a little time
would help to prepare the way for his proposal.1 29 He was further encouraged
by a proposal for a treaty with the United states from Oostergo, a small area
in the Province of Friesland.

This quarter was the first public body to

venture such a proposal, although Van der Capellen de Marsch, speaking as an
individual, had done so in the assembly at Zutphen.

Oostergo was only a

minute part of the sovereignty, but Adams predicted that "the whole republic
must follow.
work."

It was necessitated to it by a mechanism as certain as clock-

He wisely expected no precipitous rush to follow the Oostergo example,

as he knew the operation would be "studiously and zealously slow. ,,130 There
were other indications that the Dutch were beginning to take a slightly stiffer line.

They declared themselves unwilling to accept the Russian mediation

except on the fulfillment of two preliminaries.

These were that England agree

to aocord them 1) the enjoyment of all the rights of the Neutral League and
2) complete indemnification for all losses sustained in the war.

Such terms

England could not accept and Itthis little bubble will burst like the great
one at Vienna.,,131
Not only was the situation in the Netherlands gradually assuming a
more favorable aspect, but Adams' relations with France appeared to him to be
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improving.

He considered himself as being on excellent terms with the Duc de

la Vauguyon and rejoiced that the "miffs at Passy and Versailles seem to be
wearing away.,,132 His latest commission apneared to reinforce that impression.

From the wording of the instructions, which directed that he concert

action with the French ambassador. Adams gathered that the commissLon resulted
from an agreement between Luzerne and Congress.

He. therefore, presumed that

it was an outgrowth of an approved French poliCy.133 Consequently, he expected no problem in obtaining Vergennes' sanction on its
ever he and La Vauguyon decided.

when-

implemen~tion

He was completely unaware of the

~act

that

the attitude at Paris had changed considerably from the time that the suggestion for a triple alliance had first been forwarded to Luzerne.
slowness of

~rans-atlantic

Du. e to the

communication and the dilatoriness of Congress

Adams found himself possessed of a commission supposedly initiated or at
least favored by the French ministry but which, unknown to him, the French
government was no longer willing to support.
La Vauguyon. too, was unacquainted with the change in Vergenunes t think-

ing and had, therefore, encouraged Adams to expect French co-operat j,on in
proposing an alliance.

He had even taken the unexpected step of in. timating

that Adams might now request an answer to his April memorial. l34

~is latter

proposition was entirely agreeable to the American plenipotentiary and. while
he awaited Vergennes authorization on the alliance--a wait which proved unending.~-he

proceeded to make arrangements accordingly.

A first step was to accept an invitation from Dumas to meet and discuss
with some personages at The Hague the idea of requesting a categor:tcal answer on the memorial. 135

He planned to keep the appointment on Deeernber 18,
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but the Duke's arrival at Amsterdam on his way to Paris caused a postponement
until the following day.

La Vauguyon called upon Adams at his home about noon

on the eighteenth and during the ensuing discussion the two men talked at
length upon the possibilities of a categorical answer.

La Vauguyon believed

that the recent ItCornwallization" warranted a "higher tone" and that a request for an answer would be entirely proper.

He suggested that Adams go to

The Hague at a time when there was a president favorable to American aspirations and demand an answer from the States General.

To support his demand,

the minister ought then to apply to the regencies of the various cities of the
Province of Holland.

The two men agreed that, as a preliminary, Adams should

seek the reaction of the important government officials he had planned to
meet at The Hague.

Grateful for the good understanding subsisting between

himself and La. V'l.uguyon, Adams resolved to follow the advice but to "take care
not to advance too fast, so as to be able to retreat."l36

Consequently, the

following morning, he visited The Hague where his friends similarly advised
him to see the President of the States General at the first favorable opportunity and demand a categorical answer.

Once that was done, he planned to

wait upon Van Bleiswick, the Grand Pensionary, Secretary Fagel, and the pensionaries of all the cities of :'olland and to apprise them of his intention. 13'i
Adams and La.
cuss the advice

V~uguyon

~dams

quite enthusiastic.

met again at 10:00 o'clock on December 21 to dis-

had received at The Hague.

They were both becoming

La. Vauguyon in requesting the appointment had expressed

himself as "impatient" to converse with Adams on the affair.

He had in fact

stayed over in Amsterdam the extra days primarily to get a report.

It was

agreed at their meeting that La Vauguyon should acquaint Vergennes with the
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proposal for a categorical answer.

Adams also requested that the ambassador

should inform his chief of the American's personal disposition to follow the
directives he had received relative to an alliance.

At the same time La

Vauguyon was to impress Vergennes with Adams' firm determination to act only
with French approbation. l }8

Vergennes, when informed by La Vauguyon of the

plan for a categorical answer, raised no objection to it provided that Adams
restrict himself to a purely verbal communication.

Adams was, furthermore,

to limit himself to a request for information as to whether there had been
any deliberation on the memorial and as to what answer he might communicate
to Congress.

No permission was given for introducing a treaty of alliance. 139

The approbation was scarcely a week old when Adams put it into execution.

Dumas had returned with Adams to Amsterdam after the latter's Hague

consultation with influential friends.

Thus both were at Amsterdam when La

Vauguyon's message arrived and they immediately made plans.

140 The States

of Holland--that all important section of the sovereignty--was to reconvene
on January 8.

The States General was also to be in session then with the

sympathetic Vll.n de Sandheuvel as president for the week.

The minister and

his agent travelled to The Hague on the eighth and sought an audience with
Van de Sandheuvel at ten the next morning, January 9, 1782.

In a brief

verbal communication, Adams reminded the President of his memorial of the
previous April notifying the States General of his plenipotentiary powers and
his readiness to negotiate a treaty of amity and commerce.

He added that the

president at that time (Baron de Hemmen) had promised to present his communication to the States General but that he had not received any answer from
Their High Hightinesses.

He concluded with a formal "demand" for a'bategor-

ical answer which I may transmit to my sovereign."

Having received the
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President's assurance that he would report the interview to the States General
for their deliberation. Adams sent a request to Van Bleiswick for an interview.

Due to illness. the Grand Pensionary was unable to grant the interview

but indicated that public business could be presented through his secretary.
Dumas then presented /\.dams' message verbally to the secretary for tranSlllis"ion
·
t o th e Grand Pens10nary
•141
. The following morning the pilgrimage continued.

The first stop was at

the home of Secretary Fagel who assured them that he knew all about it.
President Van de Sandheuvel had immediately reported to the States General
and this body had taken Adams' request ad referendum as was their custom.
Adams must await results.

142 After his visit to Fagel. the minister began

his visits to the official headquarters of the regencies of each city in
Holland beginning with that of Dort.

There he met the pensionary, M. Gyselaer.

who not only officially received the communication but in his private capacity
expressed willing acknowledgment of

~oth

Adams and America.

The entire depu-

tation of Haarlem received him cordially and, while unable to promise more
than to pass the information to their constituents, sincerely wished him
sucoess.

He continued his calls at the houses of Leyden, Rotterdam, Gouda,

and others until all eighteen deputations had been visited.

Each deputation

accorded him a good reception and several expressed an earnest wish for
friendship between the two republics. 143 Adams was well satisfied with his
efforts and with the reception they had received. 144 He very probably would
have been even happier if he could have read, over Franklin's shoulder, a
page from his own book.

Franklin, shortly after he heard of Adams' proposed

demand for a categorical answer, wrote to Jay in Spain.

"I conceive there
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would be nothing amiss in your mentioning in a short memoir

. . . pressing

t.hem to give you an explicit t de fini ti ve t immediate answer, whether they would
enter into a treaty with us or not, that you might inform Congfess and, in
case of refusal, solicit your recall.!!145 This was a classic statement of
militia diplomacy.
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In the meantime, Adams had received the approval of his plan and of
the strong terminology from several members of the States General. Van der
'I1,1
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CHAPTER V

/

TREATIES AT LAST, JANUARY-OCTOBER, 1782
Having presented his demand for a categorical answer, there was little
ministerially for Adams to do but await results.

While he marked time, he

undertook a number of trips about the countryside, trying to interest influentia! people in a categorical answer.

The first of these trips, made in

late January and early February (1782), was through Friesland, the most republican-minded of the provinces. 1

His efforts there were rewarded when,

toward the end of February, Friesland became the first province to vote for
recognition of the sovereignty of the United States.

From Friesland, he trav-

e11ed to various sections of the country, but the greater part of each week
he spent in the major cities of Holland, particularly Amsterdam and The
Hague.

2

In this manner, he kept in constant contact with the various areas

although there was little he could do to direct their deliberations.
Not only in the matter of recognition, but in all the other projects
which he had been pursuing, circumstances dictated a dilatory policy.

One of

these projects which had to await a more opportune moment was that of negotiating a loan.

The Neufvi11e loan had produced practically nothing. 3 To add

to the frustration, Franklin informed Adams that he was finding it more difficult than formerly to obtain the money to pay drafts.

Therefore, it would be

necessary to set the end of February as the tentative date to "shut up shop."
This message, in union with his own intense desire to help, led Adams to
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attempt one more effort at borrowing.

He quietly applied to an old, estab-

lished house which had participated in the American trade for a hundred years
and could be relied upon to evaluate the possibilities accurately.

After two

days of study, the banker reported that, until a treaty had been secured,
there was no chance of success.

He explained to Adams that the entire loan

business was controlled by four men.

If anyone of them would help, a loan

could be arranged without much trouble.

Without them, no loan could succeed.

After indirectly approaching the four, Adams concluded that his efforts were
in vain as they were all well paid to resist.

According to the information

furnished by the banker, the acquiescence of the states of Holland was not
legally required for a loan but, in practice, no loan would be given without
it. 5 Franklin, aware of the close connection between government and finance,
agreed that it was not an opportune time to solicit in the Netherlands for
fear of complicating the delicate negotiations on both mediation and the categoric demand.
latter.

He expressed great "impatience" to hear the results of the

Favorable results would relieve him, also, and he was "quite sick of

my Gibeonite ~siS7 offioe--that of drawing water for the whole congregation of
Israel. ,,6
Another project that Adams would have been overjoyed to advance was the
proposition of a triple alliance.
tion.

It was infeasible without French approba-

He carefully abided by, but chafed at, the restraints upon him.

While

the States General were still debating the latest mediation offer, he informed
Franklin that the republic was seriously considering an alliance and that he
was sure a proposal to that effect would be successful.

He pointed out, how-

ever, that the ardor of many who favored such a measure was "dampened"
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by the apprehension that France was not anxious to see it materialize. 7 La
Vauguyon's passion for declaring France neutral on the proposition easily
fostered that assumption.
c~pted

~Ihen

the states General, on February 14, 1782, ac-

with reservation the mediation of Russia, Adams grumbled that the

French desire to retain the Empress' favor for the day of peacemaking had
caused an excellent opportunity to be lost.

8 Although forced to abandon the

idea temporarily, before long he again found an opportunity to solicit French
approval.

By late February, several small areas of the sovereignty appeared

on the verge of acknowledging America.

These signs Adams interpreted as

certain evidence that the Netherlands were ready for a treaty.9

Optimistical-

ly, he prepared notes for a proposal of an alliance to be verbally delivered
to the President of the States General.

Dispatching these notes to La

Vauguyon for prior approval, he explained that the general enthusiasm in the
provinces made it "high time" for him to execute his instructions of August

16.10
The French ambassador hastened to cool the undesired ardor displayed
by Adams.

He informed the latter that it was impossible for him to make any

statement ministerially as he had received no instructions from Versailles. ll
Adroitly conveying the impression that, in his private capacity, he heartily
endorsed the end to be achieved, he gravely warned Adams that the inconveniences in its accomplishment were serious.

The presentation of Adams' pro-

po sal , he warned, would more retard than accelerate a treaty.

With proper

diplomatic finesse, he promised to explain more fully in conversation with
Adams if that gentleman planned soon to visit The Hague. 12
Temporarily that

s~uelched

There was no need.

the idea as Adams had no intention of going ahead
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without French approbation.
tions" claim.

Periodically La Vauguyon repeated the "no instruc-

The very most he would promise was to do nothing publicly

either to aid or to hinder an American-Dutch alliance. 13
This neutral ground served French interests excellently.

From this

vantage point La Vauguyon could impress the independent Dutch with the moderation of the Frenoh oourt in not desiring to interfere in any way in their internal affairs.

France, he deolared, would confine herself to wishing the

Netherlanders well in whatever they judged most conducive to their country's
welfare.

14 Adams he hoped to steer away from an alliance by arguing that

there was no real object to be aocomplished by forming one.

By their concert

for defense with France. the States General had already united their cause
with that of France and, consequently, with that of America. 15

If Adams

raised objections to this rather specious reasoning, La Vauguyon was directed
to point out to him that the king deemed a neutral conduct prudent, more
espeoially as Congress had shown a repugnance to accept his majesty's offer of
intermediation.

Franoe, acoordingly, felt obligated to demonstrate to Con-

gress her disinterestedness and her delioacy in anything which might give the
least offense.

16

To the frustrations on the loan and on the alliance was added the aggravation of criticism from Robert Livingston, the recently elected Secretary
of Foreign Affairs. 17 When Livingston took office on October 21, 1781, Congress, due to the misfortunes that had befallen his copious correspondence,
had only very poor information on Adams' activities.

Of the minister's dis-

patches. only the brief note of May 16. enclosing copies of the memorial, but
giving little explanation of the what, why, or wherefore of it, and no
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information on the presentation of his credentials, had been received.

Word

from several other sources concerning Adams' memorial had reached Philadelphia
but the accounts were vague.

Consequently, Livingston lacked authentic inform

tion on the motives, intentions, and circumstances relative to Adams' presentation.

Nothing daunted, he proceeded to trace a proper path of diplomacy for

the militia enthusiast.
The first missive containing this unsolicited advice reached Adams only
on February 13, 1782, although dispatched the previous October, nearly five
18
months earlier.
Adams failed to record his deepest sentiment on the document, but he proceeded to take it apart line by line and, under the diplomatic
courtesy of accepting bits of advice, annihilated the entire array of Livingston's arguments.

Agreeing perfectly that his situation was "delicate," he

assured the Secretary that from infancy he had "passed through an uninterrupted
series of delicate situations" and so was accustomed to the experience.

With

deliberate misinterpretation, he acknowledged that his health was still delicate and that there were some who feared his person was in danger but remarked
that he had no apprehensions for himself. 19

Livingston had written that the

Dutch were disposed by their constitution and their economy to peace and would
accept war only as long as absolutely necessary.

America, through Adams, would

only open itself to embarrassment by trying to deterudne them otherwise.

20

Adams agreed that the republic ardently desired peace but, he amended, only on
honorable terms.

England would not grant such and so the war would continue,

and Adams might remain there in a "very insipid and insignificant state a long
time without affront or answer."

As for the partisanship of which Livingston

accused him, he issued a firm denial.

He had treated all men alike regardless
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of party and had been as well treated by the court party as by the Patriots.
Agreeing that the Dutch had a perfect right to judge for themselves on the
matter of recognition, Adams rejected the implication that he had portrayed
dissatisfaction with their conduct and declared he had "no reason to be dissatisfied.!!

By

way of proof he pointed out that time was demonstrating the

correctness of his judgment, and the increasing conversion to those ideas had
enabled him to proceed.

On the advice of Vergennes, La Vauguyon, and several

prominent persons, he had subsequently demanded an answer to the memorial and
had been received politely by all parties.

Complaints that he had not been

well received would reach Congress via his opponents, but "they have their
views • • • and know that this is a good string for them to touch.t!

To

Livingston's directive to flavoid giving offense to government by the appearance of intrigue." he staunchly replied. nI stand now in an honorable light.
openly and candidly demanding an answer in my public character."

If there

were any dishonor, he argued, it resided in the republic as none had yet
ventured to return a negative answer to him.

liThe dignity of the United states

is therefore perfectly safe, and if that of this republic is questionable,
this is their own fault, not ours. n2l
Having vindicated his position, he expressed complete willingness to
subscribe to the Secretary's advice to avoid any measure likely to encourage
a public affront.

He soothingly assured Livingston that "all appearances of

intrigue and all the refinements of politics have been as distant from my
conduct as you know them to be from my natural and habitual character'.;'" On
the point of spending more time at The Hague, and of forming better connections with ministers of uninterested powers so as to glean information from
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them, Adams responded that he would in future follow the first part of the
advice and spend more time at The Hague.

(He neglected to mention that he

was at that very time negotiating for a formal residence in t~~t city.)
demurred on the second part.

He

Forming connections with ministers of uninter-

eated powers was a matter "extremely delicate."

There were no "uninterested

powers." Every count17 waa interested, at least indirectly, in American affairs.

Further. eve17 minister had to be on his guard as he had competitors

spying on his every move and could not risk openly vis! ting with an American
minister.

Nor did Adams think contact with any of them was

it would involve.
22
fundit1·

wort~

the intrigue

None of them was entrusted with information of any pro-

Within the week after Adams received Livingston's first broadside, he
was treated to a second.

Written on November 20, 1781, this, too, was a

lengthy and pointed criticism of Adams' methodology.2 3 Livingston first took
him to task for not sending information as was "expected" of him and especially for not explaining the principles and views of each major Dutch party.

To

this Adams dryly responded that it was not only "somewhat dangerous" to send
information but that it was impossible as "the views of all parties are enveloped in clouds and darknesse,,24

~ince Livingston's October letter, Con-

gress had learned from Dumas that Adams had presented his credentials.

The

Secretary, therefore, declared himself "astonished" that Adams had not written to explain whatever peculiarity of situation induoed him to take measures
which placed Congress in such a "humiliating light.,.

Congress, Livingston

darkly hinted, would want an explanation of this and of the minister's reasons
for publishing the memorial.

Livingston then set himself to tutoring Adams

on the best interests of the Dutch--contending that they had nothing to gain
from recognition that they could not as easily secure without taking that
step.25
This was just too much, and Adams quickly responded that his letters
of

May

3 and May 7, 1781, had contained full explana. tions of all the details

that it would have been prudent to commit to paper.

He volunteered the in-

formation that he had had the advice of friends and that, if he had not acted,
his situation would have been "ridiculous and deplorable indeed."

Far from

placing Congress in a "humiliating light," his step had improved his own
position.

The measure, he repeated, was so well received that, with the ad-

vice of La Vauguyon, Vergennes, and friends, he had carried it further and
demanded a categorical answer.

He did not expect to receive the answer de-

manded, but the attempt placed America in a "glorious light."

As for print-

ing the memorial, it was thepnly means to reach beyond the States General
and contact the real sovereigns of the country.

No one in Europe had made

any objections to the publication and, if he had not done so, he would have
"met with many disagreeable scenes if not public affronts.,,26
To the Livingston advice "to be, in your language and conduct, a private gentleman, fI Adams replied that that was exactly what he bad been.

He

remarked, however t that he was far too well known to remain incognito and that
it was not to the public interest to attempt it. 27 Livingston, although
softening it with compliments on Adams' patriotism, injected a thought from
the French court.

"As our objects must be very similar to those of France,

I should suppose it would be prudent for you to keep up the closest connections with her minister, to advise with him on great leading objects, and to
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counteract his opinion only upon the most mature deliberations." Adams tossed
this off with the simple rejoinder that "without interruption" he had ever
had a "friendly connection with the French ambassador."

28

/

If Livingston's comments on prudent retirement and quiet conSUltation
were pertinent when they were written, they were outdated by the time they
were received.

The internal situation in the Netherlands had evolved toward

a firmer stance vis~-v1s England and a more favorable reaction toward
America.

Adams could hardly claim prime responsibility for this evolution,29

but he had understood well how to capitalize on it.
goric answer was generally well taken.

His demand for a ca.te-

As far away as Spain, Carmichael in-

formed Congress that, since Adams had presented his demand, he, Carmichael,
had been invited to the home of the Dutoh minister in }_drid--thereby denoting
an improvement in the Dutch attitude toward America.. 30 Adams forestalled
concern on Dr. Franklin's part by assuring him that there was no need for
/

anxiety over the demarche.

It had been well ooncerted both with Frenoh min1s-

ters and prominent Dutch officials.

Its prime purpose was to force delibera-

tion on a connection with the allies at the same time as consideration was
being given to the mediation proposal. 3l
Vergennes and Adams were equally anxious to secure limitations to the
Dutch acceptance of the mediation.

Vergennes could not afford to lose the

Dutch source of naval supplies; Adams could not afford to lose a co-belligerent, especially one with money.

The proposal might open the door to his

own negotiations or, at least, bring anc;end to a tiresome wait.

He observed,

"If it does not suit their affairs to make a bargain with us, let them tell us
so candidly and let us all go home. ,,32

He had not yet completely regained his
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health and discouragements were again beginning to crowd in upon him.

He

personally wished himself nat home again every hour in the twenty-four.,,33
Naturally, he had no intention of going home unless recalled or replaced.

His

primary objectives--loan and treaty--had not been achieved, but his time, he
felt, was not entirely uselessly spent.

He enumerated. for the edification

of Livingston, every allied success--political and military--of the entire
past year.

He did not claim credit for all of them but submitted that it was

"impossible not to believe that the memorial bad some infiuence in producing
some of them.,,34
Tangible results shortly began to appear.

On

the twenty-sixth of

February, 1?82, Friesland recognized American sovereignty and instructed her
deputies to move in the States General that the entire republic do likewise. 35
By late February the States of Holland took ad referendum the resolution to
recognize the United States and the matter was soon under consideration by
the various regencies of the province. 36

This prompted the first burgomaster

of Amsterdam to predict that America would be recognized by all seven provinces within six weeks. 3?

Although time proved his prediction to be only a

week short, Adams was not immediately willing to accept that estimate.

The

general attitude, it appeared to him, was a desire for friendly relations
but not for any treaty, even one of commerce, for a long time. 38
advisor, Dumas, was largely of the same opinion.

His Hague

He noted a very perceptible

change in favor of America immediately after Holland took the memorial ad
referendum, but he, too, tended to underestimate the power behind the changes
that he observed.

Having a long acquaintance with the interminable delays

that could result from the ad referendum process, Dumas feared it was to be
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used as a ruse for the States General to hide behind.
~nstructions

While alleging lack of

from their constituents as a reason for not taking action, they

could sit back, carefully watch developments, and spend immeasurable time on
deliberation. 39
As time passed, Adams appraised the situation as increasingly hopeful,
but he continued to entertain some misgivings.

Since the beginning of the

year, trouble had been brewing from a new and totally unexpected quarter-Amsterdam.
~nterests,

Formerly that city had held pride of place in furthering American
but altered sentiment in the regency threatened to delay and pos-

sibly even to prevent the reception of an American ambassador.

40

A group of

Anglophiles resorted to various subterfuges to accomplish their purpose.
Representatives of this opposition called on La Vauguyon to discuss the French
attitude toward the recognition of America.
~nterference

If the French policy of non-

could be propagated as one of indifference, much of the enthu-

siasm of the Francophiles would be negated.

La Vauguyon, suspecting the

motive of their visit, took pains to assure them that the king would undoubtedly be grateful to see the states General following his example.

41 The

Anglophiles then spread the rumor that the French court was jealous of a Dutch
connection with America and was secretly working against it.

They went so

far as to add that the French ambassador had said that his court would not be
willing to recognize American independence if it had not already been
granted.

42 Another scheme proposed by the opposition was to adjourn the

states of Holland without taking a vote on recognition.

This plan was opposed

by the powerful cities of Dort, Haarlem, and even a major part of Amsterdam

itself because of other unfinished business in which they were interested,
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particularly the plans for concerting military operations with France. 43 For
a time Dumas feared that the Anglophiles would attempt to keep Adams' admission under perpetual deliberation.

To avoid this, he personally contacted

many whom he thought would aid in preventing that type of action, and he implored

Ad~~s

to visit The Hague and lend the weight of his presence. 44

The Patriots recognized the necessity of counteracting any and all
schemes concocted to prevent Amsterdam's approval of Adams' mission.
Amsterdam there could be no recognition.

Without

Consequently, they produced a com-

promise plan and forwarded it to Adams for his approval.

Basically, it was a

plan whereby the provinces would acknowledge America in such a manner that a
commercial treaty could be drawn up between the two nations, but no publiC,
formal act of acknowledgment would be made.

Adams quickly recognized that

this would provide a nice "out" for the Dutch but would not provide a thing
for him.

His approval was not forthcoming.

Rather, he viewed the proposal

with "utter detestation.,,45 Dumas returned the plan to its chief proponent
declaring that it could not be accepted as it did not provide for the categorieal answer Adams had requested nor did it provide for a public audience
for the American minister. 46

Adams hoped that the strong republican feelings

of Friesland would effect the rejection of the compromise in the States General, and thus prevent a permanent crippling of his negotiations by means of it.
He regarded it as a half measure--one by which a country declared itself well
disposed and yet refused to grant an audience--and therefore most unsatisfactory to him.

He could only interpret it as "an answer in the negative • • •

and depart in consequence.,,4?
on his mind.

For some days the proposition continued to rub

At first he believed it to have been conceived by Van Bleiswick
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and not by the Patriots at all.

Dumas assured him that Van Bleiswick had no

part either in its instigation or in its development.

It had been tormulated

by triends who regarded it as the last alternative if they could secure nothing better.

48 Adams teared it the more as

La Vauguyon appeared to accept it

as a possible solution and, therefore, could not be expected to use his very
considerable influence against it.49
In order to map strategy, a triend,50 through the agency of Dumas,
urged Adams to come to The Hague and confer with Burgomaster Hooft and the
regents of Amsterdam.

In this way Adams could discover what were their inten-

tions in regard to acknowledging America and receiving her minister.

If the

regents declared themselves favorable to his admission, Adams could then insiat that they espouse the cause openly and support it fully in the provincial
assembly.5l

Adams, accordingly, consulted Van Berckel and M. Bicker, Jr. on

the wisdom ot approaching Hoott and the regency.

He also discussed with them

the suggestion that he approach ragel and verbally set a
demand tor an answer.

t~me

limit to his

It no &Dswer were received by a given date (April 15

was suggested), he would so inform his government.

As the regents appeared

generally to hold the desired opinions, Adams was convinced that they would
ultimately come to the right conclusion--provided that they were not sidetracked by the conciliatory plan.

This project was thereupon dropped and the

three men agreed that it would be better to leave the regency to its own deliberations. 52
As February moved toward March, the minister became more and more
aware of the changing atmosphere.
were no longer successtul.

Anglophile attempts at arousing mob scenes

Sometimes the mob failed to materialize; at other

2~

times, the tumult was turned against the Anglophiles. 53 When an opportunity
arose to purchase a house at The Hague which would serve well for an embassy
building, Dumas and his confreres were elated.

After some high-pressured

salesmanship Dumas sold the idea to Adams, and the house was purchased at
public auction on February 22. 54

When the identity and the purpose of the

purchaser became known, many Hague residents expressed their pleasure while
the Anglophiles found it prudent to remain silent. 55

Sentiment had changed

to such a degree that Dumas was convinced that no one would dare to object if
Adams were to move immediately to The Hague and assume his ministerial character without waiting the decision of the States General. 56

Not only were

there obvious advantages in the purchase of the house economically, but it
appeared to have a good effect politically.57
La Vauguyon, similarly cognizant of the changed atmosphere, notified

Vergennes of the enthusiasm which he encountered everywhere for breaking all
connections with England. 58

Vergennes was skeptical; he doubted that the

Dutch intended to avow American independence.

There was, he argued, no good

reason for their doing so; on the contrary, they would only involve themselves
in embarrassments.

Nevertheless, France had a great interest in Dutch recog-

nition of American sovereignty as this "would cause an entire rupture between
Holland and the Court of London"--an advantage not to be lightly eschewed.
Therefore, La Vauguyon was to do nothing to discourage the Patriots.

To avoid

pitfalls on the other side, the minister was carefully to refrain from promoting the action in any way, even indirectly.

"We do not wish to impose upon

ourselves the obligation of guaranteeing the results which it could have for
the Republic. u59

Vergennes in his communique of the following week repeated
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the directive "neither to favor nor to contradict" the activities of Adams so
that France would not be responsible for the consequences.

If La

V~uguyon

were pinned down on French intentions regarding Adams' demand, he was to
state that the king had clearly manifested by his actions his intentions regarding America.

Beyond that, his majesty made it an inviolable rule not to

advise, particularly in matters of so much importance to the other country.60
Ever wary of the perspicacious Adams, Vergennes warned La Vauguyon to use
prudence in carrying out these instructions so that Adams could not interpret
the ambassador's attitude as indicative of a bad disposition or change of
principles on the part of France. 61
Early in March, 1782, the deputies of Friesland, following the directives of their own States, presented in the States General a resolution that
American sovereignty be acknowledged.

Deputies from all seven provinces took

copies of it to present to their constituents.

The presentation of a resolu-

tion by a province was a significant step and not to be equated with the
referendum action taken on a memorial by an unrecognized minister.
satisfaction was again apparent.

~

Popular

Adams, wherever he travelled, was universal-

ly congratulated on his approaching reception at The Hague. 62

He took aatis-

faction in informing his beloved wife,
Your humble servant has lately grown much into fashion in this
country. Nobody scarcely of so much importance as ~~nheer Adams.
Every city and province rings with De Heer Adams, etc., etc., and
if I were to judge of things here as we do in other countries, I
should think I was going to be received at The Hague in awful pomP6
in a few weeks, but I never can foresee one hour what will happen. 3
The public in general expected the example of the Friesians to be imitated by
the rest of the country.

French and Dutch gazettes both widely reflected the
64 On his part,
opinion that the American minister would be received shortly.

Adams feared that too much credence was being given to the popular belief that
the Friesians were always sure to attain whatever they undertook.

He further

discounted the prognosis on the basis of information he possessed of secret
intrigues against his recognition both in The Hague and at Ameterdam. 65
The interval between Holland taking Friesland's resolution ad referen~

and the regencies of the province submitting their decisions was both busy

and nerve-wracking.

Although influential gentlemen had promised Dumas not to

permit it, there still existed the possibility of the States adjourning before
all the regencies and the body of nobles had reported.

Dumas. supported by

La Vauguyon. desired Adams to spend a few days and lend his influence in The

Hague before the final vote was taken. 66
a real dread of some last-minute slip.

In spite of the good omens there was
It was presumed by the Patriots that

the English were strongly endeavoring to separate the Americans and the Dutch
from each other and from the French and to involve Adams in any separate
negotiations that would render abortive the effort to form a Duteh-American
pact. 67
Paul Wentworth was the first of a group who were sent

t~he

United

Provinces to gather information on the possibilities of a separate peace.
In mid-March a forged article to the effect that Adams was preparing for a
trip to London to treat of peace had appeared in a London paper supposedly
at the instigation of Wentworth and with the sole object of breeding trouble.
When Wentworth completed his professed business of arranging prisoner exchanges. the Patriots insisted on his being requested to leave The Hague.
Apparently he proceeded to Amsterdam.

It was suspected that he would there

attempt some ruse to detract from the full authenticity of Adams' reception
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if he could not completely prevent it. 68

Another emissary, Thomas Digges, who

enjoyed the added advantage of being a former correspondent of Adams, was sent
to contact the American minister and to make some inquiries r61ative to peace
negotiations. 69 He requested a very secret interview with Adams. 70 The
minister replied that he would receive Digges only in the presence of Thaxter
and that he intended to communicate any interview in full to Franklin and to
Vergennes. 71

The Russian mediation offer which was still in process was

another source of concern.

Consequently, Thaxter had some basis for his com-

ment that "some Northern blast t or some demon from Britain may yet disappoint
our well-grounded expectations_,,72
By the end of March both Russian and English ministries, realizing that

the resolution on recognition would certainly be brought before the States
General very soon, tried to delay the progress of the deliberations. 73 A
major effort was initiated through the Russian court.

The Russian government,

acting as intermediary, communicated to the States General that George III had
reversed his policy and was now disposed to permit free navigation to the
republic and to negotiate a treaty similar to that of 1674.74

It was this

treaty which permitted traffic in naval supplies and to which Dutch adherence
had inaugurated the Anglo-Dutch rupture.

At the same time England proposed a

truce while these negotiations were carried forward. 75 Fearing that her
minister at The Hague was not sufficiently sympathetic to the English party,
Catherine dispatched a second representative, presumably more sympathetic to
the English cause, to aid in reestablishing peace. 76

The Prince of Orange

exerted his influence, not to block Adams directly, but to strengthen the
relations with Russia and to retain the right to make a separate peace.

He
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presumed that France would not object to a separate peace if the Netherlands
secured the right to free navigation.and the right to export naval supplies.??
Adams undertook a constant round of conversations, visits, and trips
throughout the country.
their aid.

He visited a number of mercantile houses to enlist

As only Friesland, prior to the end of March, had voted recogn1-

tion, Dumas advocated spreading the idea that an American act of navigation
could open to Friesland alone the ports of the United States.?8 This thought
was quietly filtered among the merchants and shipowners of the major cities.
As the same time news of the ordinance of Congress against British manufactures reached the United Provinces.

As the ordinance enhanced the Dutch

prospects of garnering a laraer share of American trade, its arrival was welltimed to have a strong influence on the Dutch merchants.

It was impossible to

estimate the degree of influence each of these factors had upon the merchants
and business men.

They culminated, however, in a deluge of petitions from

merchants, bankers, shipowners, and others to their regencies requesting the
recognition of America in order that commercial treaties could be signed.
Many of the petitions were drawn up by close collaborators of Adams,

~ ••

LUKe in Layden, Calkoen in Amsterdam, and Van Zoon in Rotterdam, to mention

only

III

fe'll.
The first of these papers, drawn by Jean Luzac, was the petition of

members of the orsanizatioD of Traders, Merchants, and Manufacturers of Leyden to their city council.

It was signed by nearly sixty business houses,

and at their request two copies of the petition were forwarded to Adams.?9 A
similar petition from the Merchants, Insurers, and Freighters of Rotterdam to
their regency followed.

The merchants of Amsterdam petitioned first their own
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regency and then joined with Haarlem and Leyden in a petition to the provincial
States and to the states General.

On the latter there were approximately five

hundred names, and twice as many would have willingly signed it it had been
necessary.

Hany familiar names appeared, among them that of Neuf'ville.,and Son.

Van Staphorst. de la Lande and Fynje. and Matthew van Arp.

A wide number of

other petitions, most of them dated March 20 and signed by a greater or lesser
number of persons depending on the size and commerce of the area or city petitioning, were also addressed to the regenoies. to the States of Holland and
West Friesland, and to the States General.

Dort was a major exception.

letter of March 20, the city merchants expressed

confidenc~

In a

that their regents

would authorize their deputies to vote for the reception of' Adams at The

80 The

Hague.

They, therefore, "judged it unnecessary to present a petition."

petitions worked effectively and oontributed to the speed of the deliberations. 8l

Adams took delight in them as they enhanced the reputation of the

Amerioan cause and supplied "an increase of strength and power equal to a
great army or navy.1f

82 By March 22, half of the eighteen cities in the Prov-

ince of Holland had voted for acknowledgment.

Some of the most populous

cities in the Netherlands were among those acceding, e.g. Amsterdam, Leyden,
Dort, and Haarlem.
The stadholder insisted that the measure was premature but decided that
the movement was too powerful for him to stop.
he did not intend to make the effort.

Therefore, he announced that

He promised to restrict himself to

stating his views as his personal opinion only and not to use his influence
against the acknowledgment. 8} The Grand Pensionary, whose intentions Adams
had often questioned, had earlier promised to promote the business with all
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his power.

84 The most critical stage of the difficult wait was thus over. On

March 26. the remaining cities of Holland voted acknowledgment.

The States of
. 85
Holland and West Friesland gave provincial assent on f1arch 28, 1782.
The
States directed Van Bleiswick to notify Adams immediately of their resolution.

Adams assured Van Bleiswick that he was very sensible of the "unequivocal
demonstrations" of "national harmony and unanimity" and hoped these would
forcibly operate toward a general peace.

He also hoped that all other prov-

inces would soon follow the examples of Friesland and Holland.

All breathed

a sigh of relief as the accession of Holland virtually "amounted to acknowledgment of American independence and opens the road to negotiation."

86

Other provinces were certain to follow, but delaying taotics would
first be tried in some.

Zwolle, where half the regency was composed of the

nobles, sought to have a committee first take the proposal under advisement
before it was turned over to the regency itself.

Van der Capellen used his

full influence to prevent so lengthy a process. 87 The insistence of merchants
and populace were too powertul. for any intrigue.

Netherland's "inclination

for us, like a spring pressed by a strong hand. is escaping and declares for
us nobly, by an accumulation of addresses of corporations, which appear from
all parts."

88 Petitions continued to flow.

the gazettes.

Many of them were published in

Public opinion and commercial interests so coincided that early

in April Dumas quite correctly predicted recognition before the end of the
month. 89

On the day of this prediction, April 4, 1782, the third province,

Zealand, approved recognition.

She was quickly followed by OVeryssel on

April 5. Groningen on April 9, Utrecht on April 10, and Guelderland on April
17.

The States General gave its approval on April 19 and formally received

Adams on April 22.

Thus, within three weeks of the affirmative vote in the

states of Holland and West Friesland, reoognition was acoorded. 90
A reasonable pride in the aooomplishment might well be forgiven Adams
sinoe he had for over a year and a half looked forward to it as "the turning
point"--the final determination of the question whether the Netherlands was
for or against the allies.

La Vauguyon agreed with this evaluation and re-

joioed that the event would separate conclusively the republio from England;
that it would fix Amerioa more firmly in its independenoe; and finally, that
it would foroe England to solioit a general peaoe.
termined militiaman to aohieve!

No small ends for a de-

An admiring Rotterdam oitizen thought the

deed to have been aocomplished in "suoh an unexpeoted and singular way that
whoever aCknowledges a Divine Providence will find her finger upon every
step."

Adams described it as the "foundation for prosperity and security to

both nations. n9l

Tired out from the exertions of gaining recognition and the

round of formalities and congratulations whioh followed it, Adams wrote to his
wife that "a ohild was never more weary of a whistle, than I am of embassies."
But the very word "embassy" reminded him of the viotory that was his--a
viotory which he believed to be a greater achievement than that of forming
the alliance with France.
The embassy here, however, has done great things. It has not merely
tempted a natural rival, and an embittered, inveterate, hereditary
enemy, to assist a little against G. B., but it has torn from her
bosom, a constant faithful friend and ally of a hundred years duration. It has not only prevailed with a minister or an absolute oourt
to fall in with the national prejudioe, but without money, without
friends, and in opposition to mean intrigues, it has oarried its oause,
by the still small voioe of reason, and persuasion, triumphantly against
the uninterrupted opposition of 9~mily conneotions, court influence,
and aristocratioal dispositions.
The thought of his accomplishment so enohanted him that his offioial

244
correspondence repeated it in substance for the delectation of Congress. 93
Although bursting with pleasure at the event which even "many indifferent
people thinlc is a great point," he was too honest not to disclctim complete
responsibility.

His success, he assured his friends, was the result of a

great number and variety of causes operating in the several parts of the globe
which he "could no more influence than the fly upon the chariot wheel could
raise the clouds of dust.,,9 4
,\ full round of congratulations and receptions followed.

Several days

were almost exclusively devoted to the paying and receiving of visits from
members of the government and the court.

Adams estimated that there were at

least a hundred and fifty of these ceremonial calls during the first four days.
First and most important was the formal reception by the whole body of the
States General.

Following that, Adams was formally received by the Prince of

Orange and a rew days later by the Princess. 95

Not the least among the

formalities--and one which Adams particularly relished--was a dinner given on
Tuesday, April 23, by La Vauguyon in honor of the United states.

Adams was

introduced to all the members of the diplomatic corps at The Hague.

This was

a novelty since Adams had not been accepted by the vast majority of the
diplomatic corps--nor was he destined to be accepted on any but neutral territory for some months to come.

Although he railed against a protocol which

restricted the exchange of visits with many of these ministers, he cryptically
observed that none had missed this event since nothing "in the whole voluminous ceremonial, nor in all the idle farce of etiquette fl prevented a minister
from partaking of a "good dinner in good company."

La. Vauguyon, "by paying

more attention to the new brother than to all the old fraternity," quite
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compensated for any stiffness on the part of those ministers whose country
had not granted reCognition. 96
Among the very few of whose coolness Adams could not complain was H. de
Llano, the "grave Spaniard."

Adams, who possessed his full share of vanity,

was proud to repeat in whole or in part the extremely effusive compliment
paid to him by that dignitary.
You have struck, Monsieur, the greatest blow in all Europe. It is the
greatest blow which has ever been struck in the cause of America. It
is you who have frightened and overwhelmed the Anglomanes. It is you
who have fi1 ,d this nation with enthusiasm. It is you who have turned
their heads.

9

Recognizing that the remark could well be regarded as the effusion of the
moment, Adams would relate the scene of the following morning when de Llano
called upon him at his hotel.

On that occasion the Spanish envoy. repeating

his remark, turned to a gentleman of his party and added that he had not said
it "in order to make compliments to f.1onaieur Adams" but "because. in truth, I
believe it is his due."

Recounting the incident

~o

his close friend, Jenings.

Adams hastened to assure him that he would not fall an easy prey to such compliments.

"They will never turn my head, I assure you."

Jenings wryly

replied that the compliment did appear to him a little too extreme.

On the

other hand, he observed that Adams deserved plaudits for recognizing the
proper tDoment to act and seizing it to his "own honor, the public benefit, and
the confusion of his enemies, public and private. n98
In addition to the official visits a number of local groups planned
public entertainments in Adams' honor.

Because of the pressure of time and

also due to the ill health which revisited him through much of May and June,
these invitations could not be accepted, but even their rejection required
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time and tact. 99

Among the most determined was a merchant group from Schiedam.

In March they invited him to be guest of honor at a hundred-place dinner tenta ti vely

set for the second week in

r·~ay.

On the day that recogrii tion was

accorded, April 19, a delegation from these merchants called upon the minister
to renew their invitation.

Because of the burden of his occupations, Adams

requested Dumas to try to have him excused.

Dumas, anxious not to alienate

any group, personally called upon the secretary of the city regency and informed him that Adams, out of thoughtfulness for the mixed emotions in the
United Provinces, thought it better not to appear in person, but that he would
gladly forward their compliments and the invitation in his dispatch to Congress.

100
Complete entrl to diplomatic circles was by no means granted.

Frequent-

ly he met members of the court and diplomatic corps at social functions given
by Dutch magistrates or at the homes of the French and Spanish ministers, both
of whom were instructed to acknowled.ge him, but many doors were closed to him.
Although he was finally invited to dine with the Prince and Princess of Orange
at their country estate, the Maison du Bois,

101 time and prodding were re-

quired to elicit for Adruns an invitation to one of the Prince's receptions.
~oJith

102

the exception of France and Spain, the foreign embassies were loathe to

exchange visits. 103 The Russian ambassador was instructed to have nothing to
do with him.

Dana wrote from St. Petersburg that the news of recognition

"gave a shock here, and is not well received."

That court was irritated that

the mediation had neither prevented recognition nor brought a partial peace
between Britain and Holland.
aloof.

104

.
Ministers of the other countries remained

The Emperor was particularly displeased at the States General's
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precipitancy in admitting Adame and forbade his minister to acknowledge the
American. 105 Franklin, although pleased that Adams had been recognized, entertained some misgivings on the procedure.

It appeared to him that America

was harming both her credit and her standing by sending militia diplomats all
over Europe. "begging alliances. and soliciting declarations of our independ-

106

ence. 1t

On

the other hand, La Fayette gladdened the minister's heart with

congratulations and a statement of the importance of the Dutch declaration in
the current crisis.

La Vauguyon even more generously commented that the Dutch

had avenged themselves for "All the political and other evils which the English have done them since Cromwell."

Louis XVI, through Vergennes, expressed

his pleasure at the event which he predicted would permanently sever AngloDutch relations and force the English to solicit peace.

When the news finally

reached Philadelphia five months later, Livingston described it to the several
state governors in glowing terms.

He deemed it "an event which widens the

basis of our independence and leads to our immediate connection with a powerful nation, whose alliance a variety of circumstances in their origin and
government render extremely desirable. nl07
In England the event caused a "profound sensation" and drove the cabinet
to a desperate effort to regain the Dutch. 108

On May 4 Fox dispatched to

Simolin a second letter further explaining the communication of March 28
which had proposed an unlimited freedom of the sea.

This, in turn, was pre-

sented to the States General by the Russian ministers at The Hague.

The

Tsarina applied pressure through her ambassador at Versailles to enlist French
co-operation in urging the Dutch to accept the English offer.

To these

Russian overtures, Louis XVI used his favorite graceful exit.

He responded
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that he was sensible of the Empress' efforts but did not desire to interfere
in Dutch affairs. 109
In reality, his minister, in concert with Adams and Du~s, was devoting
considerable time to interference in the English peace project.

No sooner had

the first intimations of England's proposal to revert to the treaty of 1674
been made than these gentlemen concerted plans to thwart it.

Working through

their friends at Amsterdam and in The Hague, they had secured on April 25 a
resolution in the states of Holland to refuse the offer made through Russia
.
110
earlier in the month.
When England renewed her offer in explicAted form in
May. they again went into aotion.

Unfortunately the secret interviews, con-

ferences, and negotiations kept them too busy to record their activities adequately.

They were conscious, too, that many of these meetings "ought not

yet to be trusted to paper."lll As a result of all the activity the States ot
Holland resolved not to reestablish the alliance or articles of commerce with
England, and the States General resolved not to accept a separate peace without French approval. 112
Although Adams had taken a very active part in these negotiations
earlier, after mid-May. when they seemed safely launched, he gradually withdrew in favor of the other two diplomats.

He himself was busy moving to the

new Hotel des itats-Unis, resisting separate peace feelers, initiating another
loan, and ironing out differencea with the States General on a treaty of amity
and commerce.

Barely was the first round of ceremony over recognition com-

pleted than Adams proceeded to revitalize his efforts to secure a loan.

He

had consistently believed that lack of recognition was the chief obstacle to
procuring money and, with that roadblock removed, he was prepared to go to
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banke rs,
Encouraged by an April repor t from Frank lin that the Paris
or six millio n
Fizea ux and Grand , predi cted the succe ss of a loan for five
siasm over recog florin s if Adams took imme diate advan tage of the Dutch enthu
imme diatel y disnitio n,l13 he drew up a s~t of altern ative propo sals. He

work.

ercial house , in
patch ed these to the banke r, Hodshon, and invite d that comm
t, to engage to
union with whate ver co-op eratin g house s Hodshon could enlis
end of July. Alfurnis h Congr ess with four or five millio n florin s by the
lly expec t to obthoug h ready to contr act for that sum, Adams did not actua
h the past two years ,
tain it. Dutch profi ts from trade had been ruine d throug
by loans opened
and any money avail able for inves tment was alread y solic ited
sever al other powers
for "Fran ce, Spain , Engla nd, Russi a, Sweden, Denmark, and
10ans . nl14 To make
as well as their own natio nal, provi ncial , and colle giate
were payin g highe r
the negot iation s more diffi cult, sever al of these count ries
rs were not the men
inter est than Adams could offer , and the Dutch money lende
s assur ed him that
to let enthu siasm repla ce finan cial good sense . His friend
misti c and obser ved
American credi t was mounting viSib ly.11 5 He was more pessi
r was chief ly
that the "prod igiou s" eager ness to act as the American banke
uctio n to Ameribecau se of the honor involv ed and the oppor tunity of an introd
can trade .

None were willin g to guara ntee a loan,

an~he

enthu siasm , in spite

strin gs." Also
of appea rance s, did not seem "stron g enough to untie purse
the other s was certa i
whate ver estab lishm ent he chose , a "cry and clamo r" from
ty of his friend s as
to resul t and led him to compl ain that he found the avidi
es. He descr ibed his
great an obsta cle to succe ss as the ill will of his enemi
iating for his life
posit ion as "that of a man in the midst of the ocean negot
116
among a schoo l of shark s. tt
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Adams had scarcely engaged Hodshon as broker when his friend, Cerisier,
warned him that Hodahon was an Anglophile at heart and could not be expected to
devote his best efforts to the loan. ll ? As this news arrived just as Hodahon
was engaged in the financial aspects of Adams' removal from Amsterdam to the
new American embassy building, Adams was in a delicate position.

With some

skill he managed to convince Hodshon that the party spirit and disagreeable
altercations that would arise from continued association would be damaging to
both Hodshon and the PUblic. llB
tract.

He thus secured his release from that con-

Just as he verged on the completion of another with a group of bank-

ers, a "fatal" circumstance--the opening of a loan for nine million for the
India Company, under the warranty of the States and bearing an interest of one
per cent above the ordinary rate--dashed his hopes by threatening to channel
any available funds elsewhere. 119
In spite of these unfavorable conditions, Adams, with his accustomed
pertinacity, strove to get a loan inaugurated.

On

Y~y

the affair with representatives of three major houses.

10 he met and discussed
At this meeting the

Dutch bankers pressed for the best possible terms and the conferences ended
120
on a hazY agreement for 4}4% for brokerage and charges.
In subsequent correspondence, Adams very clearly stipulated that he understood the agreed 4}4%
to cover all the expenses, receiving and paying to the order of the United
states the money in the first instance, receiving and paying of the annual
interest on the loaD.:. and receiving and paying off of the capital in the final
instance, as well as the brokerage, the fees for the undertakers, and all
other charges. 121 The companies regarded the 4~% as the rate for receiving
and paying out of the money and brokeral5e charges but expected to charge an
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additional 1% annually on the amount of the interest for the work of paying it
out and another Y4% to cover expenses on the final redemption of the obligations.

U2

/

Adams was prepared to compromise, but he was determined not to go

the whole way.

He accepted the 1% annually on the amount of the interest,

raised the original

4~%

the final redemption.

to

4»% but flatly refused to pay any percentage on

If the bankers were unwilling to accept these terms,

he requested that they notify him so that he could find another house. 123

In

view of this ultimatum, they quickly agreed to his terms.
There were some differences also on the size of the loan to be opened
and on the possibility of America opening other loans before this one should
be filled.

Adams preferred that it be for three million florins, but the

commercial houses preferred five million.

They in turn were anxious to bind

America against opening any other loan in the meantime.
some faint hope of securing the warranty of either the

Adams entertained
Stat~s

General or a

provincial States and did not want to eliminate the possibility of accepting
their offer.

Nor did he desire to be completely bound to a house which might

or might not make progress in the business.

On these points, also, a com-

promise was worked out whereby the loan would open for five million
1y at

5%.

immediate~

but the "no other loan" clause was to be binding only on Adams

personally and not on his successor nor on Congress.

Theref.:Ore, if Congress'

interests should so dictate, they could open further loans by replacing him
with another minister.

Similarly, the clause would not be applicable to any

loan opened for America under the warranty of any segment of the Dutch government as the warranters, not the American minister, would choose the commercial
house in that case. 124

If the Dutch bankers could drive a close bargain

80
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could Adams.

',ii th the terms worked out agreeably to both parties, the pros-

pectus was published and the bonds printed. 125
By June 20 the first thousand blank bonds (face value one million
florins) were ready for Adams' signature.
and a second thousand in process.

Within two days they were signed

Meanwhile, the bankers prepared twenty-five

Dnglish and twenty-five Dutch copies of the general bonds--five copies in
either language of each million florins--to be forwarded to Congress by five
different opportunities. 126

Adams forwarded to Philadelphia five copies of

the contract itself with the reminder that the commission to negotiate a loan
had included a promise of Congressional ratification.

He urged speedy action

as his lenders were fearfUl of putting out any considerable sum until the
ratifications arrived.

These contracts and the obligations arrived in Phila-

delphia on the Heer Adams in mid-September and Congress prowptly proceeded
to ratify and return them. 127 The news had arrived at an excellent time to
receive Congress' immediate attention.

That body had been occupied with a

resolution for a loan of fiVe million dollars on whatever terms they could
obtain.

News from Adams caused them to lower this sum to four million. 128

Livingston, aware of the necessity for a sizable sum of money, urged Adams
to "extend every nerve to get it filled; for if the war continues it will be
essential to our exertions; if it should terminate, it will not be less necessary to enable us to discharge our army; in every view it is necessary.,~29
Adams had not given cause for over-confidence in the loan.

His cover-

ing letter to Congress stressed that he had no expectations of securing the
five million for a long time, and that a million and a half by Christmas would
exceed his expectations.

The Heer Adams also brought his letter of June 9

253
imploring Congress not to draw on the proposed loan because the "extreme
scarcity" of money would make it impossible to realize any great amount. l30
Unofficially, however, Congress received from other sources the more cheering
information that the loan was nearly one-fourth filled when the boat embarked. 13l
B,y

July the money was coming in.

Adams directed his bankers to keep

Congress informed of the general progress of the loan but not to make statements in excess of the money actually on hand.

He preferred that the amount

stated should be a '1few hundred thousand guilders under" as bills were still
arriving which had been drawn on Henry Laurens two years previously.132

The

bankers promised to heed Adams' advice and be cautious in the information that
they forwarded.

They, however, were inolined to take a more favorable view of

the prospects than Adams was, and they pointed out to the minister that they
had received nearly a million in cash within the first month. 133 When preparing their report for Congress in August, they notified Adams that to date
(August 8) they had received 1,484,000 florins and requested his advice on the
sum to be reported. l34 Pleased to have the affair proceeding so well,

Ada«~

suggested that they report 1,300,000 florins and then keep Congress informed
most exaotly of everything that related to the loan. 135

His part in the nego-

tiation Was more or less completed and he was anxious to devote his full energies to the realization of the seoond commission which he held in the
~therland8--that

of securing a treaty of amity and commeroe.

His interest in this project had led him--with full intention of presenting it regardless of eventualities--to prepare a draft of such a treaty
even before the first province had voted to recognize America. l36

Scarcely
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had Adams been received by the states General than he applied to President Van
Citters for a oommittee to disouss the proposed treaty.

In order to expedite

the matter, he presented to the committee the project of a treaty drawn up in
conformity to the model furnished him by Congress. 137

This draft the commit-

tee immediately had translated--Adams had presented it in English--printed and
mailed to all members of the sovereig.aty.
miralty for recommendations or alterations.
May 21 with a list of desired changes .138

A copy was transmitted to the AdThe Admiralty reported back on

~1a.ny

of these were inconsequential,

really, and involved nothing more profound than minor rewording,

~.t

the

change in title from the "Seven United Provinces of the Low Countries" to the
simpler "United Netherlands. ,,139

Whenever the "most favored nation"! phrase

appeared, they wished the additional phrase "in Europe" eliminated aa unnecessarr and without precedent.
agreeable.

To both of these changes Adams was perfectly

Another change, which he oonsidered important and personally would

have been willing to insert, concerned recaptured vessels and letters of
marque.

However, his instructions did not cover these points and he could

only draw up a separate convention with the understanding that the United
States
~per.

~hould

be free to ratify the treaty either with or without this added

Another problem, which recurrently was raised in various parts of the

sovereignty, was in reference to articles twenty-two through twenty-four.
Article twenty-two in a very detailed manner stated that this treaty might not
in any way derogate from the treaty of alliance or of commerce with France.
The following article referred to the open invitation to Spain to adhere to
the alliance at any time.

The Dutch were a little leary of being subordinated

to French or Spanish interests.

But Adams insisted that these articles must
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remain in substance.

The twenty-fourth article related to the possibility of

the United £3tates negotiating with the frubary States for security of navigation on the Hedi terranean, in which case the Dutch consuls in "those countries
were to second the lUnerican requisition.

In regard to this article, Adams

pointed out that it bound the Dutch to nothing and was no more than an act of
good will on their part. 140
The Admiralty report, as soon as presented to Their High Hightinesses,
was taken ad referendum by six provinces.

The seventh, Overysse1, being an

interior province, determined to abide by the decision of Holland as the
principal maritime province. 141

Since Holland was obviously the key to ac-

ceptance of the treaty, Adams deemed it prudent to pay a special visit to the
Grand Pensionary.

He

hoped to remove some of Van Bleiswick's objections and t

explain to him the reasons for certain articles, especially those regarding
France and Spain.
vince.

To his relief, the pensionary was not difficult to con-

Indeed, Van Bleiswick made light of the objections being raised and

predicted ultimate success, but he warned that time must be allowed for the
cities to deliberate and suggested six weeks as reasonable.
too sanguine.

142

Adams was not

After his earlier patience-wracking experiences with the com-

p1icated mechanism of the Dutch constitution, he expected the final acceptance
of the treaties to be at least three months distant. 143 His estimate proved
to be more realistic than that of the Grand Pensionary.

In the meantime, he

applied himself to the task of answering objections and explaining his position on the various articles to all who inquired.
In mid-:Ju1y the first positive step was taken.

'l'he States of Holland

and West Friesland took ad referendum a resolution to propose to the States
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General that deputies from that body enter into discussion with Adans and work
out with him a mutually agreeable treaty.

The one firm stipula.tion was that

t"le offensi va articles twenty-two and twenty-three either be omitted or be so
clearly stated that the Franco-'\.merican alliance could in no way derogate from
the proposed treaty between the republic and America.

144 Van Berckel as usual

served as Adams' right arm in Amsterdam and to him Adams sent an explanation
of the American viewpoint on the various recommendations of the Admiralty and
in particular on the two most troublesome articles.

;\dams expressed again his

willingness to accept most of the changes made by the Admiralty but argued
that it would be impossible to omit the two articles in question.
had a solemn agreement with France which must be

safe~~arded.

Congress

Furthermore,

no one had yet demonstrated what possible injury these articles could cause
the Netherlands.

On the contrary, their sole purpose was no other than that

the treaty under consideration should not derogate from the previous treaties
wi th J.<"rance.

145

Adams was correct in his presumption that Amsterdam would again be the
key to success or failure in the negotiation.

The city hemmed and hawed until

every other city in the province had voted approval.

Finally, on August 8,

the Amsterdam regency gave its approval and added the admonition to its deputies not to retard under any pretext ,the final accomplishment of the business.
The regency, however, submitted minor recommendations made to it by the bourse
for discussion with Adams.

As a criterion by which Adams might judge whether

each recommendation :proposed was truly that of the bourse or only that of a
committee member, Van Berckal informed him that the bourse recommendations
all bore a common characteristic.

They were, in every case, to supply or to
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ask clarification rath0r than to add or to retract any essential point.

In

order to prevent any modifications which might be proposed from delaying the
negotiations on the pretext that it must be taken ad referendum, a final
clause was added that Their High

~ightinesses

be given full power to conclude

a treaty with whatever changes should be agreeable to the two contracting
powers.
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Amsterdam's sanction received and the proposed conference with Adams

held, the States of Holland and West Friesland approved the treaty on August
14.

The States General proposed an immediate conference with Adams to put

the final touches to it.

Another conference on the same subject was scheduled

with Van Bleiswick as he was the most influential individual in the States
General. 147 These many conferences at every level wearied the impatient Adams
and he complained to Mrs. Adams that she could have "no idea of the difficulties" encountered, some t'too cruel" even to be committed to paper. 148
On August 22 a committee composed of deputies from each province, Van
Bleiswick, and Seoretary Fagel met with the American plenipotentiary to present to the latter their remarks and propositions.

A compromise was shortly

reached on the controversial twenty-second and twenty-third articles, and
these were condensed into a single simplified article. 149

A new treaty em-

bodying the compromises was then drawn up as also a convention on the subject
of recaptured prizes.

All this consumed time and it was mid-September before

Adams could write that "all articles, words, syllables, and letters, and point
are adjusted, and nothing remains but to write five fair copies, in Dutch and
English, and sign, seal, and deliver th'em. f1

He wa.s plea.sed with the results

which he described as being !las near the spirit of my instructions as I could

obtain, and I think it is in nothing materially variant from them."150
Finally, the signing of both treaty and convention was scheduled for
Monday, October 7, but a last-minute delay postponed the event
lowing day.

~ntil

the fol-

At high noon on October 8, 1782, Adams proceeded to the state

House where he was received with all formality by two deputies and conducted
to the chamber of business.

There the copies were properly signed and, as

quickly as safe means of transport could be found, copies were dispatched to
Congress for ratification. 15l

They arrived in Philadelphia and were read in

Congress on January 21, 1783.

Two days later the Treaty of Amity and Commerce

with the United Provinces as also the convention was ratified. 152

It was pro-

claimed the same day although ratifications were not formally exchanged with
the Netherlands until June 23, 11~3.
By October 8 then, John Adams had accomplished the major part of his
assigned tasks in the Netherlands.

He had secured the recognition of his coun-

try and of himself; he had inaugurated a loan that promised to be successful;
he had negotiated a treaty of amity and commerce.
was that of forming a

Franco-Dutch-~merican

The only remaining task

alliance.

Each time he had

broached that subject, his efforts had been stymied by La
"no instructions.tI

V~uguyonts

claim of

Adams was determined to await the advice of France on this

matter although he admittedly had gone against it on the occasion of presenting his memorial. 153 This resolution he perhaps found the easier to make as he
was convinced that La Vauguyon was well disposed toward an alliance and would
give his acquiescence to the undertaking as soon as possible. 154
however, continued to stall.
Adams began to wear thin.

B,y

Vergennes,

late summer the none-too-durable patience of

In a dispatch to Livingston he pointed out his
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embarrassment in not knowing what action to take.

On the one hand, he was

anxious to preserve peacefUl relations with the French ministers.

On the other

hand. the wording of the tenth article of the Franco-American 'treaty directed
that any invitation to other countries be extended in concert.

He presumed

that the concert was settled in Philadelphia, and that his instructions,
therefore, to make the proposal were positive.

He was anxious to fUlfill his

instructions, especially when they were so agreeable to his way of thinking. 155 Before any further action could be taken, he was called to the peace
convention in Paris.

This convention not only superseded any negotiation on

an alliance but nullified the commission to form one since any alliance was
to be restricted to the duration of the war.
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CHAPTER VI

TRIUMPH OF MILITIA DIPLOMACY
Long before Adams affixed his signature to the treaties of amity and
commerce, the first serious efforts toward the long-awaited peace settlement
were being made.

Adams, with his customary impetuous distrust of English in-

tentions, refused to grant any credence to the peace emissaries sent to him.
In mid-April, 1782. Franklin, who had also been contacted by English envoys,
extended a first request to his co-commissioners that they come to Paris prepared to aid in a projected peace settlement. l

John Jay's militia efforts at

diplomacy in Spain were not paying off as Adams' were, and so he accepted the
invitation, arriving in Paris on June 23.

Adams, in process of being received

and of presenting his draft of a treaty of amity and commerce, had excellent
reasons for his refusal to be drawn to Paris at that time.
Four months later, in response to a request from Jay to come to Paris,
Adams explained his reluctance both in terms of the uncompleted treaty of
commerce and of his lack of belief in Lord Shelburne's sincerity.

He also

pointed out the imprudence of three American ministers converging on Paris at
the same time unless the negotiator from England had full powers to treat with
America.

Adams adamantly refused to accept anything short of a specific

statement of American independence.

2

He scornfully rejected all offers of

negotiation under ambiguous commissions.

England's offer to treat with all

the "belligerent powers" was suspect since America had never been recognized
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as a power by England.

Adams interpreted that offer as a British device to

reserve lito themselves a place for chicane.".3

A reputed commission to treat

with the "four powers at war with England," he described as equally ambiguous.
It could as well refer to "Hyder Ali or the Mahrattas" as to America.

Simi-

larly Oswald's commission to treat with "the said colonies or plantations, or
any of them, or any parts thereof" proved unacceptable to him.

He proudly

declared that he was not a minister of any "fourth state" nor of any "American
colonies.,,4 Jay and Franklin agreed with him and Oswald was forced to send
for a furth0r, and more explicit authorization, which would be acceptable to
the American commissioners. 5
In spite of the fact that Adams refused to come to Paris short of a
commission explicitly to treat with the United States of America, he was not
the man to ignore any matter affecting the well-being of his country.

Con-

sequently, he regularly sought information on any progress toward a negotiation.
arrive.

Finally, the message which the American plenipotentiaries awaited did
Oswald received on September 27, 1782, a commission to treat with

"the commissioners of the United States of America.,,6

These words conceded

the explicit reoognition which the Americans had demanded and which their
firmness had won for them.

Adams received the message, accompanied by Jay's

urgent request, on October 6, a matter of hours

befor~the

his treaties of amity and commerce with the Netherlands. 7

formal signing of
With great industry,

he signed another two thousand obligations, wrote long explanatory epistles
to Livingston and to his family, to Jenings, Dana, and other friends, turned

"
over the affairs at the Hotel des Etats-Unis
to Dumas, fulfilled the ritual
of taking leave of the numerous dignitaries, paid farewell visits to friends
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at The Hague including La Vauguyon, and set out for Paris on October 17,
1782. 8 He was not to see The Hague again for nearly a year when he would return to solicit more money.
As the roads were bad and travel was difficult, Adams took his time and
indulged in sightseeing along the way.

Also, he did not really believe Eng-

land was prepared to make peace and he no longer enjoyed the vigor of a young
man.

Thus, it was already October 26, when he drove up to his old lodgings

at the Hotel de Valois.

As the I1first thing to be done in Paris is always to

send for a taylor, peruke maker, and shoemaker," he spent some time arraying
himself suitably as a diplomatic representative of a sovereign country.9
Finally, on Monday, the twenty-eighth, he paid his respects to Jay and learned
from him the details of the negotiations.

Delighted with the conduct of Jay

in resisting both English and French efforts to bobtail the American claims,
Adams spent the entire day with Jay and worked up an ever greater resentment
at every indication, real or imagined, of Franklin's willingness to conciliate
either France or England.
He refused for a time to so much as call upon Franklin and declared
that it was the Doctor's business to come and see him.

A friend, arguing the

imprudence of demonstrating a division among themselves to interested parties,
finally prevailed upon him to go out to Pasey and see Franklin who was slowly
recuperating from a long debilitating seige of the gout.

Once there Adams

minced no words in expressing his complete approval of Jay's conduct and
their mutual resolve to negotiate boundaries and fisheries entirely independent of France.

10

Adams obviously was not in a tractable mood.

He had too

long felt both restricted and undermined by the Franklin-Vergennes

combinatio~
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As he had been blessed with small ability to forget and still less to forgive,
his previous trips to France and subsequent unpleasant "flights" to Holland
undoubtedly rankled in his mind.

On this occasion he had retarned somewhat

as the victor and his self-esteem dictated a policy that no flight of imagination could call subservient to either Franklin or Vergennes.

Franklin wisely

heard him out and, before conferences again began in earnest, proceeded to
announce his intention of supporting his colleagues in their resolution to
keep their negotiations secret from the French court. ll
Adams was still more reluctant to contact Vergennes.

On previous

visits to Paris he had called upon the Foreign Secretary at his earliest possible convenience.
see Vergennes.

Now he permitted two weeks to slip past with no effort to

He excused this dilatoriness on the claim that he was "so

constantly engaged forenoon, afternoon, and eveningTl in peace conferences
that he could not find time to go to Versailles or nanywhere else. ,,12

Finally,

La Fayette took him to task on the matter and pointed out that Vergennes could

justifiably resent the neglect.

When Dr. Franklin repeated the same message

at dinner that evening, Adams resolved to pay his respects the next morning,
November the tenth. 13
The effort was well rewarded.

Vergennes' entire attitude toward Adams

appeared to have undergone drastic change.

Adams could reasonably deduot that

this change was related to his success in the Netherlands.
tion seemed probable.

No other explana-

A presumption, had the Foreign Secretary entertained

one, that treaty negotiations were beyond the point of interference from the
"pedantry, stubbornness, and self-importance" of Adame would have been insufficient to induoe Vergennes to aesume a more congenial air.

14 Aotually the
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peace negotiations were quite unsettled and Vergennes had no accurate knowledge of what progress was being made.

His mind was undoubtedly relieved to

know that Adams was restrictea by co-negotiators, but the relief could
scarcely have been great enough to explain the new kindliness with which he
received a former adversary.

His later correspondence proved that he still

did not trust Franco-American relations in Adams' hands any further than he
had two years earlier.

Writing to LUzerne in September, 1783, he warned his

ambassador that there were people who would still like to destroy the bonds
between the two countries "and chief among these is John Adams.,,15

A shrewd

diplomat, he may have surmised that Adams would be easier to lead than to
drive (though he was not apt to be led very far), but the Comte apparently
made no serious effort at this period either to lead or to drive.

On the

other hand, Vergennes was eminently capable of recognizing another man's success and ot appreciating the magnitude ot the achievement.

Also, he was

diplomat enough to know which way the wind was blowing--at the moment the air
was laden with Adams' praises--and bend with the breezes.

Something of these

considerations may have prompted the new respect with which he received Adams.
At any rate, he accorded the American minister considerable time and then,
when the interview was over, invited him to dinner.
In his diary that evening Adams gloated over the experiences of the
day.

He had been privileged to conduct the Countess to dinner where, sitting

to her right and opposite Vergennes, he received the constant attention of
both.

"In short I was never treated with half the respect at Versailles in

16 He was tully as pleased with the fulsome compliments of those

my life."

whom he met at the Count's home.

Various gentlemen praised him for his great
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success in Holland and for having demonstrated that Americans "understood
negotiation as well as war."

Having been invited to take care of the war and

leave the negotiation to France on an earlier occasion, Adams discovered a
special appeal in these words.

However, the crowning encomium was, "Monsieur,

you are the Washington of the negotiation"--a compliment difficult to ex'17
ceed.
He was to hear it repeated by various persons throughout Paris in the
next days and each repetition thrilled him anew. 18
As generous as these praises were, however, they could hardly exceed
Adams' own estimate of the event to which they referred.

Barely six weeks

after the official presentation of his credentials in April, 1782, he wrote
to his confidant, Jenings:
I sometimes think that I shall die a martyr to the Dutch alliance,
and I declare to you, if it had been the only action of my life, I
should have thought it a life well spent. Such are my ideas of its
importance to the cause of our country. The influence of it may not
be soon perI~ived and may never appear in a striking light, but it
will exist.
From his beloved wife, he solicited both praise and sympathy.
The American cause has obtained a triumph in this country more signal
than it ever obtained before in Europe. It was attended with circumstances more glorious than could have been foreseen. • • • Your friend
will never have leisure, he will never have the patience to describe
the dangers, the mortifications, the distresses he had undergone in
accomplishing this great work. It is better that some of the opposition an~ointrigues he has had to encounter should be buried in oblivion.
When an admirer had a medal struck in commemoration, a pleased Adams assured
him that the influence of April 19 "upon France, Spain, Great Britain,
America, and all the neutral powers, has already been so great, and in the
21
future vicissitudes of things will be so much greater. 1t
Adams fully understood that any nation, to enjoy the full fruits of
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sovereignty, must be recognized as a sovereign nation by other countries.
It was to this end that he directed his struggle against "parties, factions,
and nations."

His first interest in the mynheers was expressly to make

America less dependent upon France, more able to speak in her own behalf.
This applied immediately to the financial assistance he hoped to procure but
in larger measure to the diplomatic status Dutch recognition must bestow on
the United States.

The alliance with France, although eminently fair and

even beneficent, bore more the marks of sponsorship than those of equality.
America, France, and all of Europe were aware of this pseudo-subordination.
Adams determined to change that.

He was also convinced that by the achieve-

ment of recognition on a basis of equality the thirteen states would cease to
be a pawn of European politics.

Then, once the peace was settled, England

and the powers of Europe would tlprefer our friendship to our enmitylf and
gladly refrain from drawing the new country into future wars.

"This," Adams

declared, "is the object of all my wishes and the end of all my politics.
To this end and for this reason I look upon my success in Holland as the
happiest event and the greatest action of my life past or future."

22

To an

old friend he confided:
Not the declaration of American independence, not the Massachusetts
Constitution, not the alliance with france, ever gave me more satisfaction or more pleasing prospects for our country than this event.
It is a pledge against friends and enemies. It is an eternal barrier against all dangers from the house of Bourbon as well as a
present security against England. Perhaps every imagination does 23
not rove into futurity as much as mine, nor care so much about it.
One of the qualifications which marked Adams as a statesman was his
ability to "rove into futurity" rather than to fasten his efforts to temporary contingencies.

Consequently, when Livingston directed that he work in
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"closest connection" with the French minister and "advise with him on great
24
leading objects." Adams natly disagreed. Never niggardly with words, he
devoted more than a thousand to the importance of insisting "upon seeing with
our own eyes, using our own judgment, and acting an independent part."

With

true wisdom he concluded, "It is of the last importance that we do it now thus
early, otherwise we should find it very difficult to do it hereafter.,,25
Having used his eyes, his judgment, and his independence in full measure according to his own prescription, he rejoiced in the result.

"I think

that no opportunity will present itself for a century to come, for striking
a stroke so critical and of so extensive importance in the political system
of America. • • • Its consequences will not be developed for centuries. • • •
A future war in Europe w11l show the importance of the American negotiations
in Holland. u26
Some of his contemporaries began to observe the results without awaiting the clarifying experience of a future war.

La

Fayette dryly remarked that

the Dutch were finally acknowledging American independence since the action
would "neither cost them blood nor money."

But he hastily drew Livingston's

attention to the fact that considerable political advantage would accrue to
the United States from the recognition. 27 Franklin noted that the English
stocks, which had been rising at the prospect of a separate peace with Holland,
.
28
fell immediately upon hearing of the Dutch recognition.
Even the news of
Rodney's victory over de Grasse and the French neet in the West Indies failed
to revive the faltering English credit.

Somewhat later Franklin cheerfully

passed on the news that the reputation of the United states seemed to be
rising in Europe.

As proof of this he cited the interest of Sweden in forming
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a treaty with the United States as soon as that between the Netherlands and
America was concluded and her intention of incorporating into her treaty such
improvements as the Dutch treaty might suggest. 29

Before the Swedish treaty

could be concluded, the war was over, but Adams was quick to note that the
government of Gustavus III had been the first to "invite" the United .states
to an alliance--a considerable switch from the militia style conquest required in The Hague. 3D

Shortly Denmark and then Portugal requested treaties

based on those between Congress and the States General. 3l
The exaltation with which he immediately favorably compared the Dutch
recognition to the Franco-American alliance bespoke not only a short term
complacency.

Nor was it solely a sigh of success at a long and tedious job

happily concluded--a reaction which would normally diminish with the passage
of time.

Throughout his life,

'~dams,

a man who had helped sculpture many of

the landmarks of American history, never faltered in his estimate of this
particular achievement.

~fter

years of public office were completed and he

could look back upon a rich and varied life, he wrote to an old collaborator.
"Whatever you may think; I know that, if ever my name deserved to be mentioned, from my birth, on the l~ of October, 1775

Li7327.

to this 29~ of May,

1814; it ought to have been noted in Holland in 1780, or 1781. or 1782.,,32
Interrogated bY:J.a correspondent as to the part he acted in public service,
Adams reiterated the policy which had led him to the Netherlands and which had
served as the

~~iding

principle of his activities there.

He had, he wrote,

pursued "an inflexible course of studies and labors, to promote, preserve, and
secure that independence of my country, which I early saw to be inevitable,
against all parties, factions, and nations that have shown themselves unfriendly to it.,,33

2~O

If a small addition to t1merican stature on the world scene or an increased probability that Europe would not so eagerly pull the new republic
into the next European upheaval had been the only results of Adams' activities,
his work would have merited acclaim.

But there were other benefits--diplomat-

ic and economic.
Diplomatically, the treaty with the Netherlands may have had some effeet in bringing the war to a close, and perba.ps--at least indirectly--in
securing a remarkably favorable treaty.

Of this Adams was convinced.

He

entertained no doubt that Holland would have succumbed to pressur~s from both
home and abroad and formed a separate peace with England if he and the Patriots had not consistently prevented it.

Early in 1781, when Dutch spirits

were at their lowest, he had produced his memorial, "that well-hove harpoon
iron thrown by a Cape Cod whaleman,lt and thereby furnished a badly-needed
rallying point.

In his eyes, only this memorial and other measures taken in

consequence of it had prevented England from a separate peace. 34

Forgiven

the natural exaggeration to which he was prone, his statement bore a strong
relation to truth. 35

Later, when recognition was accorded and a treaty be-

tween the two republics undertaken, Adams informed Congress that a treaty
with any country would have been as valuable to the American cause as a battle
or seige but a treaty with the Netherlands at that time was "of as much
weight in the war as the captivity of Burgoyne or Cornwallise,,36

Forty years

later he was still convinced that his negotiation with the Dutch was "the
event which ultimately turned the scale of the American Revolutionary War and
produced the Peace of 1783.,,37
In the course of time his opinion has been seconded by others.

Among
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his colleagues, both La Vauguyon and Thulemeyer generally agreed_

It was ob-

vious to them that The Hague's recognition of America would complicate any
program for reconciling the United Provinces with England, and La Vauguyon
added that England would be forced thereby to a general peace. 38
of

R~ssia,

Catherine

too, realized that chances of a separate mediation were seriously

injured by The Hague resolution. 39 To England the Dutch recognition of
American independence constituted a physical loss as it eliminated the last
hope of support from the continent.

It was also a moral loss as it threat-

ened the commercial hegemony of Britain and forewarned that nation of an approaching realignment in the balance of power.

40

The American plenipotentiary thought himself deserving not only of a
generous share of the credit for bringing the war to an end but of additional
merit for preserving his country from a wretched peace.

He reasoned that

"the House of Bourbon 50uld have beey so pressed for peace and we so dependent on them that we should have lost the western country and the fisheries
and very probably been left in a truce,

i~

state of poverty and weakness,

which would have made us long the miserable satellites of some great European
planet."41
rate.

His analysis of France's desperate straits was reasonably accu-

France was so pressed for peace that she most certainly would have

accepted terms much less generous to America than those which were finally
approved.

The favorable terms actually drawn cannot. however, be credited

chiefly to the Dutch negotiation.

A number of other factors. centering

around England's need for peace. her choice of negotiators, and the firmness
and unity with which the American commissioners negotiated, deserve a major
portion of the credit for the treaty.

42 Perhaps the most that could be said

282
for Adams' point of view was that the Dutch negotiation had given America a
firmer ground from which to bargain.

A second belligerent had acknowledged

independence and England would find it that much more difficul.t to grant less.
Dutch recognition and the treaty of amity and commerce between the two republics gave moral strength to America even as they siphoned it away from
Jijngland.

To the degree that these factors supported the American negotiators

and weakened the British position, the Dutch negotiation aided in securing a
generous treaty.
Economic4l1y speaking, Adams' success hi1s never been challenged.
Throughout his mission he was constantly reminded of the need to secure money
"which is almost the only thing wanting to render our affairs respectable at
home and abroad.,,43

The news of his reception brought an enjoinder to aC-

complish with all due haste the "one great object of your mission--the procuring a loan--which neither the probability or the conclusion of a peace will
render unnecessary."

44

\1hen the loan contract arrived for congressional rati-

fication, Livingston couched his congratulations in a plea that Adams "extend
every nerve to get it filled; for if the war continues it will be essential to
our exertions; if it should terminate, it will not be less necessary.,,45
Robert Morris, Secretary of Finance, also congratulated Adams on successfully
inaugurating a loan tlequally splendid and useful."

And he, too, remarked on

the great importance the loan would be to the country.

46

Unfortunately, after a very auspicious beginning, the loan gradually
lost momentum through the latter part of 1782 and much of 1783.

Adams had

expected this as he was all too aware that nearly every power in Europe, as
well as the local governments and the Indies Companies, were busily floating

loans and literally every available guilder was already destined for one loan
or the other. 47

In spite of the competition, Congress obtained a desperately-

needed $720,000 from the Netherlands in 1782 and an additionat ~584,oOO in
1783.

Although this equalled several times the entire financial support

granted by Spain, it amounted to less than one-half of the French aid for the
same two years.
quenee.

48

Under the circumstances, however. the sum was of conse-

Toward the end of 1782, as French funds for the year were running

low. Franklin requested Adams to pay the interest on the ten million livres
raised in Holland on behalf of America by the French 80vernment.49 M. Grand,
the French banker handling American funds, desired to transfer American funds
from Holland to pay drafts on Franklin.

Adams and his bankers rejected that

proposal but assumed the obligation to pay those notes which Franklin could
not. 50
After 1783 the French withdrew their assistance and only the Netherlands continued to lend to the Confederation government during the ensuing
years, the "critical period,It--a time of serious financial strains for the
new republic.
and 1783.

Dutch loans to the United States totaled $l,304,()OQ in 1782

During 1784 that sum was supplemented by an additional $1,395.000--

the importance of which to America can hardly be overestimated.

After 1784

the yearly amounts dropped appreciably before again climbing upward.

In 1785,

$53,600 was borrowed; 1786,&47,200; in 1787, $129,000; in 1788, $270,800,
and by 1789,

~}400,OOO

tracted by John Adams.

a year was procured in the Netherlands from loans con-

In all, the loans negotiated by Adams in the Nether-

lands, once he had secured the friendship of that nation, amounted to
$3,600,000 or roughly a sum equal to one-half of the total funds lent by
51
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It should be remarked that there was a difference in the spirit behind
the loans of the two countries.

France lent her money for political reasons;

the Netherlands lent hers only when American credit appeared to justify it.
The Dutch loans are significant in evidencing the beginning of a national
credit. 52

A number of factors and a number of individuals contributed--some

of them more than Adams--to the founding of a solid American financial system.
But in the Netherlands, where the loans were raised, no one did so much to
make the foundations of American credit known and understood as Adams.

To

him, therefore, must go not only the primary gratitude of his compatriots
for the money received from the Netherlands, but, since the Dutch were noted
for their financial acumen, the concomitantly enhanced credit rating throughout Europe.

That the loans he secured in the United Provinces were not

greater and that the credit of America was insufficient to overcome other
factors and thereby secure loans from other European countries were facts to
be deplored, but they could not in any way be laid to Adams' charge.
Obviously, therefore, America gained significantly in both the financial and the diplomatic spheres from her changed relations with the Dutch
republic.

Nevertheless, Adams frequently failed to receive full credit for

the part he played in promoting these improved relations.

He himself tersely

explained this phenomena as a design of the French and the English, and of
their friends in America, to ignore the importance of the Dutch negotiation
and, thereby, cause it to fall into oblivion. 53 A more accurate analysis
could well be that negotiations for the all-important treaty of peace followed so closely upon the Dutch negotiations that the latter tended to be lost
in the shadows.

Furthermore, the Netherlands was a small country which failed

to oome off a viotor in the treaty of 1783, and this failure prevented its
war diplomacy from receiving wide attention.
On the other hand, room existed for skeptioism regarding the primaoy
of Adams in securing the friendship of The Hague.

He certainly had no share

in the breaking of diplomatic ties between The Hague and London, nor in the
English declaration of war on the Dutoh.
well established in the Low Countries.

Tnese transpired before he was
It should also be noted that the

Dutch were very loathe to have any oommunication with him until the spring of

1782. By that time England apparently was not going to achieve an unqualified
sucoess, and daily it was beooming more olear that the Court of st. James
would be foroed to seek a negotiated peaoe.

Aware of this and aoutely mind-

ful of their dependence on trade for tbeir very existence, the Dutoh revised
their former

0001

attitude toward the Amerioan.

the Aohilles heel.

Francis Dana quickly spotted

He opined that the basis of sudden Dutoh zeal for

~~erioan

independence lay in the merchants' anxiety to form intimate commercial relations with America before England had the opportunity to readjust her commeroial connections.

Dana was so convinced of the importance of commeroe to

the Dutch that he believed the Netherlands, by the spring of 1782, would have
made serious efforts to establish good commercial relations with America even
if they had been "in profound peace with Britain,

{.8.n{l

even at the hazard of

a war. ,,54
There was a considerable amount of truth to Dana's refleotions.

This

was evidenced by the flurry of petitions from the merchant and oommeroial
classes which immediately preoeded Adams' reoeption.

On the other hand, the

Dutoh had little reason to doubt the commeroial advantages of a renewed
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alliance with England and the disadvantages of antagonizing the
Seas.

~1istress

of the

If there were powerful interests working for alignment with America,

there were powerful interests opposed to it.

In any event, ~ Hague left to

itself could have sought and perhaps found a means either to wait out a war
that seemed nearly over in order to re-establish her commerce or to contract
some form of trade relations with America short of acknowledgment and treaty.
That it did not was largely because The Hague was not left to itself.
A capable, energetic, pertinacious minister, whose presence had been neither
desired nor requested, had taken up residence in the country.
minister was John A.dams, 'the militia diplomat.
difference.

This unwelcome

His presence made a world of

vfuere circumstances may well have led the Dutch slowly along a

path of good will toward America, the goading of Adams propelled them rapidly
towar4 the extremity of that path. 55 To this effect he posted his own claim:
"In Holland, I had driven the English party and the stadho1der' s party before
me like clouds before the wind, and had brought that party to unite cordially
with America, France, and Spain against Eng1and.,,56
Evidence has supported Adams.

La Vauguyon directly applauded Adams

and remarked, "Honaieur, your firmness haa had a great effect here.,,5?

It

certainly was not French diplomacy that secured American recognition.

Ver-

gennes, who directed that diplomacy, firmly r.aintained almost to the eve of
recognition that the Provinces would never turn toward the United States until
the war was ended in order not to complicate their own quarrel with Eng1and. 58
Van der Cape1len observed that the Dutch people forced their government to
grant recognition and form treaties of amity and commerce. 59 Since the people
encompassed the merchant and commercial classes, this was true, but the strong
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propaganda war Adams waged to enlighten these people concerning America underlay their demands.

In the meantime a determined opposition concentrated on

thwarting Adams' efforts.

A reasonable conclusion was that drawn by Phillip

Mazzei who decided that success should bo attributed at least as much to
Adams' "prudent, wise, and indefatigable endeavors H as to favorable circumstances.

60

The minister's triumph marked the one great success of militia diplomacy.

In no other theater of Europe were the militia statesmen able to

achieve their goal.

To Adams alone was given the strategic combination of

personality, political acumen, and opportunity to overcome all the obstacles
in his path and to do so within the bounds of his instructions.

Militia

diplomats might practice a fine disregard of the wishes of the government to
which they were sent.

They did not advocate a disregard for the wishes of

their own government in so far as these could be observed.

Fortunately for

Adams, his actions had been circumscribed with very few limitations.

The

only one which seriously conflicted with his procedure was the directive not
to act without French approval, and that restriction arrived only after he
had done that which was prohibited.
As usual, his own words best portrayed his attitude toward the mission.
Although he had frequently extolled his own patience,

61 he was anxious that

the militia aspect of his work be preserved for posterity.

Upon learning

that a close friend, Mercy Warren, was authoring a history, he begged her to
celebrate his militia tactics rather than his patience.
I had rather you should immortalize my impudence, for I rather think
it was this quality, than the other which produced the effect in Holland. I entered into the Seven United Provinces with as much impudence
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as I should have appeared in the 13 United States of ~erica. • • •
If the word shocks you, Madam, call it modest assu~~nce, or honest
boldness, or almost what you will except patience.
.
/
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